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This study investigates the creation and evolution of an official U.S. Army physical 
culture between 1885 and 1958 built around systematic physical training. Facing “empty 
battlefields” wrought by new and improved weapons technology in the late nineteenth century, a 
few young officers advocated systematic physical training as a means of improving the Army’s 
manpower to meet the mounting physical and mental demands of combat. These advocates, most 
notably West Point’s Herman Koehler, drew on contemporary popular fitness culture and the 
professionalizing field of physical education to craft a new culture and associated system of 
exercise that has informed approaches to physical training in the U.S. Army ever since. Using 
archival sources, published training manuals, and professional journals serving military officers 
and physical educators, this study illuminates that original culture’s system of values, beliefs, 
and assumptions, then traces its change over time to 1958. This study finds that change primarily 
resulted from the influence of empowered institutional outsiders who applied cutting-edge 
physical education knowledge and expertise to orient the Army’s physical culture evermore on 
producing measurable physiological outcomes, especially after 1942. However, impulses driven 
by scientific rationalism existed alongside and interacted with relatively stable core values and 
beliefs, such as man’s central role in battle despite technological change, the Army’s role as a 
man-building agency, and definite connections between physical exercise, moral fiber, and 
mental strength. The Army’s physical culture also consistently existed at a nexus between 
intersecting concerns that influenced its development and motivated its deployment outside the 
Army into civilian society. Significant intersections included anxieties about American 
masculinity and fitness in an era of industrial war that demanded the deep mobilization of 
populations, and the changing relationship between man and machine in war. Beyond providing 
iv 
 
a rich description of the U.S. Army’s physical culture and training system as it evolved over the 
first half of the twentieth century, this study pioneers the investigation of martial physical culture 





 My Department Head at the U.S. Military Academy is fond of saying that a dissertation is 
a family project, especially if written while serving on the Academy’s faculty. My experience 
has borne out this insight. Out of necessity, research and writing has been shoehorned into late 
nights, lunch breaks, weekends, and family vacations for nearly three years. Many people 
sacrificed their time, shared their talents, and lent encouragement during these odds hours and 
over the long haul. Without this family support I would never have finished this manuscript. 
Appropriately, I get to meditate on that support during Thanksgiving weekend as I pull together 
the final draft of this dissertation. 
 Some of my “extended family” on this project may not even know that their names are 
going into print, but their contributions were vital nonetheless. For instance, several librarians 
and archivists helped me access obscure documents vital to my research and offered insights 
from their own areas of expertise. I think especially of Benjamin Gross of the Linda Hall 
Library, Mary Brutzloff of the Eisenhower Presidential Library, and Alicia Mauldin and Mark 
Danley of the USMA Special Collections and Library respectively. Three more of these 
collaborators went above and beyond the call of duty. Bethany Davis and David McCartney of 
the University of Iowa libraries graciously packaged and sent digitized copies of the Charles 
McCloy papers, saving me thousands of dollars and several days of leave. Similarly, Rebekka 
Bernotat of the Donovan Research Library sought out physical training conference reports from 
Fort Benning that I only suspected existed, located more reports that I did not know existed, and 
digitized the whole lot for me.  
 A small corps of readers and commentators at USMA formed a circle of more immediate 
family for me over the past three years. Cliff Rogers and Sam Watson, both brilliant historians 
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with whom I have had the great honor to work, read and commented on multiple drafts of the 
chapters in this project. Everything from my writing style and grammar to my argumentation and 
contextualization of physical training has benefitted from their insights, and I have personally 
found their friendship and mentorship to be invaluable. Members of my department’s informal 
junior faculty dissertation working group have also earned my gratitude. I thank especially Ben 
Brands, Jim Villanueva, Mark Askew, John Fahey, and Brendan Griswold for their feedback and 
support and for sharing their projects with me. I would also be remiss if I did not thank my boss, 
Colonel Bryan Gibby, whose encouragement and advice were vital. I doubt that I would have 
been able to sustain the hard work this project demanded had I not belonged to the culture of 
respect, excellence, and care he has cultivated in our division. 
 Nearing the inner-most circle of family, I thank also my committee members at the 
University of Kansas: Adrian Lewis, Jennifer Weber, Sheyda Jahanbani, and Beth Bailey. All are 
inspirations to me in the historian’s craft. Professor Lewis asked hard questions and kept me on 
track, always encouraging me to press forward. Professor Weber challenged me to be a better 
writer and more critical thinker. I have benefitted professionally from her mentorship as both an 
officer and historian. Professor Jahanbani offered her wisdom in the very earliest stages of this 
project as I struggled through my first graduate school writing seminar, probably without even 
realizing it. Finally, Professor Bailey’s insightful feedback, curiosity, and her expertise in 
exploring the interactions between the U.S. military and American society helped me take this 
dissertation to a new level. I am also deeply grateful to Professor Bailey for her positivity and 
encouragement of community among the graduate students in KU’s history department. 
 This final paragraph is reserved for those to whom I am most indebted—family members 
who made deep sacrifices to grow this project from the germ of an idea to a completed 
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dissertation. My father, Steve Gatzemeyer, listened to me when I was at a low-point and on the 
verge of folding. He encouraged me to pick myself up and drive on. He has also always provided 
a model of dependability and character that I find inspirational. Amy Gatzemeyer, my incredible 
wife, deserves an entire book to detail all of her contributions instead of these few sentences. She 
believed in my work from the beginning and never flagged in her support. She sacrificed time 
together, accepted the periods I was mentally or physically distant as a husband and father during 
the writing process, and actively sought ways to keep me energized, positive, rested, and 
encouraged. She patiently listened to me develop my ideas and contributed her own insights that 
have shaped my thoughts and arguments throughout the pages that follow. Finally, she also read 
every draft, which is a remarkable accomplishment. I look forward to returning Amy’s loving 
support as she pursues her own development as a yoga teacher. And last, but not least, I thank 
my beautiful children: Quenby Anne and Theodore Rex. They did not always understand why I 
had to seclude myself here or there to write, or why we had to go on family vacations to the 
archives, but they were always ready with a hug or word of encouragement to keep my spirits up. 
Like Amy, they sacrificed our time together to bring this dissertation to completion. It is to them 
that I dedicate this manuscript and this lesson I learned while writing—nearly anything is 
possible given planning, determination, dedication, and the support of those whom you love.  
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Introduction: Modern War, Modern Fitness 
War is physical. In combat, fortune favors the soldier in better condition. Superior 
conditioning enables troops to fight longer and harder, to move farther and faster, to carry 
heavier loads, and to endure greater physical hardship. These relative advantages can be the 
difference between life and death, victory and defeat. As the Prussian philosopher of war Carl 
von Clausewitz once observed, “War is the realm of physical exertion and suffering. These will 
destroy us unless we can make ourselves indifferent to them, and for this birth or training must 
provide us with a certain strength of body and soul.”1 So long as humans make war, this will be 
an enduring truth. Thus, physical training in some form has always been a part of the preparation 
for war. Western traditions typically locate the idealized origins of martial physical training, and 
the ideal male body type, in ancient Greece and Rome. Whether in the broader educational 
approach of the Athenians or the utilitarian version of the Spartans and Romans, physical 
training shaped bodies for war. The humanist impetus behind physical training faded in the 
medieval period, but warrior castes in feudal systems continued utilitarian physical training for 
combat. Though militaries in the early modern period had little need of individual warriors, 
elaborate drill regulations fitted soldiers’ bodies to a new sort of combat and battlefield. With 
nationalism came more widespread demands on citizenries for military service. Whole 
populations needed to be made healthy and strong in the name of war.2 
In the United States at the dawn of the twentieth century, war—as it always had—
demanded physical preparation. However, that training assumed a new character and increased 
importance. Its new character reflected a modern confidence in man’s ability to manipulate 
                                                 
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Indexed ed. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1989). 
2 Harold M. Barrow and Janie P. Brown, Man and Movement: Principles of Physical Education, 4th ed. 
(Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger, 1988), 66-74. 
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nature and society.3 Progressive educators such as John Dewey, and members of the new 
physical education profession such as Thomas Wood, Luther Gulick, and Clark Hetherington, 
endorsed an organic unity of mind and body. Learning a physical act was not just physical, they 
argued. Such learning was also mental and social. Play and exercise could develop the whole 
individual, even societies.4 Many military officers recognized the potential power of this new 
physical education philosophy. The rational application of modern, scientific training methods 
promised opportunities to shape both physical and non-physical qualities. Militaries around the 
world developed and promoted gymnastics systems and sport in order to take advantage of these 
opportunities. The U.S. military slowly followed suit, anxious about entering a competitive 
imperial world where embodied nations battled for survival in the framework of social 
Darwinism.5 
This study centers on the philosophies and practices behind U.S. Army efforts to shape 
soldiers’ bodies over more than two-thirds of a century beginning in the 1880s. Those 
philosophies and practices formed a physical culture, here defined as a constellation of ideas 
about the nature and value of fitness, and of the means by which one should achieve it. This 
definition draws on, but is distinct from, the physical culture phenomenon active in the period 
under study. This study’s cast of characters includes those actors most responsible for sculpting 
the bodies of current and future soldiers: Army officers and physical educators. Four questions 
drive the analysis. First, in whose interests were bodies shaped? Second, to what ends were they 
shaped? Third, how did the philosophy and practice of shaping those bodies change over time? 
                                                 
3 Michael Anton Budd, The Sculpture Machine: Physical Culture and Body Politics in the Age of Empire 
(New York: New York University Press, 1997), x. 
4 Barrow and Brown, Man and Movement: Principles of Physical Education, 83. 
5 Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-
American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 9-13. 
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Finally, how did the shaping of bodies contribute to projects of man-, soldier-, and citizen-
making? Because martial physical training advocates aspired to more than utilitarian benefits, the 
systems and practices they advocated open windows onto how they conceived of the future 
battlefield, the ideal soldier, the relationship between man and machine, and the nature of 
citizenship in America. In short, their exercise systems were cultural expressions.  
Understanding the nature and significance of those cultural expressions requires an 
understanding of the contexts in which they formed. The demands of modern war comprised 
their primary context and justified their creation. Martial physical training advocates imagined 
ideal soldiers needed to meet those demands, then tried to shape raw human material into those 
forms. Not everyone imagined war or the ideal soldier in the same way, but the battlefield’s basic 
emptiness comprised a commonality and thread of continuity in their imaginations. 
Paradoxically, individuals became more important on battlefields rendered apparently empty—
devoid of mass troop formations and the concomitant reassuring “elbow-touch”—by ever-more 
lethal weapons even as the individual soldier’s relative significance seemingly declined in 
inverse proportion to battle’s growing spatial and temporal scope. A fundamental orientation on 
combat, and the durable concentration on infantry combat specifically, should be borne in mind 
when considering the character of ideas and practices deployed later in other spaces.  
Science and technology also informed the emerging physical culture’s context. Advances 
in weapons technology created the empty battlefield and posed new questions about the 
relationship between man and machine in war. Smokeless powder, high explosive, recoilless 
carriages, small arms magazines, and more enabled the development of deadly new weapons, 
such as the machine gun and rapid-firing artillery pieces. Range, accuracy, rate of fire, and 
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lethality increased. So too did a defender’s ability to remain concealed.6 High volumes of 
accurate fire obliged men to disperse and hug the ground, which in turn posed serious challenges 
for command and control and for maintaining the impetus of an attack. Unit cohesion became 
more fragile without the steadying influence of tightly packed ranks.7 By 1914, these new 
technologies had, in the words of historian John Keegan, mechanized and industrialized the act 
of killing.8 
Leaders of modern armies had to find a way to attack despite the advantages of defense 
caused by the enormous increase in firepower. The strategic offensive needed success at the 
tactical level. Inspired by successful infantry assaults in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) and 
Balkan War (1912-13), European theorists argued frontal infantry attacks were still possible 
given proper support, the right attitude, and a willingness to accept casualties.9 Drawing on the 
writings of French theorist Ardant du Picq and others, military leaders stressed the moral element 
in war. These leaders perceived one of the basic keys to success to be the “spirit of the 
offensive,” as advocated by French general Joseph Joffre in 1911. What later became known as 
the “cult of the offensive” had adherents in America too.10  
 Emphasis on moral forces as a key to the offensive and victory amplified the human 
element’s importance in war. British Colonel Frederic Maude expressed the period’s dominant 
                                                 
6 For a synopsis of the "empty battlefield" phenomenon, see James J. Schneider, "The Theory of the Empty 
Battlefield," Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies Journal 132, no. 3 (1987). 
7 Michael Howard, "Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914," in Makers of Modern 
Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Pinceton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 510-11. 
8 John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: Penguin Books, 1978), 230. 
9 Howard, "Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914," 511-12, 17-18; Robert Citino, Quest 
for Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe, 1899-1940 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
2002), 132-41; Antulio J. Echevarria, "The 'Cult of the Offensive' Revisited: Confronting Technological Change 
before the Great War," Journal of Strategic Studies 25, no. 1 (2002): 205, 209; For an overview of the movement 
toward open-order tactics in this period, see John A. English, On Infantry, Rev. ed. (Westport: Praeger, 1994), 1-14; 
For more on American thought on this dilemma in the last half of the nineteenth-century, see Perry D. Jamieson, 
Crossing the Deadly Ground: United States Army Tactics, 1865-1899 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 
1994). 
10 Howard, "Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914," 515-21. 
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sentiment in his 1905 book on tactics in arguing that men would inevitably die in battle, so 
commanders should not shy away from casualties. Rather, nations and officers should train men 
to be self-sacrificing. “The true strength of an army,” he wrote, “lies essentially in the power of 
each, or any, of its constituent fractions to stand up to punishment, even to the verge of 
annihilation when necessary ….”11 Military theorists and leaders at the turn of the century 
believed that an army’s human element had to complement the power of new weapons 
technologies.12 Men required moral and muscle fiber to withstand the terrifying effects of 
devastating weapons while advancing in isolation from others, to bear increasingly heavy 
physical and psychic loads, and finally to close with and kill the enemy—sometimes by bayonet 
or bare hand. 
A broader cultural, political, social, and intellectual context informed and constrained the 
imaginations of those seeking to improve the Army’s human material, and the tools at their 
disposal. For instance, Social Darwinism and neo-Lamarkianism fixed attention on bodies and 
stressed race. Under these theories, physical appearance revealed internal qualities, and physical 
struggle shaped character or even strengthened offspring.13 At the turn of the century, concerns 
voiced mainly by white, male Americans about racial and masculine decline fueled intense 
anxieties.14 A medicalized discourse on the nation translated these concerns about individual 
                                                 
11 Frederic N. Maude, Notes on the Evolution of Infantry Tactics (London: William Clowes and Sons, 
Limited, 1905), x. 
12 Echevarria, "The 'Cult of the Offensive' Revisited: Confronting Technological Change before the Great 
War," 209. 
13 Gail Bederman, Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 
1880-1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 4-5, 78-79, 92-93; Christopher E. Forth, Masculinity in 
the Modern West: Gender, Civilization and the Body (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 142-45. 
14 For a succinct summary of the "crisis in masculinity," and a critique of its classification as a "crisis," see 
Bederman, Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917, 11-
15; for a deeper treatment of the crisis, see Forth, Masculinity in the Modern West: Gender, Civilization and the 
Body; for more on the specific American context of the crisis, see John F. Kasson, Houdini, Tarzan, and the Perfect 
Man: The White Male Body and the Challenge of Modernity in America (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001), 10-11. 
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men into worry over national strength and vigor. Men in Europe shared some of these general 
anxieties. One of them, a tactician whose writings were popular with American officers, 
despaired that the current cohort of “overcivilized” men would not be able to meet the modern 
battlefield’s rigors.15 But the “crisis in masculinity” also opened avenues for improving soldiers. 
If bodies could degenerate, they could also regenerate. A physical culture grew up in America 
around ideas that promoted sport and body building. With the right diet and exercise, men could 
cultivate proportions like Eugen Sandow, the world’s “perfect man.” If people could improve 
themselves, then the military might also engineer men’s bodies for martial purposes.16 Officers 
drew on the language and practices of existing physical culture in developing solutions to 
battlefield problems. An ongoing construction of masculinity informed that physical culture; so 
too did it inform the solutions developed for and within the U.S. Army. 
Efforts to sculpt bodies through physical training in the U.S. Army also reflected a desire 
for order, system, and control that resonated with similar desires expressed elsewhere in 
American society. Inventors, industrial scientists, engineers, and system builders applied these 
methods and values to the production of goods, and sometimes to other areas of social activity.17 
Progressive politicians and activists sought solutions to problems created by industrialization and 
urbanization. Often, those solutions oriented on order and control of people, environments, and 
                                                 
15 Wilhelm Balck, Tactics, trans. Walter Krueger, 4th ed., vol. 1 (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Cavalry 
Association, 1911), 194. 
16 Historians have thoroughly explored period beliefs in physical perfectibility, but they have rarely applied 
this concept to military training. For some literature on perfectibility, see James C. Whorton, Crusaders for Fitness: 
The History of American Health Reformers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 271-94; Joanna Bourke, 
Dismembering the Male: Men's Bodies, Britain and the Great War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 
171-74, 209; Kasson, Houdini, Tarzan, and the Perfect Man: The White Male Body and the Challenge of Modernity 
in America, 7, 29, 49; Roberta J. Park, "Healthy, Moral, and Strong: Educational Views of Exercise and Athletics in 
Nineteenth-Century America," in Fitness in American Culture: Images of Health, Sport, and the Body, 1830-1940, 
ed. Kathryn Grover (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1989), 123, 46-58. 
17 "Order, system, and control" comes from Thomas Parke Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of 
Invention and Technological Enthusiasm, 1870-1970 (New York: Viking, 1989), 4-5. 
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processes.18 Martial physical training also resonated with other movements applying scientific 
knowledge and methods, and occasionally pseudo-science such as eugenics, to improve the 
human body and thereby improve society. Nutritional science, which became popular in the first 
two decades of the twentieth century, is one example. Nutritionists revolutionized the way 
Americans approached eating by breaking food down into its component parts, such as calories 
and vitamins, and reimagining food as fuel. This approach theoretically enabled efficient and 
economic consumption, all while improving the health of individuals and the nation.19 Physical 
training advocates moralized exercise in much the same way as nutritionists moralized food 
consumption. 
Another important contextual factor is that in an age of nationalism and conscription, 
making soldiers and making citizens overlapped. All male citizens were potential soldiers. 
Military service seemed to some a way of inculcating discipline, health, and patriotism in the 
public. Soldiering could potentially be a means of elevating humanity, and certainly of bettering 
manhood. Physically fit, patriotic, and courageous soldiers could not be made in a few weeks of 
army training. Such soldiers were the products of a culture, a people, and a society. Politicians, 
educators, and Army leaders therefore also deployed the ideals and tools of martial physical 
training in spaces outside the military: schools, preparedness camps, paramilitary programs, 
debate forums, and more. Through these deployments, martial physical training abetted the 
efforts of elites seeking to define the nature of citizenship in terms of obligations, and to leverage 
military service as a positive good for society.  
                                                 
18 Michael McGerr, A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), xv-xvi; Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a 
Progressive Age (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998), 6-7, 45-52. 
19 Helen Zoe Veit, Modern Food, Moral Food: Self-Control, Science, and the Rise of Modern American 
Eating in the Early Twentieth Century (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 44-50. 
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Military leaders at the turn of the century began taking individual bodies more seriously. 
In part, this manifested in a growing embrace of sport that coincided with, even fueled, sport’s 
growing popularity in wider American culture.20 Too great a focus on sport obscures a persistent 
ambivalence toward sport in the Army’s approach to sculpting bodies, though. Army policy 
displayed a preference, beginning in 1914 with its first manual, for rational systems of exercise 
in the early physical education mold. In this model, the Army’s corporate body tended to eclipse 
the athlete’s. Discipline similarly tended to trump individual physical capacity. These tensions 
and priorities echoed contemporary discourses on mass production, standardization, and 
efficiency. They also point toward shifting relationships between man and machine, on and off 
the battlefield, operating on three levels: man as a machine, man as a component of a (fighting) 
machine, and man versus machine. 
Corporate and athlete bodies. Man and machine. These highlight a key tension in the 
development of an Army physical culture, and in the deployment of that culture outside the 
military. In every space, tensions between the community and the individual recurred. Early 
advocates identified this tension when seeking balance between physical training and athletic 
competition. Similarly, community-based physical training ideas used by Army leaders to make 
a case for universal military training struggled to gain traction with the public, especially when 
critics invoked individualism, personal liberty, and, later, the atomic battlefield.21 The Army’s 
physical culture supported an obligation-based model of citizenship that privileged certain 
bodies, namely those of healthy, white, military-aged males. The physical culture also often 
                                                 
20 Wanda Ellen Wakefield, Playing to Win: Sports and the American Military, 1898-1945 (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1997); Steven Pope, Patriotic Games: Sporting Traditions in the American 
Imagination, 1876-1926 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
21 John Sager, "Universal Military Training and the Struggle to Define American Identity During the Cold 
War," Federal History Journal, no. 5 (2013): 58-59. 
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framed the soldier and his body as interchangeable parts in a larger machine. These models did 
not always resonate well with a changing American society. 
This study’s significance is fourfold. First, exploring the Army’s contingent construction 
of physical training philosophy and practices opens windows to view the Army’s understanding 
of war and man’s role in it, and on slippage between the Army’s and wider society’s 
understanding of American citizenship. Second, this study historicizes perspectives in the Army 
on physical training and requirements. These are relevant topics in a time when policymakers 
and the public debate the role of women in the combat arms and worry over the poor physical 
condition of America’s youth. Third, this study investigates assumptions about what it means to 
make a soldier. Surprisingly little attention has been given to this topic. Between 1885 and 1958, 
soldier-making entwined with sculpting a body and making a man. In that era of extreme mens 
sana in corpore sano, shaping a body was thought to shape mind, spirit, and character too. Many 
of these beliefs are still with us today. The content of and philosophy behind the Army’s physical 
training program are therefore significant because they reveal much more than methods for 
strengthening muscles. Fourth, this study provides a rich description of the U.S. Army’s physical 
training system, culture, and infrastructure as it developed over the first half of the twentieth 
century. Ultimately, this study also opens the Army’s physical culture to evaluation. Between 
1885 and 1958, that culture proved sufficient for adapting men to modern war. However, its 
evolution also proved spasmodic owing to cultural inertia and repeated failures to sustain 
evolutionary progress in peacetime.  
 
 Captain James Pilcher once observed how much attention military historians had paid to 
revolutionary developments in weapons technology, or in his words the “apparatus of war.” He 
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contrasted that with how little attention had been paid to the “most important portion of the 
military matériel, the soldier himself.”22 Though Pilcher wrote those words in 1892, his musing 
could easily fit in today’s discourse on war, especially as a reaction against the technological 
determinism and triumphalism of the 1980s and 1990s.23 Following Pilcher’s lead, this study 
centers on the soldier’s body, the basic unit of combat power. Cultural analysis takes this study 
to surprising places because the import of sculpting a soldier’s body went well beyond the 
battlefield. This study addresses the existing historiography in two ways. First, it fills a gap 
similar to the one Pilcher identified. Army leaders were limited in their ability to sculpt the 
contours and character of a battlefield, but they could sculpt a man’s contours and character. The 
means leaders developed to do so reflected their understanding of the battlefield on which they 
would deploy bodies for combat. Second, this study investigates the rich connectedness between 
making men, soldiers, and citizens, especially in an era of warfare that demanded mass 
conscription. Historians have addressed each of these processes individually, and sometimes in 
pairs, but rarely all together. Physical training is a thread running through all three, just as its 
practice has linked the experiences of millions of soldiers since the late nineteenth century. 
Physical fitness has an undeniable effect on combat performance, yet historians have 
rarely addressed it in a sustained way. When fitness does appear, it is usually as a vaguely 
conceived factor in the outcome of a campaign or battle, or perhaps in the performance of a 
particular officer. Yet two recent works have put physical fitness front and center. James 
Campbell’s "The Army Isn't All Work": Physical Culture in the Evolution of the British Army, 
1860-1920 (2012) examines sport and physical training practices in the British Army. Whitfield 
East’s A Historical Review and Analysis of Army Physical Readiness Training and Assessment 
                                                 
22 James E. Pilcher, "The Building of the Soldier," The United Service 7, no. 4 (1892): 22. 
23 Jeremy Black, War and the Cultural Turn (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), viii-ix. 
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(2013) analyzes physical training practices throughout the U.S. Army’s entire history. Taken 
together, the books highlight crucial differences in the development of British and American 
martial physical cultures. The former evolved in a relatively coherent, linear form and was 
“inextricably tied” to the story of reform and modernization in the late Victorian and Edwardian 
Army.24 The latter evolved in a “sinusoidal pattern of surge and consolidation through multiple 
force mobilizations and times of peace.”25 British physical culture (and Campbell’s study) 
benefitted from a central proponent agency, the Army Gymnastic Staff. East shows that the 
creative sources of American physical training practices were more diffuse. Where Campbell 
moves outside the military to consider the reciprocal impact of British civilian and military 
physical cultures on one another, East limits his analysis to practices within the Army. East’s 
functional approach also masks the cultural aspects of those practices. 
 Historians of sport have been more sensitive to the larger implications of physical 
activity. Donald Mrozek, for instance, considers military sport in the context of wider American 
culture. He perceives a rising moral tone in sport at the turn of the century based on sport’s 
seeming social utility. In the military, this utility manifested in understanding the athletic field as 
a site for cultivating “primitive combativeness” and the “experience of victory.” Sports helped 
shape character and character improved combat effectiveness.26 This complex of beliefs is still 
alive and well in the Army’s culture. Wanda Wakefield charts the U.S. military’s embrace of 
sports and finds interconnectedness between war, sports, nationalism, and masculinity.27 Steven 
                                                 
24 James D. Campbell, "The Army Isn't All Work": Physical Culture in the Evolution of the British Army, 
1860-1920 (Burlington: Ashgate Pub. Co., 2012), 4. 
25 Whitfield B. East, A Historical Review and Analysis of Army Physical Readiness Training and 
Assessment (Ft. Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013), 197. 
26 Donald J. Mrozek, Sport and American Mentality, 1880-1910 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 
1983), xiv-xx, quotations on 46. 
27 Wakefield, Playing to Win: Sports and the American Military, 1898-1945, 137-40. 
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Pope goes a step farther in arguing that the military played an important role in forging an 
invented national sporting culture at the turn of the twentieth century.28 
 Sport was one means by which Army leaders sought to sculpt bodies, but too tight a 
focus on sport obscures the significance of systematic physical training, and the contingency in 
its adoption and development. Like sport, physical training reflected the ways in which Army 
leaders imagined the battlefield of the future and the soldier’s role on it. Like sport, physical 
training was a tool for shaping individuals. Unlike sport, physical training promised a more 
scientific, rational, and precise way of sculpting bodies in line with Progressive impulses, 
technological systems, and industrial engineering. Army leaders therefore invested more 
intention when crafting physical training systems than when enabling athletic competition. Army 
leaders thought and acted within a cultural context when developing those systems. Historians 
have filled out our understanding of that cultural context through studies of fitness and health 
trends, movements, and thought in America.29 Rarely have they addressed the linkages between 
the battlefield and gymnasium, though. This study traces those linkages, in the process 
demonstrating the two-way flow of ideas and practices between the military and civilian society. 
 Physical training connected more than the battlefield and gymnasium. Army leaders in 
the first half of the twentieth century claimed a role in three related projects: making men, 
making soldiers, and making citizens. Those projects converged on the male body. Army leaders 
therefore perceived the possibility of leveraging physical training as a positive tool to sculpt 
                                                 
28 Pope, Patriotic Games: Sporting Traditions in the American Imagination, 1876-1926, 15-17; see also 
"An Army of Athletes: Playing Fields, Battlefields, and the American Military Sporting Experience, 1890-1920," 
The Journal of Military History 59, no. 3 (1995): 435-37. 
29 Whorton, Crusaders for Fitness: The History of American Health Reformers; Harvey Green, Fit for 
America: Health, Fitness, Sport, and American Society (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986); Kathryn Grover, 
Fitness in American Culture: Images of Health, Sport, and the Body, 1830-1940 (Rochester: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1989); Shelly McKenzie, Getting Physical: The Rise of Fitness Culture in America (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2013). 
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people along ideal lines in all three categories. Scholars have addressed each project 
individually, and occasionally in pairs. For instance, a vast literature already exists on manhood 
and masculinity at the turn of the twentieth century.30 Many of those works specifically address 
the relationship between masculinity and war.31 Scholars have also thoroughly explored the 
relationship between soldiering and citizenship, including the relationship’s potential for 
generating militarization.32 Much less has been done to articulate just what it means to make an 
American soldier, or on the methods employed to do so. Christina Jarvis links all three projects 
in her book The Male Body at War, though only between the late Depression and the end of 
World War II.33 This study similarly links all three, but through analysis of a longer period 
grounded more in policy and practice than in discourse. Physical training hardened, toughened, 
and improved men’s bodies. Army leaders intended it to do the same for the body politic. To 
understand that approach’s varied effectiveness over time, we need to understand the 
fundamental connectedness between making men, soldiers, and citizens.    
                                                 
30 Works on masculinity that have most influenced this study include E. Anthony Rotundo, American 
Manhood: Transformations in Masculinity from the Revolution to the Modern Era (New York: Basic Books, 1993); 
Bederman, Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917; 
Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-
American Wars; Kasson, Houdini, Tarzan, and the Perfect Man: The White Male Body and the Challenge of 
Modernity in America; Michael S. Kimmel, The History of Men (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2005); John Pettegrew, Brutes in Suits: Male Sensibility in America, 1890-1920 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2007); Elliott J. Gorn, The Manly Art: Bare-Knuckle Prize Fighting in America, Updated ed. 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010). 
31 For a useful overview, see Robert A. Nye, "Western Masculinities in War and Peace," The American 
Historical Review 112, no. 2 (2007). 
32 For a concise introduction, see Eliot A. Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); This study primarily engages the citizen/soldier relationship through 
arguments for Universal Military Training. On that topic, see also Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. 
Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); 
Sager, "Universal Military Training and the Struggle to Define American Identity During the Cold War."; William 
A. Taylor, Every Citizen a Soldier: The Campaign for Universal Military Training after World War II (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2014). 
33 Christina S. Jarvis, The Male Body at War: American Masculinity During World War II (DeKalb: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 2004); Historian Rachel Moran's recent book complements Jarvis' work on 
federal efforts to shape citizens' bodies, although it deals less with the soldier-making project. See Rachel Louise 
Moran, Governing Bodies: American Politics and the Shaping of the Modern Physique (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2018). 
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For all its potential, physical culture is a new and shockingly under-studied pathway in 
military history. Exercise is ubiquitous in military life today, and even those unfamiliar with 
military matters tend to intuitively associate combat and physical fitness. Since the late 1960s, 
military historians have expanded the scope of military history while incorporating fresh 
methodologies in their investigations of subjects both old and new.34 Though this movement’s 
“new military history” moniker is of dubious value half a century later, the method of examining 
interfaces between war and society is still alive and well.35 Centering physical culture as an 
object of historical analysis fits within this conceptual framework. A military’s physical culture 
is itself an interface between war and society. Military physical cultures grow out of civilian 
society, but they are mediated through the demands of the battlefield as perceived by military 
leaders and institutions. By analyzing a military’s systems of exercise as cultural expressions, 
historians can find evidence of beliefs within a military organization and its society on topics as 
diverse as combat, soldier ideals, relationships between man and machine, race, gender, 
citizenship, and more. Because physical cultures also exist outside the military, the concept 
should likewise be of interest to the wider scholarly community. The ways people exercise, use 
their leisure time, and define fitness reveal other beliefs and values. Study of these issues, and 
especially of the interaction between civilian and military physical cultures, will enrich the ever-
expanding literatures on weight and physique culture, biopolitics, food and eating history, state 
development, federal policy-making, and more.  
 The sheer amount of work left to be done on the Army’s physical culture between 1885 
and 1958 alone suggests the enormous potential in physical culture studies generally. This 
                                                 
34 John Whiteclay Chambers, "The New Military History: Myth and Reality," The Journal of Military 
History 55, no. 3 (1991). 
35 Robert Citino, "Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction," The American Historical Review 
112, no. 4 (2007). 
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project primarily examines the official culture, one created by elite producers, as captured in 
articles, doctrine, and policy and propagated downward with varying degrees of effectiveness 
throughout the rest of the organization. However, much evidence exists to suggest that the 
official culture did not penetrate everywhere and not everyone bought in to it. Journal articles 
bemoaning an undue focus on field days at the turn of the century, reports of custom-made 
obstacle courses at Fort Belvoir in 1941, and complaints in the 1950s about the recreational tail 
wagging the conditioning dog after World War II all show that the Army’s official physical 
culture had competition. Future work might explore these sub-cultures and their divergence from 
the official culture. Historians may also find an examination of the physical cultures developing 
in other branches of the armed forces during the same period productive, especially in their 
interactions with the Army’s culture. Future work might also explore the lived experience of 
soldiers. Men toiling through the Army Dozen on parade grounds around the world may not have 
understood fitness or exercise in the same way as Koehler, Raycroft, Bank, McCloy, or other 
cultural producers. There is more of this story to be told beyond 1958 as well. East has broken 
much ground for future researchers in this area with his monograph A Historical Review and 
Analysis of Army Physical Readiness Training and Assessment. However, East does not venture 
much beyond tracing doctrine and policy development, so future researchers might usefully 
apply the concept of physical cultures to learn more about the U.S. Army’s development and its 
relationship to American society in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
This study takes a cultural history approach to exploring the creation and development of 
the U.S. Army’s physical training philosophies and practices in the first half of the twentieth 
century. Physical training policy, doctrine, and practice are loaded with meaning and both 
representative and constructive of values, assumptions, and beliefs widely held within the 
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Army.36 Together, these values, assumptions and beliefs constituted a physical culture, but they 
did not arise spontaneously. Rather, they emerged and developed in a specific context that was 
discursively constructed. Discourses about the decline of white manhood in the West, perfectible 
bodies, and the criticality of discipline, high morale, and resilience to victory in modern war 
created a perceived need for systematic exercise in the Army. These discourses also inclined the 
organization to embrace certain solutions, namely Herman Koehler’s Turner-based system. 
Activities included in that system came laden with meaning, and in practicing them members of 
the Army layered atop the exercises new and different meanings. The actual practice of physical 
training inculcated assumptions, values, and beliefs in participants. This made physical training a 
deployable tool for shaping people in ways beyond bodily strength and endurance. Thus, this 
study considers both the discourse on and practice of physical training in the period because both 
contributed to the Army physical culture’s development. 
Two more themes relevant to this study’s methodology bear mentioning: influence 
vectors and agency. First, external sources of influence dominated in the Army physical culture’s 
initial period of development. These external influences were resources upon which members of 
the Army could draw that both enabled and constrained their imaginations. After the core of the 
Army’s systematic training-based physical culture coalesced, it became a resource upon which 
individuals and organizations external to the Army could draw. Over time, influence increasingly 
moved in two directions. This study is sensitive to the changing magnitude and direction of 
influence as it relates to exercise and its meanings. Second, individual actors decisively shaped 
the Army physical culture’s character and path of development at various inflection points. This 
                                                 
36 This draws on historian Joan Burbick’s observation that “language about the body is saturated with 
culture.” Joan Burbick, Healing the Republic: The Language of Health and the Culture of Nationalism in 
Nineteenth-Century America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 3. 
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was not an abstract, amorphous culture that emerged solely from the accretion of popular thought 
and practice. Thus, this study acknowledges and highlights the tremendous influence of a select 
few people such as Herman Koehler, Joseph Raycroft, and Charles McCloy. 
Physical training philosophy and practice share a mutually influential relationship, so this 
study draws chiefly on two overlapping types of sources. First, it uses actual physical training 
practices within the Army. The Army first published standardized, universal training guidance in 
1914. Before that, many related systems published by several officers were in use. After 1914, 
doctrine began standardizing unit training practices. Published manuals supplemented by 
memoirs and articles in newspapers, periodicals, and professional journals enable a close study 
of the means employed to sculpt bodies. Except for East’s monograph on Army physical 
readiness training, no focused study of these practices exists.  
Second, this study uses the forums in which cultural producers proposed and debated 
practices to access the philosophy underlying and bound up in those practices. Professional 
journals are especially useful here. Within the military, key journals include the Journal of the 
Military Service Institute and the Infantry Journal (later Army). Journals serving the combat 
arms, especially the infantry, and the medical corps proved most sensitive to physical training 
issues. Outside the military, the American Physical Education Review (1896 - 1929) and its 
successors The Journal of Health and Physical Education (1930 - 1948) and the Journal of the 
American Association for Health, Physical Education, and Recreation (1949 - 1954) reveal 
discussions among physical educators. These professionals are important because they 
influenced the Army’s philosophies and practices, sometimes through direct and involvement, 
but often by helping set the intellectual and cultural context for military practice. Physical 
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educators also transmitted Army ideas and systems into wider American society, sometimes as 
promoters, sometimes as opponents. 
Many sources needed for this analysis are published. Most of the unpublished sources 
reside in three locations: The United States Military Academy (USMA), Princeton University’s 
library, and the National Archives. The USMA and its Department of Physical Education exerted 
an enormous influence on physical training philosophy and practice throughout most of the 
period under study. Historians have made little use of the Academy’s files on physical training, 
except in exploring sport at USMA. Princeton University’s library holds the papers of Dr. Joseph 
Raycroft, a Princeton faculty member and leader in the Commission on Training Camp Activities 
who played a deeply influential role in Army physical training during and after World War I. 
The National Archives hold files pertaining to wartime practices, physical training schools, 
Army boards responsible for writing and approving physical training policies, and extra-military 
spaces such as the Citizens’ Military Training Camps, Victory Corps, the post-World War II 
Universal Military Training initiative, and President Eisenhower’s President’s Council on Youth 
Fitness. 
 This project’s exploration of the official Army physical culture’s evolution over the first 
half of the twentieth century proceeds chronologically. The first chapter, “Bodies and 
Battlefields: Contextualizing Martial Fitness for Modern War,” argues that the Army’s physical 
culture developed as a response to specific battlefield concerns and within the context of 
contemporary American culture. This argument begins with an analysis of the tactical problems 
created by improved weapons technology before World War I and the solutions military theorists 
proposed. A key theme in most of these solutions was the improvement of an army’s and 
nation’s human material. Human improvement as a concept drew on popular fitness cultures, 
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evolutionary science and racial pseudo-science, and experimentalist philosophy then dominant in 
American society and scholarship. More generally, it also echoed impulses toward order, 
systems, control, and moralizing in Progressivism, industrial management, and technological 
development. From the beginning, the Army’s physical culture was about much more than a 
soldier’s simple physical efficiency. It was also about cultivating desirable qualities, especially 
discipline; promoting an idealized warrior masculinity; and improving the moral fiber of 
individuals and units. Chapter one situates the soldier’s body at the intersection between the 
battlefield, Progressive culture, physical education philosophy and pedagogy, and the 
components of the period’s “crisis in masculinity.” This chapter relies mainly on professional 
military and physical education journals, periodicals, physical training manuals published by 
Army officers, and secondary literature. 
 Chapter Two, “Origins of a U.S. Army Physical Culture, 1885-1916,” examines the 
construction of the Army’s first systems of exercise and the first deployments of the ideas bound 
up in those systems outside the military. This chapter shows how rational physical training 
philosophies, themselves cultural expressions, decisively shaped the Army’s physical culture. 
Also visible are the ways in which the Army’s physical culture began bending back and exerting 
influence on the larger societal context within which it formed. Debates inside the military about 
the nature of physical fitness, its value, and the best means for achieving come under analysis 
first. Exploration follows of the transnational roots of the Army’s physical culture, pre-World 
War I systems promoted by physical training advocates, and the parallel development of training 
systems at USMA. Politicians, physical educators, Army officers, and other elites deployed the 
Army’s emergent, systematic-training-based physical culture to support arguments about the 
need for improving American citizens’ bodies as a matter of national security in an age of 
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American imperialism. Ultimately, linkages between individual bodies and national security bore 
implications for the nature of American citizenship and for state reach. 
 Army practices return to the fore in chapter three, “The U.S. Army’s Battle of the 
Systems, 1914-1920.” Before World War I, West Point’s Master of the Sword, Herman Koehler, 
and his disciplinary gymnastics largely defined the physical training in the U.S. Army. In 1917, 
war demands called hundreds of civilian educators into service. Civilian physical training 
directors, most notably Dr. Joseph Raycroft, replaced Koehler as hegemonic culture producers 
until 1920. These civilians changed the character of Army physical training and redefined fitness 
along the lines of functional combat efficiency and introduced now-familiar concepts such as 
measurable fitness standards. An analysis of the competing training systems’ manuals and of 
contemporary discussion in professional military and physical education journals provide the 
foundation for this chapter. Changes in the Army’s physical culture during wartime and the 
durability of its core components in peace also come under analysis. This chapter also 
investigates how the Army’s physical conditioning philosophy and practice reflected cultural 
assumptions about the role of man in modern war and his place on the modern battlefield. 
Largely as a result of efforts made by Raycroft and his team of civilians to refresh the Army’s 
approach to mass physical training and supplement its means of delivering that training, the 
Army’s physical culture proved adequate for these challenges. 
 Chapter four, “Reversion, Disaggregation, and ‘Prehabilitation,’ 1919-1940” shifts 
attention to the influence of the Army’s physical culture on American society in the interwar 
years. This chapter chronicles changes in the Army’s physical culture in the interwar years, along 
with its deployment elsewhere in the project of shaping good citizens. Wholesale reversion to 
Koehler’s physical culture, which was the greatest change in the period, is explained as being the 
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result of cultural preference and the earlier system’s bureaucratic entrenchment. Other subjects 
for exploration include the debates about masculinized national health and analyzes the 
deployment of martial physical culture in practical and rhetorical ways to improve the body 
politic. Anxieties over national health, rooted in large draftee rejection rates during World War I 
and the Depression’s devastating physical, psychic, and moral toll, framed those debates. Finally, 
chapter four explores deployments of the U.S. Army’s physical culture’s in American society 
through the Civilian Military Training Camps (CMTC) and Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). 
Where the CMTC linked physical fitness with citizenship, the CCC also sculpted men’s bodies 
and helped remasculinize their public and self-images, often under the direction of Army leaders. 
 Much like chapter three, chapter five (“Physical Cultures for Total War, 1936-1946”) 
examines the development of the Army’s physical culture during wartime. As in World War I, 
Army physical training underwent intense change during the war. Remarkably, the Army almost 
totally failed to retain lessons learned during its WWI experience. As a result, the officers and 
civilians responsible for physical training had to rapidly re-learn how to prepare a mass conscript 
force for war. The culture’s emphasis returned to functional, combat-oriented training and its 
producers rediscovered standardized testing. Spurred by the need to draft an enormous army and 
by trends in civilian physical education, the Army’s physical culture increasingly recognized 
different body types and degrees of ability during the war years. Again, professional physical 
fitness educators and athletic coaches, such as Theodore Bank and Charles McCloy, pushed 
changes based on state-of-the-art thought in the physical education community. However, these 
civilians operated within military structures to a greater degree than had their WWI predecessors. 
Their empirical, data-driven approach to crafting a physical training system with performance 
standards came to be hailed as the “new physical training concept” by later cultural producers. 
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Additionally, the creation of the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC, later WAC) in 1942 
and publication of a WAC physical training manual in 1943 provides a unique opportunity to 
analyze the Army’s physical culture as a gendered construct. As in World War I, the Army’s 
physical culture proved adequate and adaptable between 1940 and 1945, even if cultural inertia 
and a failure to sustain growth in the interwar years unnecessarily complicated the culture’s 
evolution. 
 This study’s sixth and final chapter (“Hard Bodies for a Cold War: Conditioning and 
Prehabilitation, 1945-1958”) follows the Army’s physical culture into the early Cold War years 
when its producers re-evaluated the need for and nature of fitness on the battlefield of the future. 
As in the late nineteenth century, the real and imagined battlefield implications of technological 
advances converged with cultural anxieties over American masculinity and physical fitness. On 
one hand, nuclear weapons and technology suggested to some the likelihood of “push-button” 
war in which the soldier’s physical capacity barely factored. On the other, Korean War 
experiences and deep-rooted cultural convictions in the Army about the centrality of man in war 
suggested that physical training remained relevant, and that it might even be more necessary than 
ever. By 1958, the chief producers of the Army’s physical culture came down firmly in support 
of the latter camp and reaffirmed the basic tenets of the Army’s World War II-era physical 
culture. Fitness was not just a soldier’s concern in the 1950’s, though. Mass mobilization in 
World War II and the intense ideological struggle of the Cold War kept attention on civilian 
bodies and their training as well. Yet the acceptable and effective means by which the state could 
pursue the prehabilitation of its citizenry had changed considerably since the 1930s. This final 
chapter therefore also explores a series of federal efforts to enhance American fitness: the 
Victory Corps, proposals for Universal Military Training, and the President’s Council on Youth 
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Fitness. American social, cultural, and political posturing against militarism and totalitarianism 
combined with a popular understanding of citizenship in which obligations factored less and less 
to reduce the appeal of martial prehabilitation and increase federal reliance “advisory state” 
approaches. Analyzing arguments for and against these programs, and the character of the 
programs that were implemented, helps illuminate the relationship between the Army’s physical 
culture and wider American society. 
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Chapter 1: Bodies and Battlefields: Contextualizing Martial Fitness for Modern War 
Images of soldiers running, sweating, squatting, pushing, and pulling their way toward 
physical readiness are ubiquitous in the media and popular imagination today, so it may be 
surprising to learn that such activities have only officially and regularly been part of the U.S. 
soldier’s life since 1914.1 In that year, the U.S. Army published its Manual of Physical Training. 
This manual laid out for the first time in the Army’s history a comprehensive, professionally 
developed, uniform system of exercise designed to occupy a permanent position in the training 
of America’s soldiers. Major General Leonard Wood, then Chief of Staff of the Army, penned an 
introduction to this seminal document in which he asserted that “There is nothing in the 
education of the soldier of more vital importance than [physical training].”2 Wood’s words were 
undoubtedly genuine. The Chief of Staff was a famously active man, known especially as a 
companion of Theodore Roosevelt’s in the “strenuous life.” Hagiographies published about 
Wood in the lead-up to his 1920 presidential campaign invariably extolled his “magnificent 
health and robust physique” that resulted from making “part of the day’s work to keep the body 
in trim.”3 Yet this riding, rowing, and wrestling general officer was an abnormally avid physical 
culturist among his cohort of military leaders. Accordingly, his ideas on the importance of 
physical training were not universally held, especially among older officers. Wood’s confident 
assertions about physical training’s importance in 1914 should therefore also be read as an 
argument for a relatively new idea that still lacked total acceptance throughout the Army. Before 
                                                 
1 Modern U.S. Army physical training practices continue to evolve. The most recent doctrinal publication 
on physical training, Training Circular 3-22.20 dates to 2010. The current Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) 
consisting of a two-mile run and two minutes each of push-ups and sit-ups dates to 1980. Testing only became 
mandatory in 1963. As of this manuscript’s completion in late 2018, Army officials have revealed a new six-event, 
age- and gender-neutral physical fitness test set to take effect in 2020. 
2 War Department, Manual of Physical Training for Use in the United States Army (New York: Military 
Publishing Co., 1914), 3. 




1914, the place of formal exercise systems in American military training practice was not 
determined, as highlighted by Wood’s introduction to the 1914 manual. Physical training’s 
benefits had been of a “negligible quantity” in the past, Wood argued, “owing to the absence of 
any well-defined authorized method of procedure”; that absence created conditions that “lacked 
system and uniformity.”4 The Army’s implementation of systematic physical training had indeed 
been haphazard and belated in relation to European militaries, and even to wider American 
society.5 In contrast with the boom in American interest in physical training immediately 
following the Civil War, efforts to incorporate physical training into standard Army practice did 
not gain traction until the 1880s and 1890s. 
Understanding the system that emerged in 1914, and the patterns and dynamics in Army 
physical training philosophy and practice thereafter, requires an understanding of the broader 
context in which advocates conceived that system. At the turn of the century, social, intellectual, 
and cultural anxieties intersected with struggles to understand and prepare for combat on new 
battlefields rendered more dangerous and demanding than ever by technological developments. 
Physical training seemed to be a means by which to address all of these problems. Emerging 
physical training thought and practice inside the Army also corresponded with a simultaneous 
professionalization movement among physical educators. This chapter contextualizes the 
perceived need for, and form of, Army physical training in its earliest years.  
 That context begins with a set of social, intellectual, and cultural concerns that gripped 
Americans in the latter decades of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth. 
                                                 
4 War Department, Manual of Physical Training for Use in the United States Army, 3. 
5 This was true even at the U.S. Military Academy. USMA introduced its first comprehensive program in 
1859, but it was abandoned during the Civil War. Physical training did not return in a comprehensive way until the 
late 1870s. Whitfield B. East, A Historical Review and Analysis of Army Physical Readiness Training and 
Assessment (Ft. Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013), 28-31. 
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These interlocking concerns produced a broad anxiety about the nation’s human material. 
Speaking generally, this anxiety manifested in fears of degeneration and a loss of American 
virility and vitality. In a world often conceived of in terms of social Darwinism, the degeneration 
of a nation’s human material was a critical problem, perhaps even an existential one. Of 
America’s declining human material, men’s bodies composed the most important portion. As 
historian Kristin Hoganson observes, Americans believed the health of the nation and the 
political system depended on the robustness of its men and their “manly character.”6 
Examination of the broader anxiety’s basic parts and their interactions helps explain this 
proposition, the problems it posed for Americans generally, and the problems it posed for the 
U.S. Army specifically. This anxiety over the nation’s human resources is especially interesting 
because it remains with us today, even if it manifests somewhat differently. Contemporary 
concerns about high obesity rates, the national security implications of those rates, and the 
billions of dollars Americans spend annually on diets and exercise all signal the enduring 
relevance of the body politic’s fitness.  
American men, and Western men in general, struggled to navigate a gender geography in 
flux in the late nineteenth century. The crisis was especially acute in white middle class America. 
The sources of this crisis were many, but class and economic issues were crucial. To a middle-
class Victorian of the mid-nineteenth century, “manliness” had meant self-restraint, character, 
and a good work ethic. To these qualities, the American Civil War added military service and 
combat experience. This was the era of the “self-made man.”7 In many ways, industrialization, 
corporations, management systems, depressions, and made the achievement of Victorian 
                                                 
6 Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-
American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 3. 
7 E. Anthony Rotundo, "Body and Soul: Changing Ideals of American Middle-Class Manhood, 1770-
1920," Journal of Social History 16, no. 4 (1983): 25-26. 
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manliness very difficult for many men. Fewer men were self-employed, more were trapped in 
sedentary clerical jobs, opportunities to prove oneself in war grew rare, and hard work and 
restraint did not insulate men against the effects of market failures beyond their control. 
Industrialization changed the nature of other jobs too by mechanizing production, seemingly 
integrating workers as pieces of a larger machine and sometimes relying less on male 
physicality. This transition, made especially visible in Frederick Taylor’s time-and-motion 
studies, eroded men’s ownership of their own time and labor. Meanwhile, urbanization packed 
Americans into less healthy environments. Men living in these conditions faced more 
competition for fewer prizes, along with less opportunity for self-mastery and independence in 
the workplace.8 Meanwhile, the western frontier’s closure, once a man-making space at the 
border between primitiveness and civilization, denied men their classic option for regeneration.9 
Even as middle-class men struggled to make themselves in a changing economy, many 
perceived threats from women suggested a “feminization” of modern man and of America. 
Women, it seemed, encroached everywhere in the traditional male sphere. Women increasingly 
entered the once male-exclusive working world in the late nineteenth century, denying men 
many workplaces as all-male preserves.10 More and more, women workers provided new 
competition for men, and men in most workplaces had to modify standards of behavior to 
account for women. Woman suffrage movements and other forms of political involvement, 
contemporaries argued, also denied men exclusive claims in the realm of politics.11 Even as it 
                                                 
8 Ibid., American Manhood: Transformations in Masculinity from the Revolution to the Modern Era (New 
York: Basic Books, 1993), 248-50. 
9 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (New York: Henry Holt, 1920), 2-4; Michael 
S. Kimmel, Manhood in America: A Cultural History, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 87-89. 
10 Kimmel, Manhood in America: A Cultural History, 87. 
11 Simultaneous threats came from working-class men and immigrants when political machines leveraged 
these populations' latent political power. See Gail Bederman, Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of 
Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 12-14; Kimmel, 
Manhood in America: A Cultural History, 82-83. 
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seemed that men’s purview was shrinking, increasingly fewer men could claim political and 
social power on the grounds of military service in an era when men lacked a major war in which 
to “prove” themselves, unlike their Civil War-veteran fathers and grandfathers.12 
Beyond politics and the workplace, changes in child-rearing and family life fanned fears 
of feminization. Economic changes relocated most men’s place of work from the home to a more 
distant office or factory, so men spent less time in their roles as fathers and male models. The 
bonds between mothers and their children, and especially with their sons, grew simultaneously.13 
Also, fewer male role models were available to American boys because women increasingly 
dominated the teaching profession. Men feared that women’s growing control over the 
development of male children, and the consequent “regime of sugary benignity,” would produce 
a generation of spoiled, physically weak, and morally suspect men.14 The period’s rising 
consumer culture and its “ethos of pleasure and frivolity,” in the words of historian Gail 
Bederman, further amplified an obsession widely held by American men with “softening.”15  
Fears shared by many white middle-class men about feminization manifested in another, 
related concern: “overcivilization.” Fast living, feminization, and fewer opportunities for self-
making threatened to make men too soft, too refined. In response, white middle-class men in the 
late nineteenth century increasingly celebrated the primitive. This strategy served a social and 
cultural purpose by defining distinctly masculine virtues as vital to the nation’s vitality.16 
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However, according to historian Gail Berderman “civilization” also had a racial meaning at the 
time. In this formulation, civilization was a stage of development beyond savagery or 
“barbarism.” Anglo-Saxons had achieved their advanced status as a civilized people through a 
long Darwinian struggle.17 Overcivilization’s chief threat in this sense was that soft men made 
for a soft race, a race unworthy of the evolutionary ladder’s top position. Industrialization, 
urbanization, and the frontier’s closure denied men traditional sources of struggle and hardening, 
demanding that new spaces be found and new methods developed. 
By the turn of the century, many white men, especially those of the middle-class, began 
defining manhood bodily in response to this complex of anxieties. In this corporeal 
configuration, an unstable, performative “masculinity” increasingly displaced the earlier inward-
focused ideal of a self-made man.18 More and more, proving one’s masculinity demanded 
constant effort and visible proof. The earlier ideal of a self-made man had acquired a physical 
element by the late 1870s as an outward manifestation of inner strength. However, by the turn-
of-the-century men tended to view physicality as an end to be pursued rather than as a natural 
byproduct of proper manhood. Men may have doubted the possibility of achieving their 
forefather’s manly virtues, but through gymnasium work they could at least produce the 
appearance of a virtuous inner life.19 In the best-case scenario, such work might even strengthen 
morals as it strengthened muscles. 
An irony of the turn toward a more bodily-centered masculinity was that American men 
simultaneously grew more anxious about their bodies and physical capacities. Men viewed as 
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increasingly effeminate, overcivilized, and living soft lives in mentally over-stimulating modern 
society seemed prone to breaking. Americans quickly invented a medical diagnosis for this 
culturally based fear: neurasthenia. Though the idea of nervous disease had been discussed since 
at least the 1830s, it became well-defined as an important problem, even a “near epidemic,” in 
the 1880s after the publication of George Beard’s book American Nervousness.20 Beard defined 
nervousness not as a mental illness or an excess of emotion, but simply “nervelessness—a lack 
of nerve force.” Extreme nervousness led to neurasthenia, or “nervous exhaustion.”21 Beard 
employed bank account and battery metaphors to explain the condition. Some people were 
blessed with large accounts or batteries (reserves of nerve energy), and others made due with 
little. In either case, drawing too much on those accounts or batteries led to bankruptcy or 
depletion. Nervousness manifested in a wide range of symptoms ranging from dyspepsia and 
fatigue to premature baldness.22 Its appearance nearly everywhere in America should therefore, 
according to Beard, not be surprising. 
Beard chiefly blamed modern civilization for American’s susceptibility to nervous 
exhaustion in the late nineteenth century.23 He argued that constant activity brought on by steam 
power, the telegraph, the periodical press, social institutions, and the “indulgence of appetites 
and passions” overstimulated men, especially “brain workers.”24 At the same time, men’s 
physical activity decreased both due to economic changes that required less manual labor and to 
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increasing culture and refinement. Confronted with constant overstimulation, these weakening 
bodies possessed smaller reserves of nerve energy. Beard saw the signs of this pernicious 
problem everywhere, even in the American man’s reduced capacity to hold his liquor, as 
evidenced by his poor “bottle-power” in comparison to an English man.25 Neurasthenia was, 
however, not only a problem but also something of a badge of distinction because only the most 
civilized peoples (a concept freighted with cultural and racial meaning) were susceptible to its 
force. Neurasthenia did not seem to afflict more “primitive” peoples, those whose passionate and 
powerful manhood, according to Beard, both strengthened bodies and disqualified them for 
civilization.26 Beard’s solution was not to throw out civilization, but rather to leverage its tools to 
develop new technologies and social customs productive of “strength and vigor.”27  
Yet embedded in the neurasthenia concept was a potential solution. If bodies could 
degenerate, they could also regenerate. Methods designed to encourage regeneration varied 
widely and came from multiple sources. One of the more famous proposals came from G. 
Stanley Hall, an American educator and vocal expert on psychology and pedagogy. He argued 
beginning in the late 1880s that educators could utilize “recapitulation” to help American boys. 
Hall’s recapitulation theory presumed an evolutionary ladder up which human races could 
progress. Anglo-Saxons had supposedly reached the top rungs, but the modern world denied 
them the chance to experience the highly physical and passionate earlier stages. Anglo-Saxons 
therefore grew up intelligent, but lacking in passion and power, making them susceptible to 
neurasthenia. Hall proposed encouraging “primitivism” and “savagery” in young boys by 
allowing misbehavior, reading bloody stories, and even fighting in controlled environments. This 
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process supposedly molded boys into men while inoculating them against the degenerative forces 
of modern civilization.28 
More visible signs of regeneration efforts appeared in America’s late-nineteenth and 
early twentieth-century physical culture. This culture, in line with the period’s bodily focused 
masculinity, promoted sport, health remedies, body building, and more. With the right diet and 
exercise, men could cultivate proportions like Eugen Sandow, the world’s “perfect man.”29 
Americans could harness science and hard work engineer their bodies so as to appear strong and 
vital, and in the process cultivate those same qualities. The idea was not to turn back the clock to 
an idealized earlier time, but to leverage modernity’s tools to fashion new ways of fitting 
civilized men to a new time. 
Biological thought translated these broad cultural anxieties spurred by economic, social, 
geographic, and political change into a national crisis. Although Charles Darwin’s 1859 book 
The Origin of Species made no attempt to apply evolution to explain the behavior of people or 
groups, many Americans and Europeans did just that from the 1870s to the early twentieth 
century. Social sciences and politics informed by biological concepts framed global politics as a 
struggle for survival in a world ruled by the iron law of natural selection.30 National survival in 
such a world depended simply on strength, the definition of which contained racial and gender 
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components. American power therefore depended upon the strength of white American men—
the exact population whose masculinity the modern world seemed to threaten most.31 War thus 
held a paradoxical significance in late-nineteenth-century American thought. On one hand, war 
posed a threat to national survival if American manhood was indeed weakening. This was 
especially true given the likelihood of massive conscription in the imagined wars of the future 
because a broad swath of the male population needed to be fit to fight. On the other hand, war 
could also be a vehicle for toughening the latest generation of American men, who were denied 
both a frontier and their forefathers’ crucible of combat. In either case, biological thought 
heightened the national significance of strong male bodies.  
 Doubts about the strength, character, toughness, and vigor of American men were of 
particular concern to many young officers in the U.S. Army because those doubts coincided with 
specific military concerns over the changing nature of combat developing simultaneously. Such 
change owed chiefly to advances in weapons technology such as smokeless powder, high 
explosive, rifling, small arms magazine loading systems, and quick-firing systems for artillery. 
Taken together, these advances increased the range and lethality of artillery pieces and made the 
ordinary infantryman a much deadlier combatant. Equipped with a small caliber, breech-loading, 
magazine-fed rifle, the infantryman of the late nineteenth century could carry more ammunition 
and achieve a higher rate of fire with greater accuracy than could his predecessor of just a few 
decades. An infantryman could do this all from the prone position, or within field fortifications, 
which enhanced his chances of survival. So long as he remained immobile, smokeless powder 
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rendered him practically invisible. In short, modern small arms and artillery ushered the earlier 
age’s densely packed ranks of colorfully uniformed troops into a deadly obsolescence.32 
 Battlefields changed along with combat. New weapons and technologies imposed a new 
tactical geometry. Rifling, high explosives, and smokeless powder extended the effective range 
of small arms and artillery. As ranges grew, so too did the lethal zone before defensive positions 
that attackers had to cross. Longer distances increased the time troops in an assault spent exposed 
to fire, which also increased the period of time over which morale deteriorated. Defenders using 
rapid-firing weaponry generated volumes of firepower equal or superior to that generated by 
much larger units in earlier eras, but with fewer soldiers. Troop densities on typical battlefields 
thus plummeted, falling from one man per 257 square meters during the American Civil War to 
one per 2,457 in World War I.33 For attacking soldiers, survival on this ever-more-lethal 
battlefield depended on dispersion. But while spreading out and seeking cover may have 
preserved lives, it also damaged morale by denying soldiers the support and mutual observation 
of their comrades. Dispersal also limited leaders’ ability to control units and sustain the 
momentum of an attack. With friend and foe alike invisible, individual soldiers found themselves 
isolated, vulnerable, and rooted in place. Additionally, the effects of these munitions on the 
human body yielded increased physical, mental, and emotional trauma, placing even greater 
demands on the body than in earlier eras. 
 Military leaders and theoreticians in the latter third of the nineteenth century were keenly 
aware of the challenges posed by these new weapons technologies and battlefield modifications. 
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Indeed, the limitations on offensive maneuver at the tactical level became the “tactical problem 
of the day” in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1).34 Some theoreticians argued 
that the defense’s superiority was so great as to be insurmountable, at least in the near term. Jan 
Bloch is the best-known representative of this school. In his book Is War Now Impossible? and 
his earlier multi-volume study, Bloch argued that the defensive superiority generated by new 
weapons technologies would yield a bloody stalemate on a vast battlefield. Victory in such a war 
hinged on exhausting the enemy’s economic resources and reserves of will. In Bloch’s 
formulation, the use of force had little utility in national policy. 
 The argument advanced by Bloch and other like-minded theoreticians never earned a 
place in the period’s mainstream of military thought. Military leaders simply could not accept 
such a hopeless future. Successful offensive strategies depended upon an army’s ability to 
succeed on the tactical offensive, at least sometimes. Dominant Napoleonic and Prussian models 
guided the thoughts of most European and American theoreticians in the late-nineteenth century. 
The Napoleonic and Prussian models demanded aggressive action to achieve conclusive results. 
The alternative, theoreticians argued, was passivity and a return to the indecisive wars of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.35 The battlefield may have become deadlier, but to most 
military thinkers this was just another surmountable obstacle. No complete consensus on the best 
solution to the new battlefield’s tactical problems emerged, but a dominant intellectual position 
formed between 1870 and 1914. Some historians have labeled this position the “cult of the 
offensive,” though the term is misleading because it characterizes turn-of-the-century military 
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leaders as irrational, self-defeating, and ignorant.36 Military leaders and theorists were not 
ignorant or irrational. Rather, they were trying to solve massive problems with the material, 
intellectual, and cultural resources at hand, and some were unfortunately slow learners. 
The solutions these theorists proposed derived generally from two propositions. First, 
theorists argued that weapons technology benefitted the attacker as much as the defender. 
Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, an influential British military theorist at the turn of the century, 
advanced ideas typical of this position: “Neither smokeless powder nor the magazine rifle will 
necessitate any radical change. If the defence has gained, as has been asserted, by these 
innovations, the plunging fire of rifled howitzers will add a more than proportional strength to 
the attack.”37 Simply put, the advantages accruing to the offense and defense through 
technological innovation canceled each other out. Second, theorists turned to a constant in war: 
man. Henderson made this argument too. Magazine rifles and other innovations “introduced a 
new and formidable element into battle,” he wrote, but “the moral element still remains the same. 
Weapons improve, but human nature remains the same.”38  
Moral forces run as the key thread in turn-of-the-century military literature.39 Depending 
upon context, the concept held two closely related meanings. Moral forces referred to a wide 
range of intangibles, including morale, the feeling of confidence present in a force, skill, training, 
resilience, judgment, or the “inherent strength of [an army’s] national character.”40 Moral forces 
did not represent a new idea in military literature. Clausewitz emphasized them in his writing, for 
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instance, and many authors before him paid moral force close attention too. However, these 
forces assumed a marked prominence in the late nineteenth century following from the 
technology-imposed tactical stalemate that Bloch predicted and many feared. Victory in battle 
inclines to the side capable of generating greater combat power at the decisive point. Combat 
power derives from troop numbers, force capabilities such as firepower and mobility, and 
intangible moral factors. If theoreticians were correct in asserting that technological innovations 
offset one another, then moral forces could provide the crucial relative advantage victory 
demanded. 
The writings of French Colonel Charles Ardant du Picq epitomize the turn-of-the-century 
military thought that awarded moral forces the key role in battlefield victory. Ardant du Picq, 
whose service as an infantry officer began in 1844, recognized the changes new weapons 
technology wrought on the battlefield. However, Ardant du Picq rejected technology as the key 
determinant in battle. Instead, he emphasized man. Based upon his study of ancient battle and his 
modern experience, Ardant du Picq argued that “in battle, two moral forces, even more than two 
material forces, are in conflict. The stronger conquers.”41 Ardant du Picq did not believe those 
moral forces came from destructive power. Instead, moral forces derived from confidence, 
resolution, and “threatening power” in the form of fresh reserves or forces on the enemy’s flank 
or in his rear.42 Men needed to be made strong in order to project moral force against the enemy, 
and to resist the terror and fear inherent in combat. Ardant du Picq advanced several methods to 
improve an army’s moral force, but discipline was his central theme. Ardant du Picq defined 
discipline as a “state of mind” and a “social institution” built over time that “made men fight in 
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spite of themselves.”43 Nations and armies needed to find new means by which to instill 
discipline, and thereby attain superior moral force.  
A Prussian artillery shell fired near Metz in August 1870 cut short Ardant du Picq’s 
career as a military theorist. His book, Battle Studies, was published posthumously and achieved 
wide readership and influence in the French military with its second edition in 1903.44 Ardant du 
Picq’s writing resonated with the pre-1914 generation of military officers who were preoccupied 
with similar tactical problems. Battle Studies did not decisively impact military thought before 
1903, but Ardant du Picq’s work was representative of a broader, transnational trend in military 
thought at the dawn of the twentieth century. Just as in France, most military theorists in Britain, 
Germany, the United States, and elsewhere promoted moral forces as essential to victory on the 
modern battlefield.45 
Military thinkers could draw on more than abstract theory to support their conclusions 
about tactics and moral forces. Wars fought by European powers between 1870 and 1914 
furnished practical experience open to interpretation. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 
that claimed Ardant du Picq’s life provided the first major data point. French and Prussian forces 
employed similar weapons technology and tactics, though the extended order’s value remained 
open to question. Prussian officer Major Wilhelm von Sherff, writing from experience in the 
Franco-Prussian War, highlighted the debate between “new” and “old” tactics. Sherff and 
likeminded military men argued that rifling required forces on the offensive to adopt an extended 
or “individual” order or else suffer catastrophic losses, but that new weapons also enabled loose 
formations to achieve a sufficiently high rate and volume of fire at a given point to triumph over 
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a more tightly packed opponent. For Sherff and others like him, the offensive was still alive and 
preferable.46 Armies needed “new” tactics to make the offensive work, and those tactics hinged 
on improving individual soldiers through training in order to offset the psychological penalties of 
the empty battlefield. Furthermore, if French and Prussian forces were fairly evenly matched in 
terms of technology and tactics, then perhaps men were the determining factor. 
Not everyone agreed with the conclusions Sherff and others drew from the Franco-
Prussian War. Advocates of what Sherff termed “old” tactics defended the continued relevance 
of close order on the basis of moral forces. Only in close-order and under the control of leaders, 
advocates argued, could men face the terror of battle and still advance. However, close order did 
not mean quite the same thing by the late nineteenth century as it did in the Napoleonic wars, or 
in the American Civil War. Where the old basic unit had been the battalion or even regiment, the 
basic unit in later close-order systems was the platoon or company. These smaller formations 
allowed for greater flexibility in employment and would have been well-spaced on the 
battlefield. In such a system, close order did not mean marching toward the enemy shoulder-to-
shoulder, but advancing in longer, thinner lines at a quick walk or run while making use of 
available cover.47 
The British experience in the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) challenged the old close 
order orthodoxy, even in its updated form. On the veldt, hidden Boer defenders decimated 
British formations that advanced in tight formations and relied on cold steel. British Colonel G. 
F. R. Henderson, who observed part of the campaign and had earlier argued that new 
technologies benefitted the offense and defense equally, responded to continental criticism of the 
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British army by pointing out that “the flat trajectory of the small-bore rifle, together with the 
invisibility of the man who uses it, has wrought a complete revolution in the art of fighting 
battles.”48 Henderson insisted that infantry now had to attack in successive lines of skirmishers in 
an extended order. Henderson observed that troops in close order might achieve a local 
numerical superiority, but he argued that those formations would take enormous losses that 
would likely undermine the close-order formation’s moral power.49 As a result of the British 
experience in South Africa, contemporary military thought swung toward open-order formations 
as the solution to the old problem of crossing the deadly zone, a zone which continued expanding 
due to progressive improvements in weapons technology. 
Infantry actions in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) stalled, then reversed the Boer 
War-induced swing toward skirmishing. Western military theorists and leaders could dismiss the 
Anglo-Boer War as abnormal, or as a brawl between an army geared for colonial warfare and an 
irregular opponent. In contrast, the Russo-Japanese War pitted two modern militaries equipped 
with modern weaponry against one another. Even if the Japanese were considered racial 
inferiors, their German-provided training and largely Westernized military practices made them 
near-peer competitors in the eyes of most European military thinkers. The ensuing combat 
closely approximated the future of battle many theorists had earlier envisioned.50 Military leaders 
seeking the offense’s continued viability found much on Manchuria’s and Korea’s battlefields to 
support their theories. The Japanese army in particular furnished examples of successful infantry 
assaults on entrenched positions. Artillery fire did not eject Russian defenders from their 
trenches, but close infantry combat did. Commonly, infantrymen sapped their way forward 
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toward enemy defenses over several nights under the cover of darkness. Once in position and 
receiving supporting fire, Japanese infantry charged forward in mass to overwhelm their 
opponents at close quarters. In some ways, this experience upset part of Ardant du Picq’s theory. 
Ardant du Picq argued that little actual close combat occurred because one side or the other 
would break purely on the basis of moral force. However, the modern battlefield created an 
environment in which close combat occurred often because lethal fires kept troops fixed in their 
entrenchments and unable or unwilling to flee in the face of an assault.51 Close combat in 
entrenchments thus added a new layer to existing theories about the criticality of moral forces. 
Now soldiers needed not only superior moral force to engage the enemy, but also superior 
physical force to defeat him in individual combat and eject him from defensive works. 
Archibald Becke, a former British Army officer and an author of several historical works, 
captured the most widespread and persuasive pre-World War I interpretation of Russo-Japanese 
War tactics in his 1909 book An Introduction to the History of Tactics, 1740-1905.52 Like many 
military theorists of his time, Becke concluded that the attack was much preferable to the 
defense, and that offensive action was still possible on the modern battlefield. Becke argued that 
artillery and supporting infantry fires were necessary in an attack, but that Japanese success 
hinged on the Japanese soldier’s superior “fighting power,” which derived from his high levels of 
“training, courage, intelligence, self-reliance, and patriotism.”53 Positions and weapons were not 
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decisive in war, he argued, but rather the men who occupied those positions and used those 
weapons. This exhortation echoed throughout military theory since at least 1870.  
The Japanese army suffered heavy casualties even with superior fighting power. Becke 
and many of his contemporaries accepted these high casualty rates as the price of victory on the 
modern battlefield. For instance, Colonel Frederic Maude, one of Becke’s contemporaries, 
argued that successful assaults depended on soldiers being trained to “know how to die” and not 
“how to avoid dying.”54 Becke and others extended this need for bloody-mindedness beyond 
soldiers and their superiors to the whole people of a state. If people wanted victory, and a 
decisive one especially, then they had to be willing to pay the price.55 Predictions about a major 
future war’s nature reinforced the need to steel not only soldiers, but also the whole citizenry. 
Bloch and others forecast a protracted, attritional struggle. In such a war, conscription would fill 
the military ranks. Widespread conscription brought the human cost of war home to a society. 
Conscription also meant that most soldiers would have little time to prepare before finding 
themselves on a very lethal battlefield.  
On the eve of WWI, a half-century of military thought grounded in experiences on the 
battlefields of Europe, Asia, and Africa suggested a few key lessons. Of these, the most 
significant was that the offense remained possible and desirable. Despite rifling, smokeless 
powder, small arms magazines, and other technological developments, even frontal assaults 
made by infantry against entrenchments could succeed if certain conditions were met. For 
instance, soldiers might follow the Japanese example and patiently sap their way toward enemy 
trenches, and properly timed and coordinated offensive artillery fires could suppress defenders. 
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However important these preparations were, though, the key determinant of success was man, 
and specifically the concentration of moral forces at a critical point. Superior moral forces 
derived from the discipline, resilience, and psychology of individuals and units. The new 
battlefield posed a serious challenge to this formula, though. How could militaries sustain or 
improve their moral forces, and those of a whole nation, in the face of higher casualty rates and 
more challenging battlefield conditions without traditional means such as close order formations 
and tactics?  
Historians have since proposed several ways by which modern militaries sought to 
improve their human material. For example, some argue that a mystical (and irrational) 
reverence for the offensive seized military leaders, civilian elites, and publics in the decades 
leading up to World War I. This reverence produced a “cult of the offensive” in which military 
and civilian elites in Germany, France, Britain, and elsewhere blindly promoted the offensive on 
the basis of myth. The cult simultaneously generated security dilemmas while predisposing elites 
to logics that preferred war in order to address those dilemmas.56 In this formulation, the self-
deception underwriting the cult of the offensive was as a means by which militaries and states 
improved their human material psychologically by teaching soldiers and citizens to accept the 
offensive’s horrors in hopes of securing victory. 
Michael Howard and Antulio Echevarria, among others, disagree with the accusation of 
blind ignorance at the heart of the “cult of the offensive” argument. Both insist that military and 
political leaders understood the new battlefield’s challenges and the likely consequences of an 
offensive. Indeed, military leaders followed a “compelling rationale” in emphasizing the 
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offensive spirit.57 Armies needed the ability to attack at the tactical level in order to achieve 
offensive or defensive objectives at the operational and strategic levels, and attacking meant 
crossing the deadly zone. Such a passage demanded disciplined, confident soldiers and a resilient 
population along with firepower and appropriate tactics.  
Howard and Echevarria only lightly address the tools militaries used to improve their 
human material in the quest for superior moral forces, though. Howard fingers doctrine. Doctrine 
could predispose officers and men toward attacking and instill the confidence necessary to 
succeed in spite of heavy losses. Howard finds that a common sentiment pervaded the doctrines 
of most European armies in the years before World War I, one perhaps best expressed by French 
colonel Louis de Grandmaison in 1911: the offensive depended upon “cultivating with passion 
everything that bears the stamp of the offensive spirit. We must take it to excess: perhaps even 
that will not go far enough.”58 Howard interprets Grandmaison’s assertions as an intentional 
action based on a realistic assessment of probable battlefield conditions, not as an expression of 
an irrational “cult” of thought. Echevarria points to a more concrete, though narrow, method of 
improving human material: weapons drills. Echevarria argues that fire discipline training, 
especially for machinegun crews, developed confidence and a union of man and machine that 
kept soldiers focused on a definite task under stressful battlefield conditions.59  
Despite Howard’s and Echevarria’s discussions of offensive cults and weapons drills, 
they and other historians have overlooked another tool nearly every modern military force 
leveraged at the turn of the twentieth century—physical training. This tool was more concrete 
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than doctrine and more widely applicable than weapons drills. In the period’s tactical ferment 
and foment, military theorists and leaders sought solutions within their cultural environments. 
Contemporary ideas about the relationship among the body, mind, and spirit, and about the 
nature of masculinity, informed the thoughts of military leaders seeking to improve an army’s 
human material. As U.S. Army leaders scoured their cultural terrain in search of an answer to the 
“tactical problem of the day,” they encountered programs designed to sculpt bodies in specific 
ways grew in popularity in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Many of these programs were 
rooted in martial purposes or bore a martial edge. Physical training promised not only to make 
the individual soldier’s body stronger, but also to discipline individuals and units, to strengthen 
an organization’s moral force. Physical training also held wide appeal outside the military, unlike 
weapons drills. This appeal was important because it seemed to offer a way to make whole 
populations stronger and more resilient, thus preparing them for the demands of a future war in 
which success probably depended on heavy conscription. The specific means by which the U.S. 
Army in particular came to value physical training is the story of the next chapter. Before that, 
we need to link U.S. Army leaders and the wider cultural environment in which they thought and 
worked. 
In that cultural environment, military leaders confronted a problem when emphasizing 
man as the key to victory on the modern battlefield: widespread anxieties that modern man was 
just not as strong, motivated, resilient, and self-sacrificial as his forebears. German military 
officer and author Wilhelm Balck addressed this issue directly in his 1908 treatise on tactics, in 
which he argued that units appeared to be growing more brittle. Where units in the Franco-
Prussian War could sustain 25-33 percent casualties and function, similar sized units in the Boer 
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War seemed unable to sustain casualties above about seven percent.60 Balck explained that the 
“nerve-racking impressions of the battlefield” had grown over the recent decades owing to 
extended lines, the suddenness of entering combat, and the decreasing ability of officers to 
control dispersed formations. However, individual soldiers were also growing more susceptible 
to the battlefield’s impressions. “Steadily improving standards of living,” Balck observed, “tend 
to increase the instinct of self-preservation and to diminish the spirit of self-sacrifice.” Also, the 
simple “physical powers of the human species” were “partly diminishing.”61 Balck’s observation 
lays bare an interaction between the period’s “tactical problem of the day” and one of its major 
cultural phenomena—a crisis of masculinity. 
Army officers seeking to improve the military’s human material, and perhaps the nation’s 
as well, had access to tools present in American society and culture. There, fears of degeneration 
had spurred the development of regenerative means, many of which involved bodily 
improvement. These ideas held obvious martial potential. Early advocates of “scientific” 
physical training for the Army were therefore not thinking, speaking, and writing in a vacuum. 
Instead, they belonged to and were surrounded by the booming American physical culture 
composed of popular and professional elements.  
The people and organizations shaping popular physical culture were many and varied. 
For instance, the “Muscular Christianity” movement encouraged bodily improvement as a means 
of developing character, manliness, and the vigor necessary to work in arduous mission fields at 
home and abroad. The movement’s millennial message held that man was responsible for his 
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own salvation and that he could approach perfection through training of body and soul.62 The 
contours of popular physical culture were also made visible in the period’s plethora of health and 
fitness magazines. Featuring increasingly risqué cover art and photos, these magazines promoted 
a wide variety of exercise programs, diets, daily practices, and more for both men and women 
that ranged from pure quackery to cutting-edge science. Magazines also provided an advertising 
vehicle for makers of tonics, “parlor gymnasium” equipment, and books on exercise.63 Bernarr 
Macfadden’s Physical Culture epitomized the genre, though several predecessors pre-dated its 
rise in the 1890s.64 Exercise crazes such as bicycling, Indian clubs, wall-climbing, and more 
regularly gripped the American public in this period, too. Gymnastic and calisthenic exercise 
systems also competed for the favor of the American public. Most of these systems originated in 
Europe, two of the most popular examples being Swedish gymnastics and German Turner 
gymnastics. Dudley Sargent’s American individual strength training machine system entered the 
competition near the turn of the century too, though it assumed a distant third place.65 A 
construction boom accompanied the boom of interest in physical health. Public gyms, many 
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ornate and elaborate, appeared in American cities and towns alongside ethnically aligned 
Turnenhallen and Sokol facilities.66 
A sports and athletics craze, both participatory and spectator, accompanied the growing 
American fascination with physical training. Much of the sports craze originated in colleges and 
universities, and thus among America’s middle- and upper-classes, but deepening obsessions 
with football, rowing, baseball, and more extended beyond student bodies to seize whole 
communities. By 1890, notable contemporary commentator Edward Hartwell observed that it 
had become fashionable to speak of colleges “as if they were schools for forming ball-players, 
oarsmen, and athletes.”67 Organizational and business structures soon grew up around these 
activities that accelerated a transition from pure amateurism to professionalism in sports, though 
Americans clung to an amateur ideal in athletics.  
The sporting craze had many sources, and sport itself served many purposes. One 
contemporary scholar posited that sport provided a safety valve for American energy and pioneer 
spirit pent up after the frontier’s closure.68 Turn-of-the-century political and cultural elites 
certainly promoted sport as a vehicle for renewing society, preparing future leaders, and 
socializing American youth.69 Other historians have argued that sports acted like a “social glue” 
that bonded a diverse nation and helped build a unified national American myth.70 Whatever its 
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origins and appeal, the athletic side of American physical culture permeated the U.S. military.71 
Sports and sports culture powerfully influenced the thinking of U.S. Army leaders. However, 
sports came heavily laden with cultural assumptions that were occasionally at odds with the 
values and assumptions motivating advocates of “scientific” physical training in the U.S. Army. 
The advocacy of “scientific” physical training in the Army must be understood within the 
context of a concurrent push for professionalization in the physical education field. Physical 
educators, many of whom were physicians and physiologists, sought to separate themselves in 
the last two decades of the nineteenth century from popular physical culture, antebellum health 
reform movements, and the competitive athletics craze. The paths toward expert status blazed by 
physical training advocates in the Army and physical educators in American society were closely 
related, and they often intersected. Within the Army, physical training began gaining traction 
after 1885 following the United States Military Academy appointment of Herman Koehler as its 
Master of the Sword.72 Physical educators also took a major step toward professional status in 
1885 with the founding of the American Association for the Advancement of Physical Education 
(AAAPE). Physical education pioneers such as William Anderson, Edward Hitchcock, Tait 
McKenzie, James McCurdy, Dudley Sargent, and others set up the organization to discuss the 
“underlying principles of the new profession.” The AAAPE’s founders believed that most 
teachers were “individualists” and “missionaries” interested in pressing their own special 
theories of health and fitness.73 Such a chaotic discourse needed discipline, especially in light of 
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an absence of licensing measures. The AAAPE’s proto-professionals sought to establish this 
discipline, earn society’s trust and confidence, and distance themselves from a long-associated 
history of health reform movements. To do so, they asserted an expertise rooted in scientific 
knowledge that promised benefits to the whole of American society.  
The social benefit physical educators began promising in the late nineteenth century had 
two components, which historian Roberta Park labels hygienic and educative.74 Presenters at a 
landmark 1889 physical training conference held in Boston described both succinctly. Speaking 
before the assembled body of the region’s educators and the nation’s physical education 
authorities, the United States Commissioner of Education, William Harris, defined hygiene as 
the pursuit of making “the most of the body for human purposes.” Harris argued that physical 
training, which he defined as the “conscious or voluntary training of the muscular side of our 
system,” played a crucial role in hygiene by improving students’ wills. Improvement of will 
occurred through voluntary processes, such as muscle strengthening exercise, that also “call[ed] 
into action the higher nervous motor-centres of the body and brain.”75 Such promises of 
improvement and development, referring vaguely to how bodies grew and character developed, 
undergirded the educative arguments for physical training.  
Harris’s arguments reflected the positions of the field’s proto-professionals, who 
combined antebellum ideas about the nature of the will with new developments in biological 
science and evolutionary theories.76 The presentation following Harris’s at the 1889 conference, 
given by the widely respected physical training pioneer Dr. Edward Hartwell, reveals both the 
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composite basis of the educative functions and the expansive mission conceived of by early 
physical educators for their profession. Hartwell, a medical doctor with an interest in history who 
served as the director of physical training in Boston schools and as Johns Hopkins University’s 
gymnasium director, was a leading authority on the effects of exercise on the human body and 
mind. Research trips throughout America and Europe, and the influential series of reports that 
followed beginning in 1885, also gave Hartwell cachet as an expert on pedagogical practices.77  
Hartwell began his 1889 address by asserting that physical training deserved a stature at 
least equal to mental and moral training as “an integral and indispensable factor” in education. 
“Muscular exercise is at once a means and an end of mental, and moral, as well as of physical 
training,” he asserted, because “without bodily actions we have no means of giving expression to 
mental power, artistic feeling, or spiritual insight. Without muscular tissue we cannot live or 
move.”78 Hartwell supported his argument with a detailed explanation of the appearance and 
function of muscle fibers. By 1889, research in biology seemed to have validated the older 
“blacksmith’s arm” analogy, which found that exercise enlarged, hardened, and strengthened 
muscle fibers while making them more responsive to the nervous system. Conversely, disuse led 
to “wasting” or atrophy. In his remarks, Hartwell paid particular attention to the connection 
between muscle fibers and the “nerves and centres” that transmit stimuli, then continued by way 
of analogy in asserting that the cells and centers of the nervous system and brain similarly 
strengthened or atrophied depending upon use. Hartwell reasoned that in order to strengthen the 
brain, physical trainers needed to identify the muscular activation sequences that triggered 
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actions in desirable regions of the brain in order to exercise them.79 The new scientific findings 
and theories Hartwell discussed seemed to provide a definitive and direct link between the body 
and the mind, which had been long regarded as the seat of the will. Exercised strengthened 
muscles as well as the nerves and cells that made the mind work. Muscular training was 
therefore fundamental to human mental and moral development, and it was up to physical 
training professionals to unlock the most efficient and effective means of training all three 
domains at once. 
The means available were many and varied, ranging from sports and dance to free play, 
but Hartwell and most of his fellow proto-professionals advocated gymnastics. Trainers 
struggling to define themselves as experts on the basis of scientific knowledge and expertise 
found great appeal in gymnastics because they were, in Hartwell’s words, more “comprehensive 
in their aims, more formal, elaborate, and systematic in their methods,” and more productive of 
“solid and considerable gains” than any other alternative.80 Gymnastics systems came in many 
different forms based on ethnic origins and use of apparatus, among other factors. Indeed, debate 
raged in the latter half of the nineteenth century over which of the many possible systems was 
best, and what in fact constituted an “exercise.” These diverse systems shared a few 
characteristics in common, however. First, most attended to the needs of a broad population, 
male or female, and of the whole person. Gymnastics were not generally designed to create elite 
athletes or train the select few. Second, gymnastics systems were geared to produce symmetrical 
development of participants along the lines of fixed standards of physical perfection. Finally, all 
gymnastics systems were formal and pre-determined by instructors. Experts were supposed to be 
able to prescribe exercises to correct specific bodily deficiencies, strengthen particular muscle 
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groups, and, in some cases, even cultivate certain mental and moral characteristics. Americans 
especially embraced the idea of collecting precise bodily measurements and prescribing targeted 
exercises to generate desired outcomes.81 This idea manifested in many of the American systems, 
including Dudley Sargent’s and, in the U.S. Army, Herman Koehler’s. The supposed precision in 
gymnastics gave physical education proto-professionals a strong claim to unique, scientific 
knowledge and methods. 
Sports and their popularity posed problems for physical educators in the late nineteenth 
century, both in and out of the Army. Many physical educators recognized the potential value of 
sports, especially their assumed power to provide social training, especially in teamwork. 
However, school athletic programs and the intercollegiate competition model threatened to 
overshadow proliferating physical education efforts in the 1880s and 1890s. Athletic coaches, a 
body also staking out claims to professional status, competed directly with physical educators for 
institutional resources, prestige, and power. Intercollegiate competition threatened to take control 
of athletics out of the faculty’s hands, potentially undermining the educative premise of physical 
education.82 Sports also posed a few philosophical challenges. First, sports were inherently 
spontaneous and thus challenged the science-based claim to expert status made through the 
precision in gymnastics. Second, the dynamics of competition tended to focus attention on the 
development of the elite few over the ordinary many. Still, trends in physical education thought 
moved gradually toward an embrace of sport in the early twentieth century, partly in response to 
growing Progressive era social and societal concerns, and partly out of recognition of sports’ 
much greater popularity in comparison with gymnastics. 
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The Army’s first efforts to introduce formal, systematic physical training must be 
understood within this intellectual and cultural environment surrounding physical education. 
Many of the environment’s influences can be understood as indirect. Army physical training 
advocates wrote and thought in the context of the period’s popular physical culture and physical 
educators’ push for professional status. Other influences were very direct. For instance, the U.S. 
Military Academy’s Herman Koehler, a product of a Turner normal school, contributed to the 
construction of the physical education profession through articles, conference participation, and 
organizational service. Many advocates and system designers also received formal training at 
institutions such as Sargent’s Springfield College. Similar trends in thought on physical training 
manifested in both the Army and the wider physical education world too, as will be seen. Army 
physical training advocates similarly combined new scientific findings with older ideas about 
will, character, regeneration, and mind-body mutualism by way of reasoning through analogy. 
From the beginning, Army preferences for scientific prescription and highly formal exercise 
systems also faced challenges from popular pressure for sport. Much like their physical 
education contemporaries, Army physical training advocates gradually accommodated athletics 
to a greater degree over time. Still, differences existed too. For instance, preferences for formal, 
highly-controlled systems of exercise persisted much longer in the Army than outside it. 
The Army’s first efforts to introduce physical training must also be understood within the 
larger social, cultural, and intellectual context. Nineteenth-century anxieties over America’s 
health, understood chiefly in terms of the nation’s perceived masculine quotient, prompted fears 
of degeneration. By the turn of the century, Progressive era social and societal concerns added 
new anxieties while both amplifying and modifying the old. All of these anxieties seemed to 
pose a threat to the nation’s survival, or at least its vitality. Could America survive and thrive in a 
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highly competitive world? Were its men capable of enduring the demands of modern war? But 
where problems existed, so did solutions. Bodily improvement was one among many of those 
solutions. In a world fixated on social degeneration and efficiency, gymnastics and sport 
promised regeneration, renewal, discipline, order, character, morality, and more. Faith in 
modernity suggested a way forward for Americans—not a return to an idealized past, but the 
leveraging of science and technology to develop men in new ways for a new world. 
Army officers were particularly attuned to the dangers and opportunities in this wider 
context. Like physical educators and many national leaders, some of these officers turned to 
physical training and drew on thought and practice in popular physical culture and in the 
professionalizing field of physical education. The direct benefits of physical training seemed 
obvious. Soldiers could march farther, carry more, and fight harder if in better physical 
condition. Physical training’s less direct benefits were just as desirable, if not more so. Physical 
training’s potential for moral and mental development, and for cultivating discipline, promised 
improvement of the Army’s human material necessary for success on the future battlefield. The 
potential value of such improvement was amplified by the Army’s central position in the 
overlapping fields of soldier-, man-, citizen-making. The Army depended upon a fit and resilient 
male population to fight a war based on conscription, but the Army could also be an agent to 
help create a more fit and resilient population. Development of appropriate exercise systems for 
the Army, which established the basis of the Army’s durable physical culture, would come 
through the labors of a small set of physical training advocates whose identities and ideas are the 
subject of the next chapter. However, it is crucial to remember that those advocates worked 




Chapter 2: Origins of a U.S. Army Physical Culture, 1885-1916 
Standing before a convocation of modern physical education’s brightest early luminaries 
in the spring of 1891, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Greenleaf, the Assistant Surgeon-General of 
the Army, made a shocking claim. Greenleaf began by first identifying the “popular belief” that 
soldiers were men who exemplified the benefits of physical training. Surely the care taken in a 
soldier’s selection, his need to “endure the hardship of campaigns in every variety of climate” 
and still triumph in combat, and his discipline, habits, and diet made a soldier the “model of 
physical perfection.” Nonetheless, Greenleaf claimed, the soldier “cannot be regarded either as 
an athlete or even as a well trained man physically.”1 Greenleaf attributed this failure chiefly to 
an absence of “systematic gymnastic training.”2 Yet even as Greenleaf made these remarks, a 
movement was afoot within the U.S. Army to rectify the problem. That movement’s heart 
resided at the United States Military Academy, but its voices bubbled up from across the force in 
professional journals and popular periodicals. The movement crested with the publication of the 
Army’s first physical training manual 23 years after Greenleaf sounded his warning. For the first 
time in its history, the U.S. Army established an official physical culture, one based around 
systematic training. 
 This chapter analyzes this first official physical culture as captured in the Army’s 1914 
manual. A surprisingly small clique of men was responsible for producing that culture. This 
chapter analyzes their experiences, relationships, and publications during the period between 
1885 and 1914. Reading their works and the 1914 manual together reveals a coherent and 
consistent physical culture with four key features. First, physical training advocates in the Army 
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valued expert knowledge and sought to subordinate actual training practices to their expertise. 
Second, the culture they produced valued a soldier’s psychologic development at least as much 
as his physical development. Third, their culture prioritized unit fitness over maximizing the 
individual’s physical capabilities. Finally, these early advocates assumed that the human material 
needing sculpting would be of relatively high quality because the small American army could be 
somewhat selective in the personnel it inducted. 
In most ways, this culture reflected contemporary assumptions, beliefs, and practices in 
the professionalizing field of physical education. Yet by 1906, the Army’s physical culture and 
American physical education began diverging for institutional and cultural reasons. Ultimately, 
the physical culture that the Army’s 1914 manual represented responded to the beliefs of its 
producers about the value of fitness in modern war—and that value went well beyond bigger 
biceps and stronger lungs. But another question beckons first, one carried forward from last 
chapter: Why did physical training become so important to some members of the U.S. Army in 
the 1880s and 1890s?  
 That interest had much to do with European practices. In the wake of the Franco-Prussian 
War, many commentators advanced theories to explain the Prussian victory. One theory held that 
superior Prussian education accounted for the outcome. A representative example of this 
argument appeared in an 1872 letter written to the editors of the Army and Navy Journal. Its 
author, known to history as T. Gentz, argued that only one component of the superior Prussian 
education mattered—physical education, both in and out of the army. Integrating Prussia’s 
victory into a longer history of hale northern nations conquering their neighbors, Gentz insisted 
that even in modern warfare “muscular power and a hardy constitution” still mattered. Human 
bodies put machines into action, gymnastics imparted “firm nerves and a manly spirit” to its 
58 
 
practitioners. The stronger arm could “take the steadier aim and deal the more forcible blow,” the 
“stout shoulder” bore more weight, the stronger legs leapt ditches and charged uphill better, and 
superior constitutions saw soldiers through the “brunt of the dusty battle.”3 Gentz went on to 
argue that the United States would also benefit from gymnastics, especially as a part of military 
training. With the frontier’s closing, Gentz argued, “it is time that gymnastics should raise us a 
new generation of men.”4  
Positive impressions about the desirability and utility of gymnastic persisted in parts of 
the U.S. Army through the following decades. Writing twenty years later, systematic training 
advocate Captain James Pilcher advanced an argument similar to Gentz’s. “When the superior 
physical training of one of the parties to so great a contest as the Franco-Prussian War is known 
to have been the force that turned the tide of victory in its favor,” Pilcher wrote, “the United 
States cannot afford to reject it.”5 Army officers had long been aware that European militaries 
used gymnastic training to improve their soldiery. The Delafield Commission’s Captain George 
McClellan, who traveled Europe as a military observer between 1855 and 1856, had praised the 
French army’s 1847 physical training manual and gymnastic school near Vincennes, for 
instance.6 Major Richard Delafield, the commission’s leader, and subsequently the U.S. Military 
Academy’s superintendent, later acted on these findings. In 1858, he directed Lieutenant J. C. 
Kelton to develop a “systematic course” of training for West Point’s cadets based on systems in 
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use at military schools in Paris and Vienna.7 Praise for systematic gymnastic training came to 
Army officers through civilian sources as well. For instance, physical education pioneer Edward 
Hartwell commended Prussian practices in his influential 1886 report on the state of physical 
education. “In the interval between Jena and Sedan,” Hartwell argued, Prussia and 
“demonstrated most clearly and strikingly the power and worth of comprehensive and scientific 
‘training.’”8 
Some American officers also viewed systematic training as a way to prepare soldiers for 
the demands of the new empty battlefield created by the need for troops to disperse in the face of 
increased firepower, which resulted from technological advances. Greenleaf, the Army’s 
Assistant Surgeon General, insisted that soldiers themselves, lacking the “elbow touch” of linear 
warfare, had begun by 1891 to “feel the necessity for physical activity and endurance in 
attacking an enemy or in defending himself.”9 Pilcher, also a medical officer, similarly argued 
that the “soldier’s physique” had more than ever “become indispensable.”10 Fortunately, Pilcher 
insisted, modern knowledge and science made it more possible than ever to precisely and 
efficiently condition bodies for combat. This way of thinking fit perfectly with the contemporary 
turn in American high and popular culture toward activity, dynamism, and masculinity. 
Similarly, these ideas harmonized with a movement in American higher education toward 
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physical education and sport. If colleges and universities took interest in fitness, should the U.S. 
Army do so too?11 
Yet not everyone in the Army agreed with the premise or upon the means of 
implementation. Nor did many officers possess the expert knowledge needed to employ 
systematic training. Many senior Army officers had long acknowledged the connection between 
physical fitness and soldiering, but they rarely made methodical efforts to improve soldier 
fitness. Instead they assumed that soldiers’ bodies best adapted to the rigors of soldiering by 
soldiering. Lieutenant John Kulp captured this idea of incidental training when he complained 
that the older generation of officers believed “the shovel to be the best gymnastic apparatus for 
soldiers.”12 Some members of this older generation also considered systematic physical training 
a fad, possibly a dangerous one, and therefore not a necessity.13 Thus, dedicating precious 
training time to exercise outside of traditional drill made little sense. 
Others saw utility in physical training but did not know how to structure programs or lead 
exercises. Such shortcomings typically inclined officers toward either extreme emphasis on 
popular sports and field days or dull repetition of the drill manual’s limited setting-up and rifle 
exercises. Major General Leonard Wood, the Army’s outgoing Chief of Staff in 1914, stressed 
the consequences of these conditions in his preface to the 1914 physical training manual. Despite 
the well-intentioned efforts of many commands, Wood wrote, physical training’s benefits would 
“remain a negligible quantity” without a “well-defined authorized method of procedure” that 
imposed “system and uniformity.”14 
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Desire for system and uniformity in training informed by expert knowledge also existed 
at the Army’s lowest levels. For instance, Lieutenant Frank Besson also warned prior to the 1914 
manual’s publication that Army officers were aware of physical training, but they needed more 
specific guidance. Besson counted five manuals in publication dedicated to military exercise, but 
none resided in the headquarters library of the Hawaiian Department where he served, and he 
knew of no officers who owned copies. Besson had seen copies of then-Major Edmund Butts’ 
Manual of Physical Drill occasionally in company libraries. However, he believed officers were 
only familiar with the fifteen pages that described rifle drill and contained sheet music to 
accompany the drill, and even these exercises were rarely employed.15 According to Besson, 
units usually resorted to using the seven setting-up exercises in the drill regulations, but that 
these tended to “do more harm than good” owing to a lack of knowledge and enthusiasm. Too 
often, Besson remarked, physical training amounted to little more than a squad of men, “blouses 
unbuttoned and hats jammed down on their heads, going through these, the same monotonous 
exercises day after day, each man with a funereal cadence all his own.”16 
Wood and Besson both proposed a solution: the Army should first compile the best of 
what had been written on military physical training since the 1880s into a single, comprehensive 
manual. Next, the Army should require all commanders to make that training system a universal 
part of every soldier’s regular education. Publication of the Army’s 1914 physical training 
manual was an attempt to do just this. The manual’s pages, steeped in a rich broth of ideas and 
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practices cultivated by a cluster of physical training advocates, crystallized and institutionalized 
a physical culture three decades in the making. 
An exploration of that first official physical culture benefits from knowledge of its 
founding document. The Army’s 1914 Manual of Physical Training equipped officers 
responsible for training in philosophical and practical ways. In terms of philosophy, the manual 
described fitness and ascribed it value. In practical terms, the manual offered advice on hygiene 
issues, gave guidance on structuring training programs, and dictated exercise methods. Several 
manuals may have come before, but none equaled the 1914 manual in breadth, depth, specificity, 
distribution, and official endorsement. 
Appropriately for an expression of and foundation for a physical culture, the 1914 manual 
began with a definition of fitness. This definition’s elements existed in a pyramid structure, 
capped by and supporting the ultimate component—discipline. The pyramid’s foundational 
layers were fourfold: general health and bodily vigor; muscular strength and endurance; self-
reliance; and “smartness, activity, and precision.” The latter qualities were described as “physical 
expressions of mental activity.”17 The first two elements, both hygienic and physical, formed a 
base for the second set of elements, which were psychological. Once the soldier obtained “robust 
health” and an awareness of his increased strength and endurance, then he needed to be “taught 
how to former the former and how to use the latter to best advantage.”18 This knowledge 
translated into self-reliance and self-consciousness. The manual’s authors intended for soldiers to 
exercise not just their muscles, but their minds as well. Instructors exercised minds chiefly by 
insisting on “precision and exactitude.” Doing so supposedly cultivated “essential soldierly 
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qualities” such as self-respect, neatness, and grace, which “combined spell discipline.”19 Fit 
soldiers were mentally and physically healthy, strong, and resilient. Fit soldiers were confident in 
their abilities, in complete control of their bodies and minds, and willing to submit themselves to 
a unit’s needs.  
The manual provided instructors with more practical advice regarding hygiene, which 
was typical of training guidance found in period professional physical education and the popular 
press.20 For example, the manual advised that exercise should occur in open air, preferably “pure, 
dry air,” whenever possible.21 Other hygiene tips equipped instructors to teach their charges 
proper breathing techniques, and to recognize the onset of exhaustion. In the interest of 
completeness, the manual’s authors recommended the best time of day to exercise (never after a 
meal), the best clothing to wear while exercising (flannel), and the healthiest way to recover after 
drill (sponging the body with tepid water) too.22 Some pieces of advice were worded more 
strongly than others, but few mandated specific practices. 
The manual’s authors also stopped short of dictating programming. Instead, they gave 
those responsible for training leeway to build programs that took into account their soldiers’ 
aptitude and condition, and the facilities and time available. This was an enormous 
responsibility. Officers needed to take their work seriously and “not for an instant lose sight of 
the fact that to them has been intrusted [sic] a part of the soldier’s training which is of great 
importance.”23 However, most instructors held only basic training in performing exercises at 
best, so the manual included some guidance to help them structure their programs. Sample 
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advice included working extensor and flexor muscles in paired exercises, seeking harmonious 
and symmetrical total-body development, and ensuring that every day’s work “should dovetail 
into the next and be progressive.”24 The “setting-up exercises,” which were series of calisthenic 
drills, formed the core of every session. Instructors could add various types of apparatus and skill 
work to this core. The manual was like a menu. Instructors could select from a wide variety of 
exercises that ranged from dumbbell and rifle drills to gymnastic contests and apparatus work. 
Grouping and sequencing those exercises fell to the instructor’s discretion. 
A sample five-day program illustrated the application of these principles generally, 
though even this sample stopped short of prescribing specific exercises. This latitude might seem 
odd for a document that purported to standardize physical training practices across the Army. 
However, the manual’s authors sought to account for the variety of conditions in which units 
might train.25 Too prescriptive a program might allow officers to make excuses for not doing 
physical training at all if local conditions did not match those assumed in prescription. Flexibility 
in programming therefore enabled standardization of physical training itself across the force. 
 In contrast with the suggestive hygienic and programming sections, the manual dictated 
how individual exercises and drill series were to be executed. Of the manual’s 335 pages, 319 
contained exercise instructions, guidance on issuing commands, and photos and drawings 
illustrating movements and positions. The instructions were comprehensive. For instance, the 
broad jump alone required four pages and three images to explain.26 Specificity served at least 
two functions. First, it enabled the focus on precision and exactitude supposedly vital to building 
discipline. Second, it allowed amateurs to employ expertly developed movements that were 
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calculated to deliver specific results. According to the manual’s authors, every exercise had a 
“function peculiarly its own” that had a “certain effect upon a certain part of the body.”27 
Officers could be entrusted with arranging those exercises according to general guidelines, but 
they lacked the expert knowledge to design movements capable of achieving such precise results. 
Major General Leonard Wood, writing in the manual’s preface, therefore discouraged any 
“departures” from the manual that were “at variance with its methods generally.”28 
Taken together, the manual’s methods, guidelines, definition of fitness, and underlying 
assumptions comprised a physical culture. This culture was the product of a long history and a 
particular moment. A small group of men produced that culture over the three decades preceding 
1914. Their associations were chiefly with the United States Military Academy and the infantry 
branch. Their backgrounds, ideas, and contributions to Army physical training practice and 
policy provide a rich resource that informs the physical culture that ultimately emerged in 1914.  
None of those cultural producers exercised greater influence than Herman Koehler. His 
impact is evident in the general culture’s subtleties and obvious in the 1914 manual’s final form. 
A three-officer board prepared that manual, but the final document’s language and form betrays 
its paternity unmistakably as Koehler’s.29 That document essentially combined two of Koehler’s 
earlier manuals, the Manual of Calisthenic Exercises (1892) and Manual of Gymnastic Exercises 
(1904). No other advocates of systematic training had published as frequently and widely as had 
Koehler. His articles appeared in professional military and physical education journals alike. He 
may not have been the first to raise the issue of systematic, standardized training for the Army in 
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the professional journals of the day, but his voice became more prominent as the years wore on 
and the Army edged closer to sanctioning an official physical culture. Koehler’s role as West 
Point’s Master of the Sword, where he became known as West Point’s father of physical 
education, was crucial to his influence too.30 The Master of the Sword’s responsibilities were 
once limited to teaching swordsmanship and other physical skills, but Koehler had extended 
those responsibilities to cover every aspect of cadet physical development. In this position, he 
was the Army’s only dedicated expert in and practitioner of physical training. Furthermore, 
Koehler’s long service as Master of the Sword, from 1885 to 1923, meant that he personally 
trained two generations of West Point graduates, who in turn carried his ideas out into the wider 
Army. 
West Point’s administration had taken tentative steps toward incorporating systematic 
physical training into its curriculum by the time Koehler arrived in 1885. Kelton’s European-
inspired program of 1860 had cadets of all four classes performing calisthenics and gymnastics, 
though it was discontinued in 1861 with the Civil War’s onset. After 1861, cadets did not follow 
a systematic program of training, but they were required to spend time in the gym pursuing 
whatever caught their interest. Gymnastics languished at West Point until 1877 when the 
Superintendent, General John Schofield, recommended its resumption.31 The recommendation 
went nowhere until a Board of Visitors report in 1881 criticized gymnasium conditions at the 
Academy. “There was no exhibition of exercises in the gymnasium,” the board noted, and “the 
whole furnishing is unsatisfactory.” The board’s members declared that the “value of this class 
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of exercise for whose profession requires good physical development cannot be doubted.” They 
then recommended construction of a new gym and creation of a department that would make 
gymnastics training a “positive requirement” for every cadet.32  
The report helped jolt the Academy’s administration into action. The superintendent 
directed Lieutenant Edward Farrow, an instructor in the Department of Tactics, to draw up a 
training program. Farrow’s system, which included gymnastics and swimming, became a part of 
cadet development in 1882.33 Farrow directed training until he departed for a new assignment in 
1884 and was replaced by a Lieutenant Henry Kirby. Koehler later criticized Farrow’s program 
because there “was but little system” in the course and because it “lacked many of the 
fundamentals of a rational training system.” However, as Koehler also observed, Farrow and 
Kirby deserved credit for “breaking up the pernicious practice of permitting Cadets to use the 
gymnasium as they saw fit,” and for raising the Academy’s appreciation of physical training as a 
necessary component of cadet development.34 
Then in 1884, an opportunity arose to put West Point on equal footing with other 
institutions of higher education, which were rapidly incorporating physical education into their 
curricula. West Point’s long-time Master of the Sword, Antone Lorentz, died. Lorentz did little 
to advance systematic training in his twenty-seven-year tenure and seemingly left much to be 
desired, having been replaced in practice if not in title by Farrow in 1881.35 The search for a 
professional educator to replace Lorentz led to George Brosius, the Milwaukee Normal School’s 
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director and coach of the Milwaukee Turnverein’s award-winning 1880 team.36 Brosius declined 
the offer, citing his work in Milwaukee, but recommended his nephew, protégé, normal school 
graduate, and “best man of the Frankfurt class”—Herman Koehler.37 Academy officials offered 
Koehler the position. He accepted and began instructing in 1885. 
Koehler, only twenty-five years old, was an impressive candidate by dint of his physical 
prowess alone (he boasted flexed biceps nineteen-and-a-half inches around), not to mention his 
education and credentials.38 A talented gymnast, Koehler placed second overall at the 1880 
international Turner Festival in Frankfurt. While observing another meet a year later, Koehler 
learned that the man who beat him in 1880 was competing. Despite not having trained, Koehler 
entered the competition and won first place in a field of more than three hundred contestants.39 
Koehler also boasted an educational pedigree that qualified him as a professional physical 
educator, unlike any of his predecessors at West Point. He also possessed some practical 
experience, having worked since 1882 as a school gymnastics director in Oshkosh, Wisconsin. 
Koehler immediately set about constructing a system of physical training for West 
Point’s cadets. He expressed the philosophy behind this program and his broader concept of 
fitness in an article written for the Academy’s centennial in 1902. Koehler’s aim was to 
counteract the pressure placed on cadets by their program of study, the “mental strain” of which 
was “fraught with danger to the physical welfare of the cadet.” Koehler’s plan was supposed to 
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do this by building up the weak so that they might “have an even chance with the naturally 
strong,” sculpting sound bodies that might yield sound minds, and nurturing energy and strength 
reserves upon which cadets could call in times of stress. The first objective of Koehler’s system 
was general health, though he sought simultaneous cultivation of “strength, agility, precision, 
self-reliance, courage and endurance.”40 Because physical training had a fundamentally 
educative purpose at West Point, Koehler intended his system to raise the general standard 
among the Corps of Cadets. Endeavoring to “turn out record-breaking strong men, or skilled 
acrobats” was “wrong in every particular” in Koehler’s opinion because focus spent on elites did 
the majority harm through neglect. To this end, Koehler laid down a single principle that 
recurred through his later work as well: “The greatest good to the greatest number, and only at 
the expense of those who can afford it.”41 
Physical training’s share of the Academy’s curriculum grew throughout Koehler’s tenure. 
Beginning in 1885, fourth class cadets received three weeks of daily drill upon arrival at the 
Academy, then three drills of 45 minutes a piece and three periods of fencing instruction per 
week from October through June. The upper three classes were not required to attend drill, but 
they were encouraged to do so in the winter months.42 The benefits accruing to cadets were 
obvious. For instance, the 1889 Board of Visitors gushed in their report that it was “exceedingly 
difficult to believe that the gymnastic exercises performed by the fourth class could be the result 
of only one year of practice under instruction by Professor Koehler. The feats of agility were 
simply wonderful; they are valuable chiefly as evidence of sound, muscular, trained bodies.”43 
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Koehler pressed continuously to require physical training for all classes so that gains made in the 
first year were not lost in the latter three. He finally realized this objective in 1905, and 
simultaneously had boxing and wrestling added to the curriculum.44 Koehler published some of 
his system’s methods in his 1892 Manual of Calisthenic Exercises. Readers of the Army’s 1914 
manual would immediately recognize its setting-up exercises in this 1892 manual.45 West Point’s 
superintendents and Boards of Visitors repeated requests beginning in 1889 to grant Koehler a 
commission in recognition of his achievements and the value of his work. Congress agreed in 
1899, commissioning Koehler as a First Lieutenant. In 1901, Congress also made Koehler’s post 
permanent by law. Furthermore, the law required the Master of the Sword to henceforth act as 
“instructor of military gymnastics and physical culture,” and that Koehler’s successors be 
officers of the line specially selected for the post. Koehler received subsequent promotions to 
Captain, Major, and Lieutenant Colonel in 1905, 1917, and 1920 respectively.46 
Koehler’s system reflected its creator’s Turner roots. Turnen was a German system of 
gymnastics descended from Friedrich Jahn, who witnessed the Prussian army’s disastrous defeat 
at Jena in 1806 and participated in subsequent Prussian educational reforms as a leading physical 
trainer.47 Major aims of those reforms included instilling national pride and preparing Prussian 
men for a future war that might throw off French dominance. Turnen therefore sought whole 
body improvement for a broad population, not the creation of elite athletes. Turnen also 
harnessed exercise as a means of promoting well-trained citizens faithful to the nation and 
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prepared for war.48 Two waves of German emigres fleeing government crackdowns in Prussia 
and elsewhere brought Turner practices to the U.S., first in the mid-1820’s and later following 
the 1848 revolutions. In the U.S., Turnen clubs became centers of ethnic communities, but they 
also sought to Americanize their message. Turners earned national recognition for their service 
in the Union Army during the Civil War, which helped propel their system of gymnastics to 
prominence.49 Later, Turners pressed to integrate that system into American schools, placing 
them in the midst of a late-nineteenth-century nation-wide debate about the best means of 
training American youth. This “Battle of the Systems” pitted Turnen against many other 
competitors, including Ling’s Swedish Gymnastics and a home-grown system of machine 
exercises developed by Dudley Sargent. Turnen ultimately lost this battle in the first decade of 
the twentieth century, owing in part to its ethnic associations but primarily to its strong emphasis 
on apparatus work, which was impractical for many schools.50  
Regardless, Turnen was alive and well at the U.S. Military Academy after 1885 and was 
baked in to the U.S. Army’s official physical culture in 1914. Six classes of exercises comprised 
a typical Turnen syllabus for male students: marching; calisthenics; “heavy work” with 
dumbbells, rings, and other implements; apparatus work; gymnastic games; and some popular 
physical activities such as track-and-field competitions, swimming, fencing, boxing, and more.51 
This typical syllabus emphasized general body development and progressively more difficult, 
complex, and active exercises. Finally, formality characterized a Turnen session. One instructor, 
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normally led large groups through structured and rhythmical sequences, often using commands.52 
Turnen goals clearly inspired Koehler’s emphasis on general health and his principle of doing the 
greatest good to the greatest number. The 1914 manual’s material could have also been pulled 
directly out of a Turnen syllabus as it matched the six typical categories of exercise.53 Turnen’s 
high formality, emphasis on discipline and broad populations, and overt military focus must have 
appealed to Academy officials and Army officers congenial to physical training alike. 
In a time when most of the Regular Army’s officers earned their commissions from West 
Point, Koehler’s long tenure as Master of the Sword gave him a unique ability to promulgate his 
Turnen-derived system throughout the Army. Between 1885 and 1900, Koehler instructed every 
West Point cadet personally.54 As the Academy’s physical program expanded, especially after 
1905, Koehler acquired several assistants, but he retained control over the program’s structure 
and continued delivering instruction personally. By 1919, only two hundred West Point 
graduates on active duty had not received personal instruction from Koehler, and all of those 
entered the Academy prior to Koehler’s arrival in 1885.55 If officers were leading physical 
training or writing about it after 1889, then their only likely frame of reference was Koehler’s 
example and system. Dissemination through discipleship was an intentional strategy. In the 
absence of a secondary education program for physical instructors, Koehler believed West Point 
graduates needed to enter the Army prepared to lead training as local experts.56 The Army 
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refused to establish an official physical culture from the top-down before 1914, so Koehler 
sought to spread one from the bottom-up.  
Koehler’s disciples, joined by likeminded advocates of systematic training, propagated a 
consistent physical culture through praxis and print. A boom in gymnasium construction on 
Army posts in the 1890s provided proponents of systematic training opportunities for practice. 
Initially funded by profits from post canteen sales, gymnasia enabled all-weather, year-round 
physical training.57 With few exceptions, gymnasia built specifically for systematic training first 
appeared at the Army’s three recruiting depots: Columbus Barracks, Davids Island, and Jefferson 
Barracks.58 These buildings came equipped with all the tools necessary for strengthening the 
bodies and minds of American soldiers at the turn of the century. Tools ranged from “light work” 
implements such as dumbbells, barbells, rowing machines, and Indian clubs to technical 
gymnastic apparatus such as parallel and horizontal bars. A lieutenant or captain at each post was 
detailed to direct training in these gyms, usually with the assistance of a few non-commissioned 
officers.59 
Koehler believed that such “splendidly equipped gymnasiums” removed the “chief 
obstacle” to systematic physical training. However, there remained the question of how to put 
these resources to best use.60 Junior officers detailed as instructors enjoyed no training apart from 
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what they received as cadets at West Point or as college students elsewhere. Several publications 
offered some guidance. Koehler’s 1892 manual was popular for instance, as was British author 
Archibald Maclaren’s book, Physical Education. Koehler attempted to fill this gap in 1904 with 
his Manual of Gymnastic Exercises, but ultimately the Army did not mandate any specific 
practices or a consistent system. Young officers in control of gymnasium instruction thus 
enjoyed wide latitude in determining the nature of training at their posts. This was a major 
responsibility. Koehler charged these young officers with remembering the importance of their 
charge to lead critical training on which the “success or failure is dependent entirely upon 
themselves.”61 Many rose to the challenge. Gymnasia created spaces for officers to encounter, 
experiment with, and lead physical training. Several innovators, some with experience as gym 
directors and others without, published their systems in print. By 1913, at least four of these 
systems were available as full manuals: Constantine Chase’s Physical Drill for Foot Troops 
(1897), Edmund Butts’ Manual of Physical Drill (1897), Enoch Garey’s Manual of Physical 
Drill (1911), and Merch Stewart’s The Physical Development of the Infantry Soldier (1913). 
Their systems differed in some specifics, but the culture each manifested and promulgated was 
remarkably consistent with Koehler’s, including key elements such as the pursuit of the greatest 
good for the greatest number using progressive, systematic, formal training.  
The most influential of these gymnasium instructor-innovators was Edmund “Billy” 
Butts. An 1890 West Point graduate who had enjoyed Koehler’s tutelage, Butts was given charge 
of gymnastics training at the Columbus Barracks recruiting depot in 1893. He found that 
physical training did occur at the depot, but that there was no “systematic drill.” Instead, soldiers 
were “’turned loose’ in the gymnasium” under the loose supervision of non-commissioned 
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officers. Under these conditions, Butts felt that the “results could not but be more harmful than 
beneficial.”62 Butts quickly set about constructing a regular training program. He also improved 
the gym building while filling it with equipment purchased using funds from the Post Exchange 
and elsewhere. Soon, each of the four companies was sweating through thirty-five minute drills 
five days a week under Butts’ direction. These drills included a variety of activities ranging from 
calisthenics to dumbbell exercises. In designing his drills, Butts sought to “avoid that constant 
repetition” that made work “mechanical and tiresome,” while also aiming to engage every 
soldier’s whole body to promote symmetrical development.63 
Butts’ performance earned him recognition among peers and superiors alike. After fifteen 
months at the Columbus Barracks, the Headquarters Department of the East, encouraged by its 
adjutant general Colonel Samuel Breck, detailed Butts in 1894 to travel to various posts and 
establish training programs. Butts spent a few months each at posts throughout the East, 
Southeast, and Middle West departments doing so.64 This experience challenged Butts to craft a 
standardized system that could be applied in a wide range of conditions. By 1895, Butts had also 
become something of an expert for his peers. Earlier that year, the Department of the East 
required that each post place an officer in charge of physical training. Several of these newly 
appointed officers wrote to Butts seeking advice and guidance.65 
Butts utilized his knowledge and experience to respond to these requests in two ways. 
First, he published an article in 1895 in the Journal of the Military Service Institution of the 
United States offering his peers some generic advice. Butts directed physical training instructors 
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to secure and improve gym facilities initially, then prepare themselves as athletes and 
disciplinarian drill instructors, develop a cadre of assistants, and read a good reference manual 
such as Koehler’s Manual of Calisthenic Exercises.66 Butts also began work on a practical 
manual that would enable “any officer to give regular and beneficial instruction to his 
command.”67  
Just three years after being detailed to tour posts and establish training programs, Butts 
published the first edition of his Manual of Physical Drill. The manual was a practical guide, just 
as Butts intended, designed to “systematize physical training in the army.”68 The system’s 
foundation was a “simple and progressive” five-exercise-set arrangement without rest between 
exercises. Butts applied this structure to a wide variety of exercises, though the core drills 
consisted of calisthenic, rifle, dumbbell, and gymnastic apparatus work. Wall scaling, rope 
climbing, and other activities with obvious practical military value were also included as 
“essential to the athletic training.” While “athletic games and contests” occupied about twenty 
percent of the manual’s pages, they were relegated to the back of the book, confined to track and 
field events, and given only as “matters of general interest and information.”69 As in Koehler’s 
drills, officers led the drills in Butts’ system using commands. Butts recommended that those 
officers drilled their units in thirty-minute sessions at least four times per week. Ideally, whole 
companies would go through the drill together, though Butts allowed for battalions or even 
regiments to exercise together if the lead instructor had several officer assistants.70 Butts 
furnished two ten-day example programs, one for units without much gymnastic apparatus 
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available and one for units with fully equipped gymnasia.71 However, as in Koehler’s manuals 
and the later 1914 manual, Butts left the specific content of each “thirty minutes’ drill” up to 
instructors. 
From its organization and purpose to its recommendations on dress and hygiene, Butts’ 
manual bore Koehler’s unmistakable influence. This is not surprising. After all, Koehler 
instructed Butts during the latter’s cadet years. That instruction was the only formal instruction 
Butts received before becoming an “expert” in the physical training field. Furthermore, Butts 
sought Koehler’s advice when detailed to Columbus Barracks in 1893 and praised Koehler as 
“one of the best authorities on physical culture in this country and certainly one of the most 
successful instructors.”72 Butts’ system differed from Koehler’s in a few regards. For instance, 
Butts placed more emphasis on rifle drill than did Koehler, and he was more open to athletic 
contests held during field days. However, Butts’ definition and valuation of fitness, along with 
the means he thought best to achieve it, generally matched Koehler’s. The differences were more 
a matter of nuance than substance. Prior to 1914, Butts’ Manual of Physical Drill achieved a 
level of influence in the Army equal to or at greater than any of Koehler’s manuals, but the 
physical culture it advanced was chiefly Koehler’s creation. 
Koehler, Butts, and others developed and spread a coherent physical culture that yielded 
similar proposed systems of exercise, but these cultural producers struggled to get the Army to 
put that culture into practice. The systematized training throughout the Army was difficult to 
realize. Gyms may have appeared on posts and recruiting depots may have instituted physical 
training in the 1890s, but articles in professional journals at the time indicate that commanders 
often resisted incorporating systematic and formal physical training, or simply knew too little 
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about it to do much besides permit competitive sports. For instance, Lieutenant Robert Smart, an 
assistant surgeon, complained about this situation in 1901 when he bemoaned the lack of a 
“compulsory system of physical exercise” in the Army. Speaking about the drill required at 
recruiting depots by that time, Smart remarked that what physical drill did exist was “wrong 
because [it was] unsystematic.”73 Exercise was encouraged, but it was left up to local 
commanders and neither structured nor ordered. Smart recommended that authorities superior to 
post commanders make daily exercise compulsory, and then turn that training over to men 
“instructed specially in this branch of military science” at proposed training centers run by 
military medical officers.74 
Three years later, Koehler issued similar complaints in the Infantry Journal’s inaugural 
issue, writing that the “proper physical training of the enlisted man” had been “written about, 
discussed and talked over for a long time, but as yet, except in a few instances, little of lasting 
value has been accomplished.”75 Koehler rejected reliance on competitive athletics, and 
advocated instead using the “splendidly equipped gymnasiums” at most posts to execute 
systematic, supervised physical training.76 In 1905, Fort Snelling’s Superintendent of Athletics, 
Major Robert L. Bullard, observed that there was some excitement for sport in the Army, but few 
commanders arranged training to rationally build better bodies. “The present state of athletics or 
physical training in the army,” Bullard alleged, was “unsystematic, irregular, and uncertain in the 
extreme.”77 By 1907, little had changed. Koehler again wrote to the Infantry Journal 
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complaining that commanders did not treat physical training with the “degree of seriousness 
commensurate with its importance.”78 According to Koehler, company commanders did not 
integrate physical training into daily schedules and did not compel most of their men to 
participate in what little training commanders did schedule. Furthermore, senior commanders 
“considered their duty ended with the issuance of orders pertaining to the subject.”79 
The challenge confronting the Army was not one of resources, but of will and 
organization. By the first decade of the twentieth century, the Army had well-equipped 
gymnasiums at most posts and was building more. Several manuals were in print that laid out 
exercise systems specifically for Army use. The Army also had a body of officers able to put 
those systems into practice, whether they were medical officers or West Point graduates with 
rudimentary training as instructors. Yet the Army lacked a central authority to control and direct 
training. Koehler and others pointed to contemporary European practices as a possible model. 
One example was British Army’s Gymnastic Staff at Aldershot, which was established in 1860 
as a central school with a permanent staff to train instructors for every regiment in the British 
Army.80 Establishing such a center for the U.S. Army was problematic, so much that Lieutenant 
Colonel Greenleaf argued in 1891 that the creation of a permanent organization required an act 
of Congress. Without a legal basis, he predicted, a permanent organization’s future would be 
forever in jeopardy, subject to the whims of each new senior Army authority.81 
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Assuming that such a law could be passed, Greenleaf suggested the United States 
Military Academy (USMA) as a prospective location for such a center. This argument made 
sense in 1891 purely from an organizational and bureaucratic perspective. A chair at USMA 
would require few new resources to stand up, and the organization would be well positioned to 
transmit training practices into the Army through each year’s graduating class. Pointing to the 
United States Naval Academy as an example, Greenleaf argued that the leader of such an 
organization should be a medical officer well-versed in anatomy, and capable of precisely, 
efficiently, and safely honing the human body.82 Yet West Point did not have a department of 
physiology and hygiene like Annapolis. Instead, it had a Master of the Sword, Herman Koehler. 
Despite this, the argument for West Point as the seat of a permanent physical training center 
made more sense every year. As Koehler’s reputation and influence grew, and as his tenure 
lengthened into seeming permanency, there seemed no better choice. Additionally, Koehler 
enjoyed the patronage of West Point’s superintendents, who advocated for Koehler in the 
Army’s highest echelons. Koehler’s 1892 manual was the product of such lobbying, as was the 
USMA-dominated board that produced the 1914 manual.83 Still, Congressional action or, more 
realistically, firm commitment and orders from a senior Army leader was necessary to make 
systematic training a fixture across the Army. 
Movement toward such a top-down directive began in the mid-1890s thanks to a trio of 
senior leader sponsors: Generals Nelson Miles and Franklin Bell, and President Theodore 
Roosevelt. The directives these three leaders issued did not resolve all existing problems, but 
they began moving the organization toward a standardized training model. Miles took the initial 
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steps, first as the commander of the Department of the East between 1894 and 1895, and later as 
commanding general of the United States Army from 1895 to 1903. In the former position, Miles 
had a hand in assigning Butts to his educative tour of army posts, requiring athletics officers at 
each post, directing units within his department to conduct regular physical training, and 
publishing several pamphlets and circulars on training.84 As Commanding General, Miles 
continued promoting the benefits of physical training as something of a celebrity fitness role 
model and enthusiast. Perhaps his most notable stunt in this role was his surprise eight-hour, 90-
mile horseback ride in July 1903, just a month before his mandatory retirement at age 64. Miles 
supposedly rode the first 35 miles in record time in temperatures as high as 100 degrees. He 
arrived in Fort Reno “fresh as the 34-year-old officer who had been his companion,” having 
definitively proven his fitness by doubling President Theodore Roosevelt’s recent 45-mile 
Laramie-to-Cheyenne ride, which had been considered “quite a physical feat.”85 
More meaningful orders came down from one of Miles’ successors as Chief of Staff of 
the Army, Major General Franklin Bell. An 1878 West Point graduate, Bell is notable for being 
perhaps the most educated of senior officers in the early twentieth century on physical education. 
Although he graduated from West Point before Koehler arrived, Bell experimented with the use 
of gymnastics apparatus to train his troops as a cavalry lieutenant in the 1880s. He later spent a 
summer studying physical culture and training under Harvard’s Dr. Dudley Sargent, one of the 
fathers of American physical education.86 Bell’s experiences in the Indian Wars and Spanish-
American War provoked his continued interest in physical training.87  
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Convinced of the need for improving the American soldier’s physical fitness, Bell, as the 
incoming Chief of Staff, is credited for being the driving force behind the issuance of General 
Order 44 in March 1906.88 This order required cavalry, infantry, and field artillery units in the 
Regular Army to conduct physical training in garrison and in the field. Gymnastics, athletics, 
bayonet, and “kindred exercises” were required in garrison, while practice marches were 
required in the field. Furthermore, all company-level units had to conduct one practice march per 
week at a minimum of at least twelve miles, plus a monthly march of three consecutive days 
when in an active field training period.89 
Bell also partnered with President Roosevelt, himself a famed proponent of the strenuous 
life, in performing fitness “stunts” to promote the value of exercise. For instance, the two 
competed in the fifteen-mile “Muldoon Challenge” in February 1908, which Bell won.90 In 
November of that year, Roosevelt and Bell appeared together at the War College. Both men 
delivered messages about the “desirability of officers keeping in fit condition at all times,” then 
Roosevelt invited the General Staff officers and War College students present to join him on a 
“stroll” that afternoon. Unable to refuse, the 58 officers present followed the president on a 
“bully tramp” through thick woods, up and down rocky cliffs, and across a chin-deep stream.91 A 
month later, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 989, which required an annual physical exam for 
Marine officers that consisted of a fifty-mile march. No similar presidential order was 
forthcoming for the Army, however.92 
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Miles, Bell, and Roosevelt made physical training more visible in the Army, and they 
also made it mandatory in limited ways. What they did not do, however, was specify how 
commanders should conduct physical training. Thus, Koehler and others continued complaining 
even after General Order 44’s issuance that commanders did not take physical training seriously, 
and that the Army needed to systematize its practices. Pressure mounted, as did interest among 
senior leaders. Bell’s successor as Chief of Staff, Major General Leonard Wood, took the next 
step by directing the publication in 1914 of the Army’s Manual of Physical Training. Seeking 
authors for this training system, the Army turned to its internal expert at the United States 
Military Academy, just as Lieutenant Colonel Greenleaf had recommended in 1891.  
The resulting institutionalized physical culture embodied in the 1914 manual therefore 
expressed a body of ideas that had accreted over nearly three decades, chiefly birthed and 
shepherded by Herman Koehler. Four salient elements characterized that culture. First, the 
culture valued psychological qualities at least as much as physical qualities in defining fitness. 
Second, the culture prioritized a unit’s average capabilities over optimizing any individual’s 
physical capacity. Third, the culture built on an assumption that experts possessing specialized 
knowledge and training were essential to fitness. Finally, the culture’s producers assumed that 
the Army’s recruits were of generally high quality, though in need of refinement. Most of these 
characteristics reflected the culture’s second-generation American physical education heritage. 
This second generation emerged after the American Civil War and began transitioning to a third 
generation by 1906. As a result, a divide emerged between physical training practices prevalent 
in the Army and those in higher education and wider American society. 
An analysis of this physical culture should investigate the qualities the culture valued, 
and each quality’s value relative to others. The Army’s first institutionalized physical culture 
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valued a soldier’s psychological qualities at least as much as his physical qualities, and it 
assumed that physical training could address both. As reflected in the 1914 manual, Koehler and 
others presented the benefits of physical training as a pyramid. Physical qualities formed the 
pyramid’s foundation. None of these qualities were surprising or new: strength, endurance, 
improved posture and appearance, agility, gracefulness, general health, resilience to disease and 
injury, and muscular efficiency. However, advocates of systematic training claimed to be able to 
produce bigger gains faster by leveraging the latest advances in the professionalizing fields of 
physical education and training for the sole purpose of improving bodies. The application of new 
methods also addressed the pyramid’s second level: confidence, courage, self-reliance, and 
willpower. Koehler labeled these “psychologic” qualities. For him, intentional development of 
specific psychologic qualities was the “essential different” between military and civilian physical 
training, and a key goal for military training.93 The Army’s 1914 manual summarized these 
qualities using one of Koehler’s well-worn sayings: they induced “men to dare because of the 
consciousness to do.”94  
At the top of the pyramid perched an ultimate psychologic quality objective: discipline. 
The definition of discipline in this physical culture reflected an understanding of what the future 
battlefield might demand of the soldier, and of how physical training could prepare soldiers for 
that battlefield. Contemporary theorists of warfare worried over the corrosive effects on 
command and control created by the need to disperse due to the deadliness of modern weapons 
technology. If not in close order, how could units sustain the momentum of an attack? How 
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could soldiers overcome the psychological trauma of combat? Systematic physical training 
advocates responded with a type of discipline that combined individualist and corporate aspects. 
Reading Butts’s and Koehler’s definitions together sheds light on how this combination worked. 
Butts stressed individuality. “With all the discipline that is instilled [in military training],” Butts 
cautioned in 1904, “we do not want the American soldier to lose his individuality—that 
individuality which makes him the greatest soldier in the world.”95 In contrast, Koehler stressed 
subordination, as evident in his description of a disciplined soldier as an “interdependent and 
dependable effective unit, with a direct and definite responsibility to the state.”96  
With its veneer of drill, systematic physical training seemed to encourage Koehler’s 
subordination more than Butts’ individuality. The ideal training sessions imagined and depicted 
in these works always had men in ranks responding in unison to commands issued by forceful, 
disciplinarian paragons of physical fitness. Yet Koehler’s and Butt’s positions were closer than 
they at first appear. Koehler did not seek blind or unthinking obedience, but the “intelligent, 
voluntary subordination of the individual in an equal degree with every other individual.”97 
Subordination was an individual decision, compatible with American ideals of individuality. 
Physical training taught men to control their bodies and to respond to commands. Self-control 
helped men willingly submit themselves to authority and the unit’s needs while retaining their 
individuality, and thus the confidence to act on their own initiative if necessary. Physical training 
conditioned bodies and minds alike, the combination of which was supposed to enable a bottom-
up discipline productive of aggressive team-based action on the battlefield. 
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The logic behind promises of improving psychologic qualities also underwrote promises 
about making soldiers more moral. Period beliefs closely linked strong bodies and strong minds. 
Much as training muscles to submit to the will was thought to develop discipline, exercise was 
thought to strengthen both muscular and moral fibers. Noted psychologist G. Stanley Hall 
expressed the muscles-morals connection clearly in a paper he delivered in 1894: “You cannot 
have a firm will without firm muscles; and there is nothing so dangerous for morals as to have 
the gap between knowing what is right and proper and health and the doing of it, yawn; and it 
always yawns if the muscles get weak.”98  Koehler made similar comments in a draft of the 1914 
manual, writing that “it is the physical that determines the destiny of the intellectual.”99 Physical 
trainers were therefore also cultivators of vigorous, moral, and active masculinity. 
Moral development helped commend the idea of systematic exercise to otherwise doubt-
filled senior officers. Not only did exercise improve discipline and behavior, but it provided a 
healthy alternative to vice.100 Many of the authors urging the Army’s adoption of systematic 
physical training made this argument, sometimes overly simplistically. For example, Lieutenant 
A. B. Donworth, one of the young officers assigned as a gym superintendent, related his own 
college experiences in an 1897 article. Donworth wrote that maintenance fees for damaged 
school property had been on the rise, but after the institution opened a “fine gymnasium,” 
damages dropped dramatically. The reason, according to Donworth, was that the students were 
so tired by evening from exercise that the “property remained unmolested.”101 Most advocates, 
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like their counterparts in civilian education, made more sophisticated arguments that linked 
muscle fiber and moral fiber. One of their most commonly invoked analogies was known as the 
“blacksmith’s arm.” This analogy was based on the observation that the more a blacksmith used 
his arm muscles, the stronger they became. Physical education advocates reasoned that 
exercising man’s will by the disciplined and mutual action of mind and matter could similarly 
strengthen that will.102 Connections between exercise and moral behavior would only grow more 
influential as a justification for physical training in the years to come. 
A second key feature of the new culture’s definition of fitness was an emphasis on 
organizations over individuals. In a 1904 article, Koehler asserted that other armies had adopted 
physical training in the interest of improving whole-army efficiency. Koehler argued that the 
U.S. Army, like other armies, was “most invariably dependent upon the average man,” so the 
“standard of physical excellence which may be attained is dependent directly upon the efforts 
made to develop the average man and the man who is below average.”103 The point of physical 
training was to raise the average level of fitness across an organization, not to maximize 
individual physical capabilities. As Captain L. S. Upton observed a year later in reflecting on his 
Spanish-American War experiences, systematic training could ensure “that each man will be 
developed and made an efficient physical unit in the army machine.” The whole idea of physical 
training, Upton argued, was to “give all soldiers a proper physical development and sufficient 
stamina to make them equal to a required military task with the least number of ineffectives.”104 
To make his point, Upton compared two theoretical battalions, one containing the Army’s best 
sprinters, and the other focused on training their average men. If both ran a mile, the battalion 
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focused on its specialist sprinters would lose a larger percentage as fall-outs than the other, 
making it militarily inferior. Even Butts’ bragging about his trainees’ muscle growth made his 
stress on organizations clear—his statistics only highlighted average gains across units.105 
Valuation of an organization’s average level of fitness above the individual’s capacity 
also manifested in an injury- and exhaustion-avoidance mindset. “Underdoing is rectifiable; 
overdoing is often not,” cautioned the authors of the Army’s 1914 manual, echoing one of 
Koehler’s maxims.106 Systematic training advocates viewed injury and exhaustion as a double 
threat. First, because improved unit efficiency was the ultimate goal of training, injuries were 
counterproductive. Injuries kept men from training and degraded a unit’s combat effectiveness. 
Second, injuries and exhaustion could make soldiers dread physical training. Monotony posed a 
similar threat. If soldiers dreaded training, they would not participate enthusiastically or focus 
their efforts, both of which training advocates regarded as key to developing psychologic 
qualities.107 Furthermore, dread and dissatisfaction worked against the creation of a team 
mentality conducive to discipline. 
 A third key feature of the Army’s first official physical culture concerned a physical 
trainer’s qualifications. Systematic physical training was premised on claims of scientific, expert 
knowledge. Only by precisely applying the specified methods could trainers help soldiers 
achieve the promised psychologic, physical, and organizational benefits. Such precision was 
beyond the reach of people unversed in the nuances of a human body’s composition, 
arrangement, and operations. Some training advocates, almost exclusively medical officers, 
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argued before 1914 that only physicians possessed such knowledge. Pilcher made this case in his 
seminal 1892 article on physical training, noting that many of the day’s “best teachers of 
physical training” held medical degrees and that training regulations in the British Army and 
others required medical officers to supervise gymnastics. Pilcher argued that medical officers 
were uniquely equipped to obviate the “danger of injury from the abuse of exercise” and to 
diagnose “defective parts” of soldiers’ bodies.108 However, while many of the period’s famed 
physical educators held medical degrees, not all did. Similarly, not all medical officers had 
mastered the latest methods of physical training. Finally, given the imbalance between the 
number of men to be trained and the number of medical officers available, a requirement for all 
training to be led by medical officers was impractical. Other experts needed to be found or made. 
 The most efficient and effective system most advocates proposed resembled European 
establishments, especially the British army’s program at Aldershot. This program, created and 
directed by experts assigned to the British Gymnastic Staff, certified trainers who then returned 
to their regiments and served as physical training specialists. Ideas for a similar program in the 
U.S. Army invariably identified West Point as the obvious proponent and Koehler as its director. 
Though not a physician, Koehler could claim the necessary expert knowledge thanks to the 
professionalization of physical education. Yet hopes for a similar “post-graduate” course in the 
U.S. Army had died out by late 1904.109 Instead, Koehler and his compatriots settled for relying 
on West Point graduates as local specialists. Educated by Koehler and his staff as cadets, 
Academy graduates were theoretically equipped to apply a centrally constructed system of 
training.110 This stopgap solution to the expertise problem worked so long as cadets and 
                                                 
108 Pilcher, "The Building of the Soldier," 334-35. 
109 Koehler, Manual of Gymnastic Exercises: Prepared for Use in Service Gymnasiums, 9. 
110 Koehler, "Physical Training in the Army," 11-12. 
90 
 
commanders alike took physical training seriously, and so long as commanders only assigned 
those men most interested in the work as training officers. However, this solution also had 
drawbacks. For example, it produced a limited pool of potential trainers that was not easily 
expansible. Also, potential instructors equipped with the latest knowledge were invariably the 
youngest officers in a unit, and thus they lacked influence over unit training. 
 Finally, those responsible for the Army’s first official physical culture assumed that the 
Army’s recruits were of a generally high quality, even if they harbored doubts about wider 
American society. The period’s cultural producers tended not to explicitly reinforce the popular 
perception of the enlisted ranks being peopled by society’s dregs. However, the culture’s nearly 
complete focus on improving the rank-and-file’s physical fitness and the absence of disciplinary 
training for officers implies some paternalist assumptions about the qualitative differences 
between the two populations. For instance, Butts, ever the American fighting man’s promoter, 
observed in 1895 that the Army’s human material was “of the highest order.” New recruits 
entered with sufficient foundations of strength and endurance, each “well developed in his 
uncouth way.” Physical trainers, Butts declared, needed to make the most of this raw material to 
sculpt each soldier into a “magnificent specimen of physical manhood.”111 A decade later, 
Captain Guy Palmer delivered a similar assessment of the American soldier. New recruits 
possessed a solid foundation, though they lacked “grace, agility, and a knowledge of how to use 
their strength” and displayed unevenly developed bodies. “Latent qualities exist in these men,” 
Palmer observed, but they needed a “course of systematic and wise instruction to bring them 
out.”112 Systematic training advocates generally converged on the idea that to be ready for 
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modern war, the American fighting man, though not his officers, needed honing and to be made 
more efficient. 
 Yet for all their confidence about the quality of the average recruit, systematic training 
advocates regularly hinted at their doubts about the quality of men in wider American society. 
Sometimes these doubts reflected anxieties springing from the period’s dominant Darwinian 
racial theories. Major Henry Kilbourne, an army surgeon, sounded such an alarm in a paper for a 
panel on military physical training during the 1897 Association of Military Surgeons conference. 
Alongside presenters proposing systems of training and debating the place of athletics in the 
Army, Kilbourne warned that the average quality of the American population was decreasing due 
to racial mixing. The “swarthy, low-browed and stunted people now swarming to our shores” 
were problematic, he cautioned, because physical training could only enhance what was already 
naturally available. Perhaps Butts’ superior American recruit would become a thing of the 
past.113 Other anxieties sprang from the perceived neurasthenia crisis gripping American and 
western European societies. Koehler himself gave voice to these concerns in a draft of the 
Army’s 1914 manual: the “primitive and simple methods of life” that had cultivated a “physical 
and moral hardihood” in American men were under threat from modern conveniences on one 
hand, and urbanization on the other. Koehler estimated that less than 50 percent of men aged 18 
to 45 were physically healthy enough to serve as a result.114  
 Those men most responsible for constructing a physical culture around systematic 
training assumed they would sculpt generally high-quality raw material, even as they echoed the 
era’s concerns about the suitability of most men for modern war. Rarely did these cultural 
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producers give any written consideration to mass mobilization’s implications for their physical 
training systems. The closest most came was a vague hope that men introduced to physical 
training in the service would take their fitness knowledge, skills, and enthusiasm out into 
American society, thereby “pre-conditioning” the next generation of soldiers for service. One of 
the clearest expressions of this hope is found in then-Captain Merch Stewart’s Physical 
Development of the Infantry Soldier (1913). A prolific author, veteran of the Spanish-American 
War, and future West Point Superintendent, Stewart argued that all able-bodied male citizens 
between the ages of 18 and 45 were liable for military service, so all were obligated to improve 
their fitness.115 Yet exhortation could not replace planning for an influx of lower-quality recruits, 
especially given that the Army included few expert trainers and had only a narrow, fixed pipeline 
for producing new trainers. Differing perceptions of human material in and out of uniform 
suggest that this physical culture was geared chiefly toward a small regular army’s needs.  
Apart from training manuals, nothing more clearly illuminated the outlines and elements 
of the Army’s first official physical culture than did debate over sport’s place in the military at 
the turn of the twentieth century. Additionally, this debate continued influencing the Army’s 
physical culture and physical training practices over the subsequent decades as later chapters will 
demonstrate. Enthusiasm for sport and systematic physical training grew up together in the 
decades following the American Civil War. The sporting movement in the U.S. Army chiefly 
resulted from grassroots interest and organization. Soldiers’ interest in athletics coincided with 
the rise of a sporting craze in late-nineteenth century America. Their interest also coincided with 
more general reform movements within the military, especially after the Spanish-American War, 
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and with social reform movements that painted sport as an alternative to vice.116 The military’s 
sporting germ arguably originated at the academies, a key inflection point being the inaugural 
Army-Navy football game in 1890, before spreading throughout the larger force. In the 1890s, 
attitudes toward sport shifted from toleration to a willingness to experiment. Athletics gradually 
became part of the duty day for some soldiers in this decade. By the 1900s, sport enjoyed 
“unqualified acceptance” as one of the “essential elements of soldier training,” according to 
historian Steven Pope.117 
Linked by one historian as synergistic trends, sport and systematic physical training also 
represented two different, though related, physical cultures.118 Systematic physical training 
sought to organize and rationalize training practices from the top-down, and it emphasized 
average unit performance. Sports arose from a bottom-up popular movement and tended to 
celebrate the elite individual athlete’s performance. Systematic physical training activists such as 
Koehler and Butts saw both opportunity and peril in sports. On one hand, field days and athletic 
competitions built esprit de corps, celebrated physical capabilities, and encouraged interest in 
training among many soldiers. On the other, competition inclined leaders to focus on their star 
athletes and pushed soldiers to specialize instead of seeking harmonious, balanced development. 
A few went even further, arguing that sports were “mere play” as opposed to the “serious nature” 
of a soldier’s calling, so therefore the “kindergarten methods” of sport did not advance 
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training.119 These activists’ negotiation of the sports issue clarifies the outlines and contours of 
their own physical culture. 
Two articles paired under the title “Athletics in the Army” in a 1905 edition of the 
Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States captured the potential and 
problems nearly all systematic training advocates perceived in sports. In one article, Captain H. 
Hawkins expressed deep concern about the proliferation of field days and their pernicious effects 
on soldiers’ bodies and command climates alike. Field days, common features of Army life by 
1905, set aside a day or more from regular training so that entire units could participate in and 
observe athletic competitions. Hawkins described this application of athletics as submission to a 
sporting craze or fad, and argued that commanders were wrong to think of these days as physical 
training. Only men who could already run well or play a sport participated, and the rest of the 
unit’s men “merely clap their hands at the performances of their representatives.”120 The elite 
competitors benefitted little physically from participation, though they risked injury, and the rest 
did not benefit at all. In the other article, Major Robert Bullard claimed that enthusiasm for sport 
reflected a deeper concern about physical training and development present in American society 
at the time. On the whole, Bullard found athletics to be a potentially positive tool for shaping fit 
bodies necessary for soldiering. However, Bullard took issue with the Army’s unsystematic use 
of athletics that was neither entirely recreational, nor entirely for training. Athletics, he argued, 
must be “subordinated—better—completely swallowed up in the idea of training” and turned 
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from “sport, play and trifling, to training and the serious business of preparation for war.”121 
Both Hawkins and Bullard recognized the need for physical training and the potential role 
athletics could play in it. Yet both also expressed concern about enthusiasm for sports derailing 
more serious and constructive means to build better bodies. 
Bullard and Hawkins were typical of systematic training advocates at the turn of the 
century. Linking their ideas to the physical culture made official in 1914 requires an exploration 
of Butts’ and Koehler’s ideas too, both of whom proved so influential in creating that culture. 
Over more than a decade of writing, Butts consistently argued in favor of athletic competitions. 
While inaugurating physical training at Columbus Barracks in 1893, Butts also inaugurated 
regular post field days. As late as 1905, Butts still hoped for the day when these post field days 
might culminate in Department or All-Army championships equal in import to the annual Army 
Rifle Competition.122 Butts valued all kinds of field day competitions. However, he advised that 
the bulk of the events be military in nature, such as wall-scaling or tent-pitching, and involve as 
many members of a unit as possible.123 Every officer, and especially those young graduates of 
West Point, had a duty to encourage all kinds of athletic activities according to Butts. 
Still, “national sports” such as baseball and football also found favor. Butts listed the 
benefits of sport in many of his works, including building esprit de corps, inspiring soldiers to 
emulation, and providing an alternative to vice. Butts also saw sport as a way to simultaneously 
build discipline and individuality. Comparing ball players and skirmishers, Butts contended that 
both must be “subservient to and united with” the team’s efforts, and yet able to take “quick and 
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prompt individual action” on which success often depends. “An able player on the ball field will 
not forget his tactics on a field of battle,” Butts wrote, “and an able captain of a ball team will 
make an abler captain in the deadlier game of war.”124 Given his cadet reputation as a remarkable 
athlete, his enthusiasm is not surprising. Yet for all of the eloquence Butts invested in celebrating 
sport, it never figured as more than a complement to the core of his system—systematic, 
disciplinary gymnastic training. Take the composition of his physical training manual, for 
instance. Track and field training information earns a chapter, and intercollegiate and amateur 
track and field records earn a page, but both were appended to the end of the manual and added 
simply “as matters of general interest and information.”125 
Tension was also present in Koehler’s consistent opinion of sport. During his tenure as 
the Academy’s Master of the Sword, intercollegiate athletics blossomed at West Point, led by an 
interest in football as at so many other institutions of higher education at the time. In fact, 
Koehler served as head coach of the Army football team from 1897-1900 and remained involved 
with the team in later years.126 Koehler also oversaw the institution of mandatory intramural 
athletics for all cadets in 1920, a practice that continues in the present day. Yet Koehler also 
argued against athletics in the army. For instance, in a 1904 article Koehler urged the Army to 
adopt a system of training that would raise that physical standard of all its members, but 
remarked that “it is needless to add that competitive athletics do not and can not do this.”127 
Though a fan of the sort of field days Butts advocated, which Koehler labeled “organization 
competition,” Koehler also argued against the proliferation of field days on units’ training 
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calendars.128 Similarly, Koehler worked to advance sport at West Point, but ignored the topic in 
his 1892 and 1904 manuals, and only briefly covered track and field events in the Army’s 1914 
manual. 
How does one explain the disapproval of sport in the Army voiced by one of the most 
influential figures in the history of West Point athletics? Features of the systematic physical 
training culture Koehler fathered are key to unlocking this puzzle. Physical training in the Army 
was supposed to improve a unit’s average fitness and symmetrically develop all soldiers, while 
simultaneously promoting discipline and other psychologic qualities. In contrast, Koehler 
believed that competitive athletics targeted small populations of men for specialized 
development who were generally already fit. Competition also inclined participants to focus on 
victory over training, which posed increased risks of injury. Competition’s seductiveness also 
threatened to take time and attention away from the serious business of physical training. 
A manifesto Koehler wrote in 1909 on the “theory and practice of athletics” at West 
Point for the Academy’s nascent Athletic Council helps explain why he thought West Point was 
uniquely capable of avoiding these hazards. In this paper, Koehler argued that West Point’s 
physical training goal had always been to develop the “very highest possible standard of general 
excellence of the mass of its students.”129 Competitive athletics, he asserted, could support that 
objective because West Point already had a mandatory systematic training program for all cadets 
and the Academy’s supervisory organizations were dedicated to keeping sport aligned with the 
developmental mission. In short, all cadets developed a foundation of fitness in systematic 
training, then those that desired additional challenges could try out for competitive sports teams. 
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This aligned with his consistent position that competitive athletics, while potentially valuable, 
should “never be more than an incident in the system of training of soldiers.”130  
Conditions in the Army did not match conditions at West Point, so Koehler doubted that 
competitive athletics could remain incidental. If all commanders were not dedicated first and 
foremost to systematic training, and the Army’s highest authorities did not make such training 
mandatory, then competitive athletics would spin out of control. Koehler’s experiences at the 
Academy likely reinforced his beliefs. After all, his 1909 manifesto responded directly to 
competitive athletics having spun out of control at the Academy a few years prior. While the 
Academy’s Superintendent, Colonel Hugh Scott, had been away on an extended absence in 1908, 
members of the Army Athletic Association had threatened to cancel the annual Army-Navy 
football game over a player eligibility dispute with the Naval Academy. For Scott, this was a last 
straw. The Army Athletic Association, founded in 1892 as a private booster organization that 
funded competitive athletics and scheduled competitions, had grown too independent and lacked 
a focus on the Academy’s core educational and developmental mission.131 Scott responded by 
establishing his own Athletic Council composed of the commandant, master of the sword, and 
various officers from the Superintendent’s staff.132 This council directed the activities of the 
newly re-chartered Army Athletic Association, bringing competitive athletics under the tight 
supervisory control Koehler extolled as one of two key reasons why competitive sport could be 
part of a cadet’s daily life, but not necessarily a soldier’s.  
In their views on sport, emphasis on psychological qualities and group fitness, and links 
between mental, physical, and moral qualities, the producers responsible for the Army’s first 
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official physical culture reflected the second generation of American physical education. 
Capitalizing on the American public’s fascination with health, strength, and fitness in the 
decades following the Civil War, this generation claimed expert knowledge based on physiology, 
theories of evolution, and traditional practices associated with ethnic groups. Scientific training 
and knowledge set this generation apart from its forebears, though much of the earlier 
millenarianism of antebellum health reformers endured. The leading thinkers of physical 
education’s second generation included physicians as well as self-styled physical educators or 
trainers, much like the population of principals behind the Army’s physical culture. Historian 
Roberta Park has shown that second generation physical education claimed two functions: 
hygienic and educative. Physical education goals were broad and comprehensive, including 
physical, mental, and moral development. These ideas match language Koehler and his peers 
used throughout their works. Second generation physical educators also stressed the need to 
direct exercise toward specific goals, and to confine exercise within tight limits set by experts 
who prioritized physical, mental, and moral development over victory in competition.133 Like 
Koehler, Butts, and other Army training advocates, second generation physical educators 
endorsed sport, but only as a complement to gymnastics and other types of disciplinary 
training.134 Similarly, physical educators also struggled against the constant threat of sport’s 
popularity overwhelming their serious goals in physical training. 
Identifying these common roots is important in light of the eventual divergence between 
the Army’s physical culture and American physical education. Where the Army’s 
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institutionalized physical culture remained stable, around 1906 American physical education 
moved into a third generation that began embracing sport. Many factors propelled this move, 
such as the increasing influence of social science and psychology over physiology, the pressure 
of popular culture, the growth of professional and college sports, and the rise of the play 
movement and child development theory.135 The Army’s official physical culture proved more 
resistant to change. Resistance stemmed partly from the decisive influence Koehler and his 
disciples exercised on policy, and partly from the overlap between military values and practices 
with the gymnastics and psychologic outcomes touted by second generation physical education. 
More and more, fitness in American physical education and wider American society meant 
“normal” social development and a healthy body. In the Army, antebellum and even earlier 
values endured. Fitness in the Army meant health, strength, resilience, confidence, and 
discipline, and psychologic qualities were just as important as physical qualities. Fitness also 
continued to have an organizational component: fitness was an obligation owed to the unit and 
nation, improving the unit’s weakest link remained the top priority, and a fit body was one 
placed in willing submission to the group’s needs. 
The 1914 physical training manual makes clear that the Army had come a long way in 
addressing Greenleaf’s 1891 warning that the American soldier was something less than a model 
of physical perfection. Though Koehler and his compatriots still complained about the 
implementation of systematic physical training and dangers of the field day, the Army as an 
institution had decisively embraced their mode of physical training. Such training seemed well-
suited to the perceived demands of the modern battlefield. There mass mattered more than 
quality by 1914, though a higher quality mass trumped lower quality masses. While the scale of 
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war grew, loss of the “elbow touch” in combat demanded more of the individual soldier. 
Discipline seemed critical given the corrosive effects of battle’s enhanced physical and 
psychological challenges. Yet discipline taken too far and made too strict could also squelch the 
individual initiative that also seemed necessary when every soldier had essentially become a 
skirmisher.  
Producers of the Army’s physical culture promised to give American soldiers a 
competitive edge in this environment. By using expert knowledge of the body and mind to 
construct systems of training, these cultural producers planned to sculpt stronger bodies and 
minds than had been possible using older, incidental modes of physical training. Though not 
intended to make individual supermen, the new physical training promised an improved average 
level of fitness for whole units. Men accustomed to subordinating their bodies to their will, and 
their will to the unit’s needs, could enter modern battle confident of success, if not survival. 
Disciplined and enhanced bodies, minds, and morals—such were the assurances of this physical 
culture. But given the limited capacity to produce certified trainers, the growing divergence from 
thought and practice in American physical education, and the assumption of building from 
relatively high-quality human material, how truly ready was this culture for the demands of mass 
mobilization and modern war? 
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Chapter 3: The U.S. Army’s Battle of the Systems, 1914-1920 
World War I is commonly remembered as a machine war or an industrial war, but it was 
a war of flesh and blood as well. Gradual changes in weapons technology culminated in the 
Great War, rendering battlefield conditions vastly different from those of a century prior. 
Machine guns, rifles firing with smokeless powder, and huge concentrations of artillery pieces 
lobbing high explosives drove soldiers underground and created strangely empty battlefields. In 
the generation before 1914, most of Europe’s leading military thinkers had posited an aggressive 
offensive mindset as the best way of overcoming the advantages that accrued to the defense 
through new weapons technology. According to this body of thought, the strategic offensive was 
necessary to win a war, and this depended upon offensive success at the tactical level. If 
opposing forces possessed similar technology, then victory would go to the side whose men were 
stronger, faster, more resilient, and more motivated.1 Firepower could enable offensive action but 
man was the determinant for success. European militaries had looked to physical training 
systems for decades as a way to gain that critical edge in qualitative manpower, and in many 
cases they expanded those systems during World War I. 
 The U.S. Army was no different in this regard. Physical training was a major component 
of every soldier’s preparation and Koehler’s physical culture initially guided it. Koehler and his 
system were both regular features of preparedness camps in the summers of 1915 and 1916, for 
instance. When the Army began mobilizing in 1917, Koehler’s Special Regulations No. 23 
equipped leaders to execute physical training even in spartan field conditions. Experience in 
combat only reinforced the value leaders inside and outside the military placed on physical 
training. When noted physical educator Luther Gulick returned from a visit to the American 
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Expeditionary Forces in Europe in 1918, he brought a message for his fellow physical 
educators—physical fitness in war had become more important than ever. Gulick dismissed 
certain pre-war theories that suggested modern war would be one of machines and that the 
improved ability to kill from a distance devalued physical strength, speed, and endurance. 
Nothing, he argued, could be further from the truth. The willingness to do or die counted, but 
“plain physical capacity” was just as important. Victory went to the man who could endure 
longer, march further, and fight harder. Gulick declared that even in the land of the machine gun 
and artillery shell, man’s physical fitness remained the “foundation of all success in war.”2 Even 
as leaders continued to emphasize physical fitness, the means of building up that foundation 
changed drastically between 1917 and 1918. In that narrow window, an insurgent corps of 
civilians entered the scene and challenged the physical culture the Army had so recently 
sanctioned as official after thirty years of development.  
 This chapter charts the displacement of Koehler and his compatriots as the Army’s 
primary producers of physical culture between 1917 and 1920. The relative decline of Koehler’s 
institutional power within the Army began in 1917 when mobilized civilians serving in the newly 
created Commission on Training Camp Activities (CTCA) suddenly took charge of recreational 
athletics and physical training in the Army. This chapter begins with the story of their rise to 
power and the mechanisms that made possible their dominance. Next, this chapter explores the 
system these civilian leaders developed. Unfettered by Army’s conventions and existing physical 
culture and bearing fresh ideas from the world of physical education about what physical training 
could be, the CTCA’s civilian cadre crafted a new physical culture. This new culture was more 
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inclusive of varied activities, more focused on combat-oriented functional, and more concerned 
with efficiently sculpting the individual soldier into an effective fighting machine. Within the 
context of a perceived crisis engendered by surprisingly high rates of draft rejections for physical 
and mental inadequacy, such efficiency seemed critical. Finally, this chapter concludes with an 
examination of efforts to make permanent this new physical culture within the Army. 
 
 As conscription began swelling the U.S. Army’s ranks in the late summer of 1917, the 
Army struggled to deliver sufficient physical training to its new recruits. At the beginning of 
1917, the Army counted nearly 300,000 men in uniform in either the Regular Army or National 
Guard. By November 1918, that population exploded to nearly 3.9 million.3 The bodies and 
minds of those recruits needed strengthening, toughening, and sculpting, but the Army lacked an 
expansible corps of physical trainers able to meet the demand. Despite the Army’s embrace of 
the physical culture developed by Koehler and his compatriots, it had not invested in a training 
pipeline to create and certify trainers. Calls for a central school on the Aldershot model had come 
to naught, and Koehler’s alternate proposal for a “post-graduate” course at West Point had 
withered by 1904.4 
 Instead of a central school, the Army had opted to rely on West Point for the production 
of its physical trainers. Young West Point graduates, all beneficiaries of Koehler’s instruction, 
assumed various duties at their new units as athletic officers and gymnasium directors. Though 
this system worked reasonably well in the pre-war Army, it proved wholly inadequate to the 
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challenge of mass mobilization.5 West Point’s accelerated program turned out hundreds of new 
officers during the war years. Yet their physical training education was curtailed, other duties 
quickly consumed their time, and they simply numbered too few. Without a central school for 
physical trainers, the Army could not equip newly enlisted and commissioned citizen-soldiers 
with the knowledge and skills to lead training. Thus, the Army was incapable of expanding its 
corps of physical trainers to meet the demands of mobilization. 
 Similar shortfalls in other areas ranging from logistics management to psychological 
evaluations challenged the Army’s ability to mobilize on such a vast scale. To make up for these 
shortfalls, the Army, and President Woodrow Wilson’s administration more broadly, turned to 
civilian elites.6 One such civilian-led organization, the Commission on Training Camp Activities 
(CTCA), rapidly assumed responsibility for the care of soldiers’ bodies, minds, and morals. 
Wilson established the CTCA on 17 April 1917, just eleven days after the U.S. entered World 
War I, and charged it with preventing the spread of venereal disease among soldiers. According 
to the CTCA, victory would come through "man-power and manhood,” so the commission 
dedicated its efforts to cultivating both.7 
In part, the CTCA’s existence revealed the obligation the Wilson administration felt 
toward the young men that it drafted into service. America’s youth were called in unprecedented 
numbers for a cause portrayed in highly moralistic terms. Accordingly, those men should be 
moral warriors and return home bearing only those scars “won in honorable conflict.”8 The 
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CTCA’s campaign against venereal disease and the immoral influences traditionally associated 
with military encampments by Americans helped assuage the public’s concerns about entrusting 
its young men to the military.9 
 The CTCA’s mission also revealed two other impulses in the Wilson administration’s 
management of the war effort. Efficiency was the first of these. Rumors at the time held that 
venereal disease ravaged the armies fighting in Europe--supposedly, the Austrian army alone had 
lost upwards of 67 divisions worth of men to it.10 Reduction in venereal disease rates therefore 
seemed an excellent way to minimize wastage. Additionally, the soldiers themselves would be 
more efficient if content and engaged. The second impulse was toward social engineering on a 
massive scale. Progressives in the Wilson administration perceived an opportunity to reshape 
American society using soldiers and their training camps as a vector. Instead of introducing men 
to vice, military service could teach men healthy alternatives. Soldiers could return home with 
their bodies “strengthened and more virile,” their minds “deepened and enriched by participation 
in a great, heroic enterprise,” and their spirits enhanced by values “which come from a full life 
lived well and wholesomely.”11 After the crusade in Europe, American soldiers could bring the 
crusade home as the vanguard in a campaign of national uplift. 
 Both impulses were evident in the ideas and actions of the CTCA’s director, Raymond 
Fosdick, and the man to whom the CTCA answered, Secretary of War Newton Baker. Both were 
Progressives keen on improving American morals and leveraging social engineering for 
reform.12 Fosdick, a city official in New York who had made his name as an investigator of 
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European and American police systems, first encountered the problem of morality in military 
training camps in August 1916. That summer, U.S. soldiers deployed to the Mexican border 
found themselves bored in a hot and desolate land. Alcohol and prostitutes helped fill the dull 
hours. Alarmed by reports of vice, the War Department dispatched Fosdick as a special agent to 
study conditions.13  
Fosdick’s report earned him the chairmanship of the CTCA in 1917. He waged his 
subsequent campaign against venereal disease and vice on many fronts. For instance, the CTCA 
established in-camp alternatives to vice such as libraries, clubs, and hostess houses. The 
organization also used repression, such as in their agents’ heavy-handed dealings with 
communities near training camps when rooting out illegal liquor sales and prostitution. The 
CTCA also sought to improve soldiers through educational programs, singing, sport, and more. 
Such diverse lines of effort demonstrate that Baker, Fosdick, and their chief subordinates 
conceived of their mission in broad terms and were willing to pursue their objectives 
aggressively by many means.  
 Athletics instantly emerged as a key tool in the CTCA’s grand campaign to combat 
venereal disease, improve efficiency, and remake American society. Sports and exercise fulfilled 
the CTCA’s immediate mission of providing healthy alternatives to vice. Soldiers could spend 
their energy in exercise and their spare time playing in or spectating at sporting events. Such 
arguments had long been among the justifications for recreational athletics, gym construction, 
and systematic physical training in the military. Additionally, sporting events could tie training 
camps and their local communities together more tightly through wholesome competition, which 
advanced the CTCA’s vision of reshaping society. Athletics also enabled the CTCA’s 
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Progressive leadership to pursue what historian Nancy Bristow has identified as one of their 
prime objectives: cultivation of an active middle-class masculinity to counter the feminization 
wrought by industrialization and urbanization.14 Ideally, soldiers would take their new 
knowledge of and zest for physical activity back to their communities after discharge. Former 
soldiers were vectors for revitalizing, and re-masculinizing, an enervated American society. 
Finally, athletics had obvious and direct military relevance. At least three decades of cultural, 
intellectual, and institutional momentum ensured that many of the Army’s leaders were receptive 
to athletics, even if the Army’s official physical culture separated athletics and training. The 
CTCA, dedicated to “educate the men to be better fighting organisms,” capitalized on easy 
analogies and this moment in claiming that athletics could make men fit to fight and keep them 
that way.15 
 Responsibility for athletics fell to the CTCA’s Athletic Division, headed by Princeton’s 
Joseph Raycroft. This division, and Raycroft specifically, ultimately displaced Koehler between 
1917 and 1920 as chief producer of official Army physical culture. The CTCA’s authority and 
reach made the displacement possible. Part of that authority derived from the professional 
credentials Raycroft and others like him brought to bear. A member of the University of 
Chicago’s first graduating class in 1896, Raycroft earned his doctoral degree in medicine from 
Rush Medical College in 1899. He later returned to Chicago as a full professor and served for 
twelve years as the university’s medical director. In 1911, Raycroft became Princeton’s second 
chairman of health and physical education, a position he retained until retirement in 1936. 
Among many other accomplishments at Princeton, Raycroft championed expanding the school’s 
intramural athletics. He based his Princeton program partly on arguments that unhealthy students 
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lowered the efficiency of the institution as a whole and that healthy bodies were essential for 
“clear thinking, clean living and efficient citizenship.”16 He also called on physical educators to 
design outcome-oriented programs instead of prescribing general programs. For Raycroft, 
physical education’s ultimate purpose was training the person to “get normal control of himself 
and to adapt himself to his environment.”17 At Princeton and in the Army, Raycroft championed 
a holistic, educational approach to physical training intended to produce positive mental, moral, 
and physical effects in its subjects.18 Raycroft’s belief in holistic education belonged to the new 
school of physical education, which had diverged from the thought and practice informing the 
Army’s physical culture around 1906.  
 The Athletic Division differed from benevolent organizations such as the Young Men’s 
Christian Association (Y.M.C.A.) and Knights of Columbus, which facilitated recreational 
athletics in camps and overseas, by aggressively interceding in military training.19 In May 1917, 
less than a month after the CTCA’s creation, Raycroft laid out his understanding of the problems 
facing physical training and his proposed solutions in a memorandum for the Army’s General 
Staff. This memorandum reveals Raycroft’s desire to fundamentally change Army physical 
training practices. In it, Raycroft asserted that the U.S. Army had to rapidly mold the “raw, 
untrained material from civil life” into men ready for “technical military training.” In brief, the 
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problem was to bring men up to “a condition of maximum physical and mental efficiency in the 
shortest space of time.” Raycroft urged a “simple, intensive, uniform” training program to 
develop the “body control, physical reserve and endurance demanded by modern warfare.”20 
According to Raycroft, doing so demanded an increase in scale, more central control, further 
standardization, and the use of “more varied types of physical activities” beyond the disciplinary 
exercises Koehler’s culture promoted.21 The Athletic Division prided itself on its open-
mindedness to any methods, whatever their source that would help them achieve their goals.22 
Raycroft and his community of newly empowered civilians were unfettered by Army traditions 
and many of the assumptions that underwrote the Army’s existing physical culture. 
 To fulfill this vision, Raycroft initially recommended using the Army’s internal resources 
to build up a cadre of physical trainers in the British mold through a central Physical and 
Bayonet School. He envisioned this central school training and certifying instructors in courses 
ranging from one to four weeks in length. As in Britain and Canada, such a school could grow 
and shrink its capacity based on demand, yielding an expansible training pipeline.23 From the 
beginning, Raycroft attached much importance to training trainers. He stressed that success in 
physical training depended upon the spirit and expertise shown by instructors. But expecting 
Koehler and his limited cadre of young West Point graduates to teach all the new conscripts and 
recruits would be inefficient, not to mention physically impossible. Instead, Raycroft wanted 
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experts such as Koehler in a school where they could “teach other men to teach.”24 Raycroft also 
proposed establishment of a physical training control board in Washington to develop the 
thought, practice, and systems to be taught at the central training school.25 Though this board 
never formed, the CTCA’s Athletic Division filled the role, temporarily replacing West Point as 
the de facto agency for development and promulgation of physical training systems. 
Much of Raycroft’s vision for the Army’s future physical training infrastructure reflected 
his study of programs in use by allied forces. In drafting his May 1917 memorandum, Raycroft 
had focused his studies on the British and Canadian systems, and even briefly visited a Canadian 
training camp.26 This was not a new or novel approach. Aldershot had served as a model for 
physical training advocates within the Army for decades. Civilian physical educators newly 
interested in military physical training repeatedly pointed to Aldershot as a model too. After all, 
it demonstrated the feasibility of an expansible central school for trainers, and its course plan 
reflected lessons learned on the battlefields of World War I.27 
 Prompted by Raycroft memorandum, the War Department dispatched Koehler to Toronto 
in June 1917 to study the feasibility of implementing a system like the Canadian Army School of 
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Physical and Bayonet Training in the U.S. Army.28 The curriculum Koehler would have 
encountered differed from his own in many respects, even if both built from a foundation of 
disciplinary physical exercise. For instance, the Canadian system reflected its British roots by 
incorporating both formal and recreational athletics into its training program. Bayonet and hand-
to-hand fighting figured prominently as well.29 Koehler issued a negative report upon his return 
that convinced the War Department that it was “not considered possible to establish a course … 
on the scale suggested.”30 What exactly Koehler found unfeasible or undesirable is not known. 
However, Koehler had expressed hostility in the past to turning over any part of Army physical 
training to civilians, so he may have found it impractical to start up such a school just using the 
military’s limited pool of uniformed experts given the urgency of mobilization. 
 Subsequently, the War Department dispatched Koehler to officers’ training camps instead 
of putting him in a school as Raycroft urged. Koehler spent two to four weeks at these camps 
giving special instruction to selected candidates.31 Graduates of Koehler’s crash course could, in 
theory, lead exercise sessions in accordance with the May 1917 Special Regulations No. 23: 
Field Physical Training of the Soldier.32 This practice essentially continued the Army’s existing 
instructor training program, but where Koehler spent four years preparing West Point graduates 
to lead physical training, he now spent at most four weeks with candidates. Several factors made 
this scheme ineffective. First, Koehler simply could not train enough officers himself. In training 
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at most a few hundred men during each two-to-four week iteration, the scheme did not produce a 
corps sufficient to meet the needs of the Army’s rapidly swelling ranks. Second, other duties 
tended to consume these officers once they arrived at their units, making them unavailable for 
service as physical training instructors.33  
 The War Department did not initially follow through on Raycroft’s recommendations, so 
the Athletic Division’s head shifted his efforts to promote a second scheme. Perceiving that 
Koehler’s assignments to the camps signaled the way forward, Raycroft moved to place his own 
men in training camps. The Athletic Division would recruit leaders of college athletics and insert 
them into camps as athletic officers responsible for organizing training and sports. This plan 
followed the model set by Koehler while capitalizing on a feature common to most Regular 
Army camps, especially those overseas—athletic councils.34 By 1917, athletic councils had been 
in operation for about two decades. Army officers on those councils had been charged with 
organizing and supervising recreational athletic competitions. Raycroft’s proposal would put 
civilians at the head of similar councils that would simultaneously organize training and athletic 
competitions while educating officers on how to do the same in their regiments, battalions, and 
companies.  
The CTCA could not force commanders to accept these men. To get around this, the 
CTCA, with Secretary Baker’s authorization, wrote to camp commanders offering “the right, if 
they so desired” to “invite the services of trained athletic coaches” in order to “stimulate and 
promote the development of a knowledge of the organization and conduct of athletic sports.”35 
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The Athletic Division reserved responsibility for recruiting and managing these civilians. The 
program first rolled out at officers’ training camps. It proved popular and rapidly expanded to 
cover all training camps. By November 1917, the CTCA’s athletic directors were operating in 
sixteen National Army and sixteen National Guard cantonments.36 This training cadre reinforced 
the Athletic Division’s institutional control over physical culture production. Over the following 
two years, they extended Raycroft’s influence down to the division level and below, built a 
school system from the ground up, and used their laboratory of human material to develop a 
comprehensive system of military physical training.  
This influential group initially included physical educators, coaches, and athletic trainers 
mostly pulled from institutions of American higher education at the outset of the war. The War 
Department designated these experts as “civilian aides” to camp and division commanders. For 
the most part, they were enthusiastically welcomed by camp commanders, and most were given 
the title of “Athletic Director.”37 Their duties involved building and leading athletic councils, as 
well as coordinating the work of Y.M.C.A. and Knights of Columbus physical directors already 
organizing recreational activities. In August, the CTCA expanded this program by adding boxing 
experts to serve under the Athletic Directors as special instructors.38 Raycroft prided himself on 
recruiting men as athletic directors, special instructors, and advisors based purely upon their 
qualifications in the subject matter. This led to the recruitment of some unorthodox trainers 
including professional prizefighters, a “Scotchman who had lived in Japan” and there earned a 
fifth-degree black belt, and a “couple of noted knife fighters” from a lumber camp in Mississippi 
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who Raycroft recalled were “very tough guys.”39 Merit-based recruitment reflected Raycroft’s 
commitment to efficiency. Yet it occasionally cut against the Progressive morality project, such 
as when rough-and-tumble instructors failed to model the honorable masculine ideal the CTCA 
sought to cultivate.40 However, the use of these instructors demonstrated Raycroft’s functional, 
combat-oriented definition of fitness that would characterize the physical culture he helped craft. 
 Inserting civilians into military organizations triggered a running debate about whether 
the athletic directors should remain civilians or receive a commission, and even deploy with their 
divisions. In part this debate reflected negotiations over the athletic director’s role. The CTCA’s 
initial pitch to camp commanders emphasized the athletic director’s responsibility for organizing 
and promoting sport. Yet clearly Raycroft and others in the CTCA imagined a larger role for 
their directors. In this regard, the title “athletic director” was somewhat misleading; one Athletic 
Division inspector observed in 1918 that most of a director’s work, and the “most important 
part” of that work, was in physical training.41 Were these civilians really just supposed to 
promote sports, or did their duties blend recreation and training? 
 Civilian status had several benefits. For instance, a civilian aide could more easily get the 
ear of a general than could a captain or major on staff because they retained a unique expert 
status in their area of proficiency instead of appearing as just one more officer among many 
others.42 Many senior leaders therefore believed that civilians potentially push the Athletic 
Division’s agenda more effectively by generating more traction with decision-makers at the 
division level and below. After the war, Raycroft’s former executive officer, John Griffith, 
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recalled that Raycroft’s civilian status opened generals’ doors, which helped him convince key 
leaders of the value of physical training.43 Secretary Baker also viewed civilian status as an asset, 
at least at first. As he observed in June 1917, civilians not only enjoyed the potential of better 
access to senior officers, but they could also build closer relationships with soldiers than could 
officers.44 Again, close relationships could help athletic directors advance the Athletic Division’s 
agenda and spread its emerging physical culture. 
 Civilian status also imposed liabilities, though. Some of these were trivial or merely 
annoying. For instance, Fort Gordon’s athletic director, Thomas Browne, complained about 
receiving extra scrutiny from sentries, being unable to purchase clothing from the quartermaster, 
and difficulties in securing memberships at a nearby country club. Other liabilities posed a 
greater threat to the Athletic Division’s mission: Browne also reported that some officers 
resented being instructed by a civilian, and many objected to him inspecting their physical 
training programs.45 Commissioned athletic directors could, in theory, more effectively 
institutionalize and police their systems of exercise and athletics by their own authority.  
 Despite the advantages that Raycroft apparently enjoyed as a civilian, he argued for 
commissions for his athletic directors as early as May 1917. Raycroft believed his directors 
deserved the pay, privileges, and respect that came with a commission. He also believed that 
commissions increased the likelihood of keeping his directors in the Army on a permanent basis, 
thereby enhancing their long-term influence on physical training policies after the war.46 Finally, 
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Raycroft believed that his division’s responsibilities extended beyond recreational athletics. 
Commissioned physical trainers could make claiming a stake in basic military training easier. 
Raycroft’s and Fosdick’s exertions convinced Baker to reverse his position and authorize some 
commissions in December 1917.47 In January 1918, fourteen athletic directors received 
commissions as captains and were assigned duties as “physical training officers.”48 More would 
follow in 1918, and a few these physical training officers even deployed to Europe with their 
divisions. 
 Commissions won physical training officers some new power in military units. They also 
helped resolve occasionally fractious relationships between the YMCA’s physical directors and 
the CTCA’s representatives. In camps, directors from both organizations found that they shared 
overlapping areas of responsibility and that their relationships were not well defined. This led to 
conflict on occasion, as when one YMCA regional secretary suggested to a camp physical 
director that he organize athletics at his camp so as to impede the CTCA’s newly arrived athletic 
director from participating.49 Conflicts led to a series of letters and meetings between the top 
leaders of both organizations in late 1917. These exchanges produced an agreement between the 
two organizations that required directors in the various camps to develop harmonious working 
relationships. The agreement implied a superior position for the CTCA’s athletic directors, who 
were responsible for coordinating athletics for commanding officers. Yet the agreement forbade 
the athletic directors from issuing orders to their YMCA counterparts.50 Relationships between 
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directors became more vertical and formal as the CTCA’s representatives gained commissions. 
The debates between these organizations are further evidence of the role the CTCA perceived for 
itself in military training. Unlike the YMCA, which worked chiefly to improve soldier morale, 
the CTCA viewed itself as a part of the War Department responsible for the “military efficiency 
of the soldiers.”51 In following this logic, the CTCA’s Athletic Division positioned itself as the 
preeminent authority on physical training and athletics by early 1918.  
 CTCA athletic directors and physical training officers, plus their YMCA physical director 
compatriots, entered service sharing many common ideas. Over time, these ideas gelled into a 
coherent physical culture. For the most part, this was a bottom-up process that resembled, in 
Raycroft’s words, a “great laboratory experiment in the development of human material.”52 
Physical educators and athletic coaches applied their knowledge and experience to improving 
soldiers in each camp’s unique conditions. As these volunteers and their military counterparts 
hashed out practices at the local level, they shared their experiences through organs such as the 
U.S. Army War College and the American Physical Education Review journal.53 The CTCA’s 
Athletic Division also served as a central clearing house for information. Camp athletic directors 
remained in regular communication with the Athletic Division’s office in Washington, D.C., and 
the Athletic Division issued weekly bulletins to their men in the field that included policy 
guidance and highlighted best practices.54 In the spring of 1918, the CTCA began holding 
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regional conferences for their camp athletic directors and boxing instructors. These conferences 
were intended to give directors opportunities to discuss common problems and develop 
solutions.55  
 Raycroft sought to standardize these practices as they cohered into a training system over 
time. This was one of his top priorities from the moment he assumed leadership of the Athletic 
Division.56 Initially, Raycroft envisioned a central school fulfilling this role. When the War 
Department declined to build a central school, Raycroft moved to meet the emergency demand 
with trainers by bringing on civilian experts, but he never gave up on the concept of a central 
school. In April 1918, the Athletic Division once again proposed an Aldershot-like central 
bayonet and physical trainer school, along with expanded duties for physical training officers. 
Raycroft grounded his argument in a review of the Athletic Division’s accomplishments to date, 
and in an awareness that the military would eventually assume responsibility for the services 
civilians had until then provided. Baker approved the recommendations. In July, he directed the 
Athletic Division to coordinate with the General Staff’s Instruction Branch to develop the plans 
further.57 Coordination bore fruit that September in the form of Training Circular No. 19: 
Organization of Physical and Bayonet Training. Among other items, the circular suggested that 
units form Physical Training Boards under commanding officers to supervise and coordinate 
athletic and physical training activities. The boards included a chairman, who was a staff officer 
directly responsible to the commander for physical training, the physical training officer, and 
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selected physical and bayonet training officers, advisers, and instructors.58 These were precisely 
the organizations Raycroft had advocated in his April arguments. Functionally, they combined 
recreational and physical training activities under one body. The boards also consolidated the 
power of the Athletic Division’s officers and directors within camps and units. 
 Another pathway to standardization had emerged organically by the summer of 1918. 
Since late 1917, many camps and divisions had formed schools under their Athletic Directors for 
the creation of physical and bayonet trainers.59 In the summer of 1918, Raycroft capitalized on 
these smaller schools to take concrete steps toward building a central school for the entire Army. 
In June, Raycroft received authorization to put into operation a test school at Rich Field, Texas. 
The school’s ostensible purpose was to improve the physical capabilities of air crew. Every 
aviation field and ground school detailed three men to attend. Officers and civilians detailed by 
the Athletic Division conducted the training under the advisement of the War College’s Training 
Committee.60 In August, the General Staff’s War Plans Division’s Training and Instruction 
Branch authorized a wider “coordination course of physical training.”61 Raycroft selected Camp 
Gordon’s school, run by Captain Thomas Brown, to host this course. Camp Gordon’s school had 
become a robust operation since late 1917. Staffed by more than thirty training officers, the 
school educated both physical training officers for units at Camp Gordon and classes of non-
commissioned officers. Attendees of these latter courses numbered at least 1,500 and were 
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intended to pass on the Athletic Division’s nascent system to the recruits who would soon come 
under their charge.62 
 After fifteen months of effort, the Athletic Division had a central school, though it was 
ostensibly temporary. The division’s physical directors, hand-to-hand fighting specialists, and 
boxing instructors were the first to attend. Raycroft later recalled that this temporary school 
represented a major step toward standardizing Army physical training along the lines of the 
Athletic Division’s emerging system.63 Not only did it increase the likelihood of the Army 
opening a permanent central school, but its graduates received a special certification and returned 
to duty with recommendations for commissions in the Reserve Corps, further institutionalizing 
the Athletic Division’s system and its associated physical culture.  
 Movement toward centralization and standardization of physical training under 
Raycroft’s model continued even as the war drew to a close and the CTCA demobilized. As part 
of that demobilization in 1919, the CTCA recommended establishment of a permanent course in 
physical instruction. The General Staff’s War Plans Division concurred and directed that the 
emergency course at Camp Gordon transfer to Camp Benning.64 Raycroft believed that the 
Benning school marked a “great step upward” in promoting a “comprehensive standardized 
physical ... athletic and bayonet training” throughout the Army on a “permanent basis.”65 
Veterans of Raycroft’s Athletic Division staffed the new school, including senior instructor 
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Major John Griffith, who was Raycroft’s former executive officer.66 Five officers each from the 
Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, and Engineers attended the Benning school’s 
first class between 8 and 30 September 1919. The purpose of this class was twofold. First, it was 
a testbed for Raycroft’s forthcoming manual, which many anticipated would replace the 1914 
Manual of Physical Training.67 Indeed, the course’s content matched Raycroft’s later manual 
exactly. Second, its officer graduates were supposed to establish similar courses at their service 
schools that would propagate the physical culture developed at Benning’s central school.  
 Between 1917 and 1919, Raycroft and his civilian compatriots rapidly displaced Koehler 
as the Army’s primary producers of physical culture. Beginning with a broad charter to improve 
the minds, morals, and muscles of America’s soldiers, the CTCA’s Athletic Division leveraged 
its influence and access at the highest levels of the War Department to reshape physical training 
in the Army. Koehler stayed active throughout this period and his ideas and practices remained 
relevant. For instance, elements of Koehler’s earlier manuals were reprinted for use in 1917, and 
Koehler himself moved from camp to camp conducting training with all the vitality and energy 
he had always displayed. Yet Koehler could not be everywhere. In place of the old Turner and 
his West Point disciples, civilian educators and coaches flooded in with their philosophies of 
fitness from the physical education community. Over time, their ideas coalesced through an 
institutional framework of conferences and schools that were built from the ground-up, but that 
fulfilled Raycroft’s original vision of a central proponent office. Civilian ascendency had major 
consequences for the Army’s physical culture, but what ideas informed the work of those 
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civilians, what sort of physical culture did they sculpt, and how did that culture differ from 
Koehler’s? 
 
 Context is key to understanding this new physical culture, here termed Raycroft’s culture 
in acknowledgement of his central role in conceiving, shaping, packaging, and promoting it. 
First, the men who created it came into the Army in a time of acute emergency with orders to 
address that emergency. Second, they revered efficiency—maximum gain toward a specific 
outcome in minimum time with minimum waste. Third, the producers of Raycroft’s culture 
approached their duties from the perspective of educators, not merely trainers. Finally, Raycroft 
and his partners understood their mission to be part of a broader enterprise concerned with the 
morality and masculinity of young American men.  
In the first case, the War Department called Raycroft and his team to service after the 
U.S. entered World War I and charged them with preparing for combat an army growing more 
massive by the day. The CTCA’s civilians understood themselves as belonging to a world where 
“everything is necessarily subordinated to the need of creating an efficient fighting force.”68 That 
force was preparing to embark on a difficult and dangerous task. Shortly, its troops would enter 
the war in Europe alongside and against veteran forces with years of experience. Raycroft 
viewed physical training as a way to make up for that lack of experience. He and his colleagues 
hoped that an effectively leveraged, comprehensive system of exercise could put American 
recruits near the level of German veterans in terms of mental and physical preparedness, and 
“fighting spirit.”69 Thus the men of the CTCA were not much concerned with the need for 
instilling iron discipline or controlling regulars. Their understanding, or perhaps imagination, of 
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the modern battlefield and combat was grittier than that held by pre-war regular officers. Officers 
such as Edmund Butts who promoted physical fitness prior to 1917 emphasized unit fitness. In 
contrast, CTCA leaders focused on the individual fighting man. This was reflected in Training 
Circular No. 19’s stated purpose: the “development of the greatest possible individual efficiency 
and power in offensive combat.”70 A battalion’s average marching speed was less important in 
this construct than the individual soldier’s grit, aggressiveness, and close combat skills. 
Reverence for efficiency appeared frequently in the texts and practices produced by the 
CTCA’s physical training experts. In a presentation delivered to the Athletic Research Society 
shortly after the war, Raycroft fingered three elements of efficiency that guided his approach to 
developing a military physical training system: a clear conception of the work’s purpose; 
suitability of the means and methods of administering work to achieve that purpose; and 
standards of measurement toward the ultimate purpose. In that same speech, Raycroft rejected as 
too general the promotion of overall strength, vigor, and discipline that he understood to be the 
purpose of pre-war physical training in the Army. Physical training needed more focus. Raycroft 
wanted its purpose to be the advancement of a soldier’s basic military training and his physical 
education.71 Physical training could do more than strengthen muscles and minds; it could make 
soldiers ready for combat.72 This was the basis of Raycroft’s repeated assertion that one 
differentiate between exercise and training when developing a military physical training system. 
Exercise of the sake of exercise was inefficient. Instead, everything needed to contribute to 
building a competent, lethal soldier. However, Raycroft and his compatriots do not appear to 
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have made any significant efforts to compile data on actual physical requirements for combat or 
to determine what specifically soldier needed to be able to do. In reflecting later on their process 
of creating a training system, Raycroft laid out broad objectives, but never mentioned specific 
requirements such as being able to move a given load over a given distance.73 
Raycroft defined physical fitness for such a soldier in his 1920 manual using four 
categories that aligned with his training system’s broad objectives. First, fit soldiers 
demonstrated excellent bearing. They were poised, neat, alert, well disciplined, and precise in 
their movements. Second, fit soldiers possessed physical and mental control. They were 
coordinated and could respond to commands and changing situations rapidly. Control of body 
and mind blessed soldiers with “initiative, persistence, shiftiness, resourcefulness, willingness to 
give and take punishment, nerve, strength, and endurance.” Third, fit soldiers could fight 
unarmed and with a bayonet. Raycroft specifically defined fitness here as a soldier’s ability to 
“acquit himself creditably in a three-round bout with a skilled boxer of his own weight.” Finally, 
fit soldiers could demonstrate achievement of minimum standards in a test that involved running, 
jumping, climbing, throwing, and negotiating obstacles.74 Mental health also appeared 
occasionally in Raycroft’s definition of fitness. He believed that sports and training toughened 
minds, provided an outlet, and prevented soldiers from “getting stale” or giving in to the anxiety 
of combat, which was a route to shell shock.75 
Raycroft’s rejection of exercise for its own sake and his desire to align means in physical 
training with desired outcomes reflected his background as a physical educator. Raycroft shared 
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this background and its attendant perspectives with the Athletic Division’s other experts. In fact, 
Raycroft believed that the purposes of civilian and military physical education were very similar, 
except in some of their specific outcomes. Likewise, the problems both military and educational 
institutions faced were “fundamentally the same.” That problem was, in short, how to leverage 
physical activities to prepare a person for success by developing crucial qualities, whether 
physical or not.76 Koehler and other early advocates of physical training in the Army had voiced 
similar ideas, but the qualities sought by these two generations differed. Koehler’s generation 
focused more on the group and the individual’s role in that group, while Raycroft’s focused more 
on the individual himself. Physical educators of Raycroft’s generation were also willing to use a 
much wider range of physical activity in pursuit of their outcomes. For instance, the Athletic 
Division promoted activities once appreciated purely for the recreational value, such as sports, as 
valued augmentations to the soldier’s “formal training.”77 This willingness reflected the heritage 
of the playground movement and physical education’s embrace of sport, both trends that had 
manifested after civilian and military physical education diverged around the turn of the century. 
Raycroft and his compatriots also demonstrated an awareness of their role in a larger 
social engineering enterprise when crafting their system. The CTCA was dedicated to cultivating 
an active middle-class masculinity in the men of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). In 
turn, the AEF represented America in the world. An article published in the Independent in 1917 
captured this prevailing perspective: the AEF was a model for the world of “a composite, human 
standard of our national ideals.”78 Soldiers needed to be masculine, morally wholesome, and 
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physically fit to meet this standard. Yet those responsible for getting soldiers up to such a 
standard shared a considerably dimmer view of the quality of American men entering the service 
than had Koehler and Butts. Based on high draft rejection rates and personal observation in 
camps, Raycroft found that many were “awkward” for not having had a chance to play and 
undergo athletic training as children.79 The consequences were social, moral, and physical. Such 
a perspective contrasted with Butts’ late-nineteenth century assertions that recruits were high-
quality raw material merely in need of refinement and sculpting. The Athletic Division perceived 
a gap they needed to bridge using physical activity. Their charge was to turn “narrow-chested 
clerks,” “lean-visaged philosophers,” and the “book-keeper and the street-car motorman” into 
soldiers ready for the modern battlefield. Their tools were exercise, sports, and teaching men 
how to “get bumped, and not to mind it.”80 The drive to cultivate a more physical and active 
masculinity in new recruits influenced the structure of Raycroft’s system and pervaded the 
physical culture his system exemplified.  
The clearest expression of Raycroft’s system is in his 1920 book, Mass Physical 
Training, and in the September 1919 operations of the Camp Benning Physical and Bayonet 
Training Course. In writing his book, Raycroft surveyed the programs of instruction fashioned 
by the various divisional and camp schools that had grown up under the Athletic Division’s 
supervision since 1917. Regular communication with the Athletic Division headquarters and 
cross-talk in various channels between athletic directors and physical training officers had 
ensured that these programs were relatively consistent. Raycroft combined these programs into a 
single system and tested that system during the Benning school’s first class. He regarded the 
result as the “first detailed and comprehensive scheme of Physical Training to be adopted by the 
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army.”81 The War Department originally intended to publish Raycroft’s book as an official 
document.  However, post-war budget cuts and downsizing forced the manual into private 
publication.82 Despite its private publication, the General Staff’s War Plans Division under 
Major General William Haan approved the book and directed that its “contents form the basis for 
the training and instruction of the military service of the United States in the subjects 
included.”83 
 Mass Physical Training’s body of subjects was much broader than that of its 1914 
predecessor, the Manual of Physical Training. Raycroft’s system covered six broad categories of 
activity: physical drill, group games, drills in personal contact, individual efficiency tests, mass 
athletics and competitive games, and bayonet training. In contrast, the 1914 manual ostensibly 
embraced ten subjects, but five of those fit within the rubric of Raycroft’s “physical drill.” Three 
other subjects received minimal coverage: running, athletics, and boxing and wrestling. Setting-
up exercises and gymnastic exercises with and without apparatus formed the basis of Koehler’s 
program. Functional training for individual combat characterized Raycroft’s. Exploration of each 
subject in detail supports this characterization. 
Physical drill was the first subject Raycroft addressed. This comprised Koehler’s setting-
up drills and other routines from Koehler’s earlier system. In fact, Raycroft simply adapted his 
drill from Koehler’s manuals.84 Adaptation was not easy or direct, though. At least one CTCA 
athletic director had found Koehler’s physical drill to be a mixed bag. “He has a mass of material 
both good and bad,” this director observed, but instructors tended to pick the bad more often than 
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the good and failed to redeem the drill with expertise as could Koehler.85 Raycroft and his 
partner therefore had to simplify and modify Koehler’s drill to meet their goal, which was to 
enable someone besides the system’s creator to conduct effective training. One of Raycroft’s 
greatest deviations from the pre-existing system was in the emphasis he placed on physical drill. 
In Koehler’s system, the setting-up drills were central to the entire physical culture. In contrast, 
Raycroft considered physical drill a useful only for disciplinary training and education in body 
control, not for exercise.86 Recruits might benefit from improved posture and responsiveness to 
commands, but ultimately physical drill was merely “kindergarten work.”87 
Mass Physical Training’s second subject concerned a wide variety of group games. All 
games were selected for simplicity of organization and their popularity in addition to their 
educational value. Raycroft intended ten of the simplest for use in regular drill periods. Examples 
of these include relay races, tug-of-war, and a mass participation version of red-rover called 
“Over the Top.” Mass Physical Training covered another eighty-three games in its later chapters, 
many of which instructors could also adapt to drill periods, though most filled supervised athletic 
periods and leisure time. Additionally, group games included a series of skirmishing and 
quickening exercises. Many of these were taken directly from French and British practices: bear 
crawl, goose steps, standing long jumps, and more. Movement on the modern battlefield 
demanded that soldiers run while stooped forward, crawl, dash, and dive. Skirmishing drills 
strengthened the muscles needed for such unusual activities. Quickening exercises also prepared 
men to react rapidly to commands. For instance, an instructor might yell “out of my sight” in the 
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eponymously named game to prompt his men to drop whatever they carried and scurry for the 
nearest tree or hole. Raycroft advised that any men remaining visible in this game be singled out 
and made to “feel conspicuous.”88  
Raycroft gave two explanations for including group games in their many forms. First, he 
considered them useful for making soldiers combat-ready, but even more useful for their utility 
in developing mental qualities. Games, skirmishing drills, and quickening exercises presented 
soldiers with rapidly changing conditions, whether due to competition or in response to the 
instructor’s commands. Soldiers had to perceive such changes, make decisions, adapt, and 
respond rapidly. Physical exercise thus achieved mental effects by training “concentration of 
attention, quick thinking and instant execution.”89 Morale building and mental health also 
justified group games. Raycroft asserted that in the Athletic Division’s wartime experience, its 
directors found that such games were more effective than anything else in “preventing discontent 
and homesickness” during training or after returning from the front lines.90 
After the setting-up drill and group games sections, Mass Physical Training diverged 
sharply from its 1914 predecessor with more than fifty pages on personal contact drills. Many 
activities fell under the personal contact rubric, including wrestling, hand-to-hand fighting, and 
boxing. Again, this training was intended to develop mental as well as physical qualities, 
specifically: aggressiveness, personal grit, mental and physical alertness, confidence, and the 
“ability and willingness to carry on in spite of punishment.”91 Treatment of hand-to-hand combat 
training in the Raycroft and Koehler manuals highlights differences between their physical 
cultures. In the 1914 manual, boxing and wrestling made a brief appearance, but were “not 
                                                 
88 Raycroft, Mass Physical Training for Use in the Army and the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, 45. 
89 Ibid., vii, quote on 40. 
90 Ibid., 34. 
91 Ibid., vii-viii. 
131 
 
recommended as an obligatory part of the enlisted man’s training.”92 Koehler encouraged boxing 
and wrestling for their value in strengthening muscles and self-confidence, but he did not 
consider them a key element of physical training.  
In contrast, Raycroft dedicated nearly half his manual to physical contact and combat 
training. A gritty individual warrior paradigm characterized his treatment of the subject. The 
“spirit of hand-to-hand fighting,” Raycroft wrote, “is that of grim, watchful determination.” 
Raycroft advised that aggressiveness and determination were keys to success, and that 
“principles of sportsmanship and consideration” for the opponent had “no place in the practical 
application of this work.”93 Like Koehler, Raycroft valued the physical and mental benefits of 
combat training. However, he also appreciated the functional benefits of the skills themselves. 
This physical culture valued an individual soldier’s ability to control a prisoner and strike, 
strangle, or trip an enemy combatant. Each manual’s imagery made these differences obvious. 
Koehler’s depicted gymnastic contests between opponents in gym clothes. Raycroft’s featured 
combatants apparently locked in mortal combat. 
Later in the manual, Raycroft continued his emphasis on aggressiveness and the gritty 
realities of combat with a chapter on bayonet training. Raycroft considered this “invaluable in 
the basic training” of all soldiers, regardless of branch or duty, chiefly because it developed 
confidence, determination, and a “fighting spirit.”94 The Army had trained its soldiers in bayonet 
fighting for years. However, Raycroft’s manual was the first instance of bayonet training 
featuring as a component of physical training. This fact highlights the functional fitness focus in 
Raycroft’s physical culture. Discipline and obedience were not enough—soldiers had be to ready 
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to kill. Mass Physical Training drove this point home repeatedly. “In a bayonet assault,” 
Raycroft wrote, “all ranks go forward to kill or be killed, and only those who have developed 
skill and strength by constant training will be able to kill.”95 Even if few soldiers ever found 
themselves in true bayonet combat, the spirit of the bayonet held value culturally, much like 
General Pershing’s emphasis on rifle marksmanship and open warfare.96 
Beyond combat training, individual efficiency tests, mass athletics, and competitive 
games also differentiated Raycroft’s system from Koehler’s. Each of these deserves an extended 
individual analysis, which will come shortly, but it is important to note here how each fit into the 
larger program. Inclusion of individual efficiency tests reflected the backgrounds of the Athletic 
Division’s personnel in civilian physical education, where such tests had become popular. 
Raycroft believed that testing benefitted both individuals and units. By setting standards, testing 
could inspire efforts in soldiers to meet or exceed those standards. Testing also gave officers a 
snapshot of unit fitness levels and called to attention to those “inefficient men” in need of 
“special attention and work.”97 As with testing, the inclusion of athletics reflected importation of 
the zeitgeist in civilian physical education. Within Koehler’s physical culture, athletics had value 
chiefly as a recreational activity, but they posed a danger to physical training. In contrast, 
Raycroft’s physical culture integrated recreational athletics and military physical training. 
Whether used in training or as a leisure activity, Raycroft valued athletics for their social 
function in developing group loyalty, teamwork, and leadership as much as for their 
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development of other qualities, as in group games.98 Thus Raycroft spent nearly half his manual 
on the topic of athletics while Koehler dedicated a single chapter to warning about the potential 
evils of athletics and giving an introduction to track and field events. 
As a final point about the structure of Mass Physical Training, Raycroft left the 
construction of daily and weekly programs up to individual instructors, much as Koehler had 
done. This freedom allowed instructors to meet the specific needs of the groups being trained and 
to adapt that training to local conditions. Simplicity and enabling physical training anywhere 
under any circumstances were central design principles, after all. However, Raycroft did give 
some guidance on the apportionment of time within a daily drill based on wartime best practices. 
In this guidance, Raycroft advised spending well over half of an hour-long session in combat-
oriented activities: boxing, hand-to-hand fighting, physical efficiency tests, bayonet fighting, and 
skirmishing exercises. In contrast, the setting up drill occupied as little as ten minutes.99 Again, 
this highlighted the differences between Koehler’s and Raycroft’s physical cultures. The former 
revered disciplinary drill, while the latter valued combat-centric functional fitness. 
Three elements of Raycroft’s system especially characterized the physical culture that the 
CTCA’s Athletic Division produced: boxing, athletics integration, and individual efficiency 
testing. Each element was a vital component of the larger system to which Raycroft and his 
compatriots attached great significance. Each also differentiated Raycroft’s system from 
Koehler’s. Moreover, the definitions and valuations of fitness in Raycroft’s physical culture 
become more visible when these three elements come under close inspection.  
Of the three, boxing was perhaps the Athletic Division’s signature initiative. Following 
the British example, pugilism figured prominently in Raycroft’s system and in the CTCA’s 
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publicity campaigns because Raycroft and others regarded it as having an “intimate connection 
with bayonet fighting.”100 Parts of this connection were very direct: the “long point” bayonet 
attack corresponded with a “left lead” in boxing, as did a rifle butt strike with a “right-hand 
counter.” Bayonet fighting was merely “boxing with a gun in your hands,” according to the 
Athletic Division’s boxing training film.101 Other parts of the connection were less direct, but 
still key to Raycroft’s definition of martial physical fitness, such as developing the quality of 
aggression.102 More than most sports, boxing cultivated quickness, self-confidence, self-control, 
and toughness in participants. The CTCA’s rules even specifically promoted aggressive offense 
and penalized defensive strategies.103 
The Athletic Division recruited boxing experts as special instructors, partly to capitalize 
on star power to popularize their work. Between the instructor corps and the special sub-
committee to study boxing formed in 1917, the Athletic Division collected many of the biggest 
names in the sport at the time, including James Corbett, Norman Selby (Kid McCoy), Robert 
Edgren, Richard Melligan, and Michael Donovan.104 Raycroft later wondered at the “galaxy of 
world’s champions” that his corps of instructors represented.105 In keeping with his dedication to 
efficiency and his combat-centric, functional definition of fitness, Raycroft repeatedly focused 
this corps on their primary mission of making “’head up and eyes open’ two-fisted fighting 
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men.”106 Mass instruction was key, not the creation of individual ring stars. Instructors were to 
stress aggressiveness, simplicity, effectiveness, and a willingness to give and take punishment. 
Soldiers did not need anything fancy, just the six standard blows and the appropriate attitude. “A 
straight left,” advised an Athletic Division memo, “well delivered and backed up by aggressive 
American determination, is a Boche eliminant in nine cases out of ten.”107 
Incorporating boxing into the Athletic Division’s physical training program posed some 
challenges, though. One was a concern about high injury rates, which would cut against the 
CTCA’s emphasis on efficiency. The Athletic Division took several steps to reduce this risk. 
Centrally developed standards dictated instruction, and only trained personnel were authorized to 
deliver and supervise boxing instruction. The CTCA’s special boxing instructors were assigned 
to each camp under the athletic directors to supervise training. Through intensive small group 
sessions, camp instructors trained and certified enlisted assistant instructors selected from the 
ranks. These assistant instructors in turn trained their fellow soldiers. Most soldiers would have 
experienced mass training, where whole companies or battalions at a time learned the 
fundamentals of stance, movement, and punching.108 Bouts were encouraged both to give men a 
real fighting experience and to increase the popularity of the training, but matches were only 
allowed under strict supervision. Furthermore, the Athletic Division created a film to 
communicate the importance of boxing and to further standardize training. Linkage between 
bayonet fighting and boxing was the film’s central thrust, but it also demonstrated basic boxing 
techniques.109 
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Boxing posed another potential problem for the CTCA in light of the form of masculinity 
the commission promoted. The CTCA promised to make men tougher, but also more 
wholesome. In contrast, boxing was illegal in most states and the prize-fighter experts brought on 
as instructors were hardly paragons of moral righteousness.110 The commission’s public 
messaging revealed sensitivity to this tension. For instance, its 1918 book Keeping our Fighters 
Fit for War and After featured an enthusiastic clergyman who declared it “worth a ten-dollar bill 
to see a man who can take a blow in the face without getting mad” after watching a bout.111 The 
book included a similar vignette directed at soldiers’ mothers and wives who feared brutalization 
of their men through boxing. “If you feel that jabbing six inches of cold steel into Germans will 
make brutes” of your men, the author asked, “what would you think about him if he refused to do 
it?” The author assured female readers that the bravery, tenderness, loyalty, and other qualities 
they taught and inspired in their men were still present, but that those men had to kill their foes to 
protect the innocent. Army training did not make men brutes with a “lust for blood,” but rather 
equipped honorable men with the skills and moral fiber they needed to fight for the 
“righteousness of the cause.”112 This rhetoric, combined with the focus on efficiency in making 
fighting soldiers, justified boxing in the commission’s broader effort to form better men in the 
progressive mold. The CTCA’s boxing program fashioned manly warriors—crusaders—who 
could and would kill in battle, but who possessed the character to control and precisely direct 
that violence. 
Boxing underscored core elements of Raycroft’s physical culture. Within this culture, 
fitness was defined functionally in light of World War I’s combat and European battlefields. 
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Like Koehler’s culture, Raycroft’s conceived of fitness more broadly than simply a measure of 
physical capacity. Both attached mental and moral elements to fitness, though each culture 
valued variations of those elements differently. Discipline and obedience were important in both 
cultures, as evidenced by Raycroft’s inclusion of Koehler’s disciplinary drill. However, Raycroft 
and his compatriots prioritized qualities such as toughness and aggression that did not feature in 
Koehler’s definition of fitness.  
As with boxing, the integration of athletics in Raycroft’s system also underscored core 
elements of his physical culture. Initially, the CTCA’s athletic program sought to encourage the 
“largest possible number of soldiers” to participate regularly in “some form of athletics” during 
leisure hours, though the program favored those “hard competitive sports that develop the 
fighting instinct.”113 The perceived value of athletics among athletic directors and military 
commanders alike quickly pushed athletics into formal training periods too. Sports were not new 
to the Army in 1920, but Raycroft incorporated them into a formal physical training program in a 
way Koehler had not. Army leaders had long tolerated sports as a diversion for troops. When 
sport exploded in popularity both inside and outside the military in the 1890s, officers argued 
that competitions had value in physically fitting men to war while molding character.114 Yet 
official physical training barely addressed sport. Training and athletics thus proceeded on related 
but separate tracks. 
Differences between the 1914 and 1920 manuals illustrate this difference well. In the 
1914 manual, athletics appeared in a single, slim chapter. That chapter led with a word of advice: 
“in order to meet the requirements of the service,” military athletics should “have nothing in 
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common with competitive athletics.”115 Koehler was not opposed to athletics, but he thought 
their presence was likely to undermine or challenge the physical training mission. Thus, Koehler 
advised eliminating any events that “have nothing to commend them from a military point of 
view.”116 The only events that met his criteria were distance running and various jumps. Other 
activities might have a place in field days, which he recommended holding no more than once a 
year, or as pure recreation, but they had no place in physical training.117 In contrast, Raycroft 
dedicated nearly half of his manual to athletics. This included chapters on conducting meets and 
contests, as well as a chapter on the “strategy and tactics” of football, baseball, basketball, and 
other games. The Camp Benning school’s curriculum also reflected the emphasis on athletics. Of 
its 145 instruction hours, just under thirteen were spent on disciplinary gymnastics, while 25 and 
a half were committed to mass athletics and “highly organized games” such as football and 
baseball.118 
Raycroft and his compatriots frequently cited the perceived value of athletics for soldiers. 
Raycroft believed that play and games were “immensely important in the making of an efficient 
man” because they developed valuable mental, moral, social, and physical qualities.119 Sports 
were also thought to cultivate group loyalty and esprit de corps.120 Linkages between combat and 
sports skills also frequently appeared in justifications and statements. Soccer, baseball, and 
football were often cited in this regard. For instance, soccer was thought to teach a short gait and 
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balance useful when negotiating no-man’s land, while throwing a baseball seemed to have an 
obvious correlation with throwing a grenade.121 In short, the Athletic Division’s members held 
that nothing “coordinated the personal faculties needed in warfare” like organized athletics.122 
Integrating athletics reflected the educational mission Raycroft and his partners pursued. 
Koehler had also repeatedly described physical training as primarily educational, though he more 
commonly used the term “training.” For Koehler, there was one best way of strengthening bodies 
and minds, improving unit capabilities, and instilling discipline and obedience—his disciplinary 
gymnastics.123 Raycroft and his partners seem to have conceived of their educational ends, ways, 
and means differently. Their ends were grounded in an individual’s functional combat fitness.  
These men also agreed that there was more than one way to achieve those ends. In a talk 
given to college administrators and physical educators in 1918, Raycroft criticized the Army’s 
approach, which followed Koehler’s thoughts and mirrored trends in late nineteenth-century 
college and university physical education. Specifically, Raycroft criticized an old false 
dichotomy between recreation and training, the latter defined as disciplinary or hygienic 
exercise. In his opinion, recreation and training could be combined in an educational mission. In 
the military’s case, Raycroft believed that sports in combination with basic soldier training could 
prepare men to react to changing situations and respond under fire. Simultaneously, sports could 
develop crucial battlefield qualities such as strength, endurance, leadership, and confidence.124 
Many of these qualities differed from those that the Army’s earlier physical culture sought to 
develop. The Army’s greatest mistake in the past, Raycroft asserted, had been its tendency to 
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commit to a single form of activity, such as disciplinary drill or gymnasium work, as the basis of 
its system. Raycroft believed a comprehensive, inclusive system was superior. By combining the 
educational strengths of various activities, a more efficient and effective system became possible. 
Raycroft had faith that sports would not displace physical training as Koehler had feared, but that 
they could supplement and augment formal military training.125 
One final element of Raycroft’s system that characterized his physical culture and 
differentiated it from Koehler’s deserves attention—individual efficiency testing. Mass Physical 
Training proposed a simple test of five events executed monthly that measured attainment of 
baseline standards in combat-focused physical activity. Soldiers sprinted one hundred yards, 
executed a running broad jump, climbed an eight-foot smooth fence, threw a hand grenade thirty 
yards into a ten-foot square box, and negotiated a simple obstacle course in less than thirty 
seconds involving hurdles, barbed wire entanglements, plank bridges, and smooth walls.126 
Testing progressed through three grades. Each grade used an identical course, but soldiers in the 
third grade performed without equipment while soldiers in the second and first grades performed 
with a rifle and with a rifle and light equipment respectively. Achievement of first grade status 
also required that soldiers prove ability with the bayonet, in hand-to-hand combat, and in boxing. 
No specific standards defined a passing score in these latter three events, but Raycroft advised 
weighting most heavily the display of “fighting spirit, determination, and willingness and ability 
to give and take punishment.” The combatives events functioned not only as motivational and 
confidence-building tools, but also as filters to help identify and possibly eliminate those 
unwilling to apply violence or endure it. According to Raycroft, testing in general identified men 
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requiring remedial training, gave commanders an objective appreciation of unit fitness, and built 
esprit de corps through competition between units over pass rates.127  
Unlike earlier Army physical tests, Raycroft’s was specifically designed to align with his 
perception of real battlefield demands.128 Testing was designed to measure the effectiveness of 
the object sought by Raycroft in physical training, namely the fitting of a soldier to combat 
through the use of physical activity. Raycroft and his compatriots identified key qualities for 
soldiers, in this case “strength, speed, skill, endurance,” and the ability to “creditably” acquit 
oneself in close combat.129 Through experimentation and study at various camps, the Athletic 
Division’s members crafted a test to measure those qualities directly. Ultimately, testing implied 
that fitness was measurable and defined it in terms of individual combat efficiency. 
Boxing, integrated athletics, and individual efficiency tests, together with the structural 
differences between Raycroft’s and Koehler’s systems, illuminate a different physical culture. 
This culture bubbled up as a collaboration between like-minded civilian physical educators and 
athletic coaches with guidance and coordination provided by the CTCA’s Athletic Division, and 
Raycroft specifically. During the war years, this culture displaced Koehler’s in the Army. It 
defined fitness in more functional, combat-oriented terms than had Koehler’s and evinced a 
willingness to leverage a wider variety of activities in pursuit of fitness. In a key departure from 
its predecessor, Raycroft’s culture also emphasized maximizing individual combat efficiency 
over general unit capability. In 1914, the fit soldier was disciplined, obedient, self-confident, and 
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capable of above-average feats of strength and endurance. In 1918, the fit soldier exhibited 
additional characteristics. He could also take and give punishment, fight barehanded and with 
bayonet, react to rapidly changing conditions, and play a number of all-American sports. This 
culture reflected the conditions in which it developed. Its creators sought to efficiently prepare 
conscripts for combat with hardened veterans, often without the lavish gymnasiums and 
apparatus collections that Regular Army posts had accrued since the last decade of the nineteenth 
century. Its creators also pursued a project of social engineering of greater ambition and scope 
than Koehler and his compatriots had imagined.  
 
 Though Raycroft’s physical culture had displaced Koehler’s during the war years, its 
continued dominance was not a foregone conclusion. The suddenness of its success posed one 
challenge to the durability of Raycroft’s culture. In contrast with Koehler’s slow and steady rise 
to almost complete control of Army physical culture, Raycroft’s was sudden, temporary, and 
occasioned by an emergency. Raycroft’s culture did become dominant, and it did determine 
Army policy from late 1917 through late 1919 at least. Two pieces of War Department guidance, 
Special Regulations No. 23 (1917) and Training Circular No. 19 (1918), show this clearly. 
Where the former advanced Koehler’s system wholesale, the latter decisively broke with the 
Army’s older physical culture, which was organized around unit fitness, in asserting that the 
purpose of physical training was to develop “in each individual soldier the highest attainable 
physical efficiency, confidence and power in offensive combat.”130 Despite its dominance, 
Raycroft’s physical culture did not fully penetrate the Army’s institutions and its larger culture 
because it was mostly developed and implemented by outsiders. 
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 Following the Armistice, the CTCA’s leadership had to work quickly and aggressively to 
sustain the programs it developed during the war.131 Raycroft began demobilization work in 
earnest in June 1918, having spent the months since November in France with Fosdick at the 
Secretary of War’s direction. As part of this demobilization work, Raycroft tried to transfer parts 
of the Athletic Division’s program to permanent organizations within the War Department. For 
example, Raycroft collaborated in the creation of the General Staff’s Education and Recreation 
branch. He also urged the establishment of a central instructor school, which he realized in 
September at Camp Benning, and the transfer of control for all athletic and physical training 
activities at camps to the physical training officers educated at that school.132  
 Raycroft’s strategy to earn permanence for and official adoption of his physical culture 
within the Army had three main components: a certified instructor corps, a central school, and 
his manual. The instructor corps’s members would serve as physical training officers in camps, 
divisions, and service schools. Physical training officers would ensure adherence to centrally 
developed physical training policy, educate others on the conduct of physical training, and 
control leisure-time athletics and competitions.133 In short, they would continue the work that the 
Athletic Division’s athletic directors had performed between 1917 and 1919, but as 
commissioned officers. Koehler and others of his generation desired an instructor corps such as 
this, but they had to settle for young West Point graduates performing additional duties and for 
unit athletic councils lacking a coordinating agency. A central school was necessary to create and 
certify this instructor corps. Raycroft intended for the school at Camp Benning to become a 
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permanent fixture beyond its first iteration in September 1919. The school would give the Army 
an expansible training pipeline and a means to rapidly propagate new policies through the force. 
Raycroft’s Mass Physical Training manual would be the school’s cornerstone document. The 
Army already had a standardized training program in the form of its 1914 Manual of Physical 
Training, but Raycroft wanted to replace it with his own. The old methods were outdated, he 
believed. His system combined the latest in physical education thought with lessons learned in 
the crucible of combat. A corps of school-trained instructors could make this a reality over time. 
 Raycroft’s strategy had to overcome several obstacles. First, all of this had to be achieved 
within the context of shrinking budgets. The CTCA had capitalized on massive government 
expenditures to build out its physical training and athletic programs beyond the scope of 
anything achieved by its predecessors. Against this backdrop, the Camp Benning school’s 
continued existence was never a given. Also, most of Raycroft’s men left the service after 1919. 
A cadre of trainers, mostly those certified at the Camp Gordon school and given commissions, 
remained at Benning and in some units. Yet most of Raycoft’s athletic directors were civilians or 
reserve officers. Their service was no longer needed after the war emergency, so they returned to 
civilian life. Creation of a new training cadre of commissioned officers through the Camp 
Benning school was thus a vital necessity. Additionally, shrinking budgets pushed Raycroft’s 
manual into private publication. As a result, it was not issued widely by the War Department 
and, despite the General Staff’s full endorsement, it did not appear as official as had 1914’s 
Manual of Physical Training.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Raycroft had to overcome the Army’s existing 
physical culture. Despite Raycroft’s culture having displaced Koehler’s in policy and in training 
camp practices, Koehler’s culture persisted during the war. Koehler himself provided instruction 
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in camps and in Europe. His manual remained in publication, and the Army directed its use in 
the form of Special Regulations No. 23 in 1917 before the Athletic Division had taken charge. 
Regular Army officers, most of them West Point graduates, were more likely than any other 
officer to remain in the service after the war. Nearly all of these had been Koehler’s pupils at one 
time or another, and they had grown up in an Army that equated physical training with Koehler’s 
disciplinary drill. A 1919 book on physical training authored by one of those officers, Colonel 
William Waldron, illustrated the persistence of Koehler’s culture. Waldron, who simply copied 
the 1914 manual’s disciplinary drill chapter and marketed it for civilian use, claimed that the 
setting-up drill was the “basis upon which the entire system of physical training in the United 
States Army is founded—the system employed in the physical training of the vast army of over 
two million men who went to France in 1918 and fought the Nation’s battles.”134 Ignoring the 
Athletic Division’s system, Waldron credited Koehler’s setting-up drill for all of the physical 
improvements civilians observed in their returning soldiers. 
 The permanence of Raycroft’s physical culture in the Army was clearly not a foregone 
conclusion in 1920. That culture was the product of a particular time and of the men who 
fashioned it. The wartime emergency opened a window of opportunity for new cultural 
producers to reimagine Army physical training. Combining the latest thought from the worlds of 
physical education and college athletics with the practices of seasoned Allied militaries, civilian 
leaders such as Joseph Raycroft and his athletic directors crafted a new training system. Their 
system responded to the needs of a newly mobilized army of citizen-soldiers rapidly preparing to 
face veteran opponents. Pursuit of efficiency, a hallmark of Progressivism, informed their efforts. 
Efficiency demanded matching means to ends while maximizing gains and minimizing waste. In 
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this new physical culture, the individual soldier’s fighting ability displaced general unit condition 
as the chief aim sought. 
 As a consequence, the system they crafted and the physical culture it reflected 
emphasized the individual in combat conditions. Where discipline and obedience characterized 
Koehler’s culture, Raycroft’s stressed grit, aggressiveness, and a functional definition of fitness. 
This new culture also embraced a wider spectrum of physical activities as means by which to 
achieve those qualities. Sports and bayonet training became core components of physical 
training, both intended to augment and supplement disciplinary drill instead of existing in 
separate spheres of work. Such inclusiveness reflected both the drive for efficiency and the 
influence of college athletics and the playground movement on civilian physical education. 
Whether such a culture developed in wartime for an army mobilizing on an unprecedented scale 
would be valued after the war remained an open question in the era of downsizing and 
normalization that followed demobilization. 
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Chapter 4: Reversion, Disaggregation, and “Prehabilitation,” 1919-1940 
Standing before the National Convention of the American Physical Education 
Association (APEA) in Chicago on April 11, 1919, Colonel F. J. Morrow claimed that the recent 
war had made “evident that one of the leading considerations in military preparedness is the 
matter of physical power and vigor.”1 Advancing a linkage between service and citizenship, 
Morrow also asserted that any effort to improve such qualities had to begin by targeting 
American boys, but that no plan for military training of civilians could succeed unless it 
“incidentally produces results which are of solid benefit to the individual and to the community 
under peace conditions as well as under war conditions.”2 Earlier that year, Dr. A. D. Browne 
made a similar appeal to adjust civilian physical education to meet the needs of military 
preparedness. Modern warfare demanded much of the soldiers fighting it. “Men are now required 
to drag themselves over many yards of rough ground without raising the body,” Browne 
observed, and men who had “never had occasion to raise their own weight off the ground” found 
it necessary to “climb out of trenches, over seven-foot walls, vault, leap and jump over 
obstacles.”3 Morrow’s and Browne’s pieces were representative of the many articles produced by 
commentators on physical fitness and combat in the decade following World War I. Nearly all 
shared a few consistent themes: fitness was a necessity in war, American men were less 
physically suited for service than once thought, military training proved more successful than 
civilian training in sculpting men, and national preparedness required a fit citizenry. 
 The U.S. Army’s experience in WWI ushered in major changes in its physical culture. 
First, systematic training came to be accepted within the military as a crucial element of basic 
                                                 
1 F. J. Morrow, "Military Preparedness," American Physical Education Review 24, no. 5 (1919): 280. 
2 Ibid. 
3 A. D. Browne, "Physical Education in the Light of the Present National Situation," American Physical 
Education Review 24, no. 2 (1919): 74. 
148 
 
soldier and unit training. The value of such training became unquestionable. Second, civilian 
educators achieved temporary dominance of physical training theory and practice during the 
emergency. These disruptors had reoriented military physical training on producing capable 
individual warriors and integrated a wide range of activities. During and after the war, this 
system was widely hailed as a smashing success. Yet its survival after the war was not a sure 
thing. While civilians departed the service, Army officers content in their success and facing 
budget restrictions returned to the physical culture they knew best—Koehler’s. Meanwhile, the 
focus of discourse on physical training within the Army shifted to the question of who should 
exercise. The answer, in an age of mass mobilization and industrial warfare, was not only the 
soldier but the citizen.  
This chapter analyzes change during the interwar years in the Army’s physical culture, 
chiefly characterized by the Raycroft alternative’s diminishing influence, and explains the causes 
of this change. Additionally, this chapter investigates the Army physical culture’s deployment 
elsewhere in citizen-shaping projects designed to prehabilitate potential future soldiers in schools 
and programs such as the Citizens’ Military Training Camps and the Civilian Conservation 
Corps. Prehabiltation efforts undertaken by military and civilian leaders geared to prepare the 
nation for the next war reflected lessons learned from World War I about the anticipated need for 
and demands of total mobilization in future wars. Such efforts also revealed impulses to address 
the perceived shocking physical shortcomings of American boys and men revealed by the draft. 
In contrast, change in Army physical training practices reflected the power of institutional and 





In the late summer of 1919, a cadre of Raycroft’s physical training veterans assembled in 
Camp Benning. Among this cadre were many of Raycroft’s top instructors who had earned 
commissions during the war, including Raycroft’s former executive officer and the future first 
Big Ten commissioner of athletics, Major John Griffiths, and Herman Koehler’s cousin, Captain 
Carl Brosius.4 These men assembled at the behest of the General Staff’s Training and Instruction 
Branch to open a special school for physical and bayonet training. Raycroft’s advocacy during 
the CTCA’s demobilization over the previous year had proven persuasive. The Training and 
Instruction Branch’s leadership became convinced that making the wartime physical training 
system permanent would improve both the physical condition of the Army’s enlisted population 
and morale throughout the force.5 
The Physical and Bayonet Training Course had a two-fold purpose. First, the course 
helped Raycroft validate his comprehensive training system, itself a product of the wartime 
collaboration between athletic directors under the Athletic Division’s leadership. Raycroft was 
busy in the late summer assembling the treatise that would become his 1920 book Mass Physical 
Training.6 Benning’s special course followed the outline of Raycroft’s later book precisely and 
furnished many of the photographs used as illustrations. Second, the course sought to propagate 
and perpetuate Raycroft’s system within the Army. Thus, three or four officers from each of the 
Army’s five service schools comprised the student body.7 Ideally, these new physical instructors 
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would return to their service schools and train the next generation of young officers as a part of 
each school’s coursework.8 The course was not exactly the permanent instructor course on the 
Aldershot model for which Raycroft and his compatriots had hoped. However, it held promise as 
another step toward displacing Koehler’s system in practice. After all, trends between 1917 and 
1919 had moved toward centralized schools for physical trainers, so the Camp Benning course 
could have been seen as another step along that same path.  
The functional training approach characteristic of Raycroft’s system fundamentally 
informed the Benning course’s program of instruction. Major J. C. Drain, the course director, 
defined functional development as physical and mental improvement, or the “development of 
initiative and spirit,” through participation in “carefully prepared games and athletic exercises.”9 
According to Drain, this approach stood in contrast with the earlier Army physical culture that 
pursued corrective, physical development, and recreational goals, but failed to combine practices 
synergistically for total physical development. Drain’s concept matched Raycroft’s earliest 
proposals from May 1917. At that time, Raycroft observed a need to bring new recruits to a 
“maximum physical and mental efficiency in the shortest time possible.”10 His solution was a 
comprehensive system that incorporated a variety of both mandatory and voluntary activities. In 
short, Raycroft sought to pull together the Army’s disparate strands concerning exercise 
activities under the control of experts who could achieve better, quicker results than had 
previously been possible. 
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 The variety of activities under an athletic director’s purview during the war and the 
range of subjects covered in the Benning course illustrate the Raycroft school’s concept of 
functional training. As discussed in the previous chapter, the CTCA athletic directors assumed 
wide responsibilities in the divisions and camps to which they were assigned. They advised 
commanders on issues related to physical training, developed local training programs, led 
exercise periods, trained uniformed instructors, supervised boxing programs, and participated in 
planning and executing bayonet training. Along with partners from the YMCA and other 
organizations, athletic directors also coordinated recreational athletic leagues and events, and 
even planned large competitions that often drew spectators from local communities. 
The Benning course prepared uniformed officer instructors to perform a similarly wide 
range of functions. Students received 145 hours of instruction over three and a half weeks. More 
than 28 were dedicated to bayonet training, which had featured prominently as a component of 
Raycroft’s comprehensive system during the war. The rest of the hours were spread fairly evenly 
between subjects that included quickening and skirmishing exercises, boxing and wrestling, 
hand-to-hand fighting, setting-up exercises, mass athletics, physical efficiency tests, “highly 
organized games” that included football and baseball, and more.11 This distribution of time and 
emphasis highlights the Raycroft school’s desire to incorporate athletics into a physical training 
program. This approach differed from Koehler’s, which had largely separated physical training 
and athletics into two related but distinct activities. The inclusion of combat activities such as 
bayonet training and wrestling also differed from Koehler’s physical culture in similar ways. Had 
the highest hopes of the Benning course been realized, Raycroft’s instructors would have been 
better prepared to direct and integrate a wider variety of activities than Koehler’s West Point 
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graduates had been. As Drain promised, the U.S. Army could look forward to beginning the next 
war with the “splendid physical opportunities” of the German army, but with the additional 
benefits of “complete physical and mental training” provided by a variety of games and 
exercises.12 The school’s instructors and others anticipated the course and its associated manual 
becoming official Army practice. The Infantry Journal’s editor, for instance, commended a 
report from the school as indicative of the future of physical training.13 
Those high hopes were soon dashed. Graduates of the course’s first class returned to their 
service schools but made only a limited impact. A second iteration took place in March 1920, 
this time pulling five officers from each department. The War Plans Division of the General Staff 
anticipated that graduates of this special course would establish similar schools in their own 
departments.14 Such schools do not appear to have become regular fixtures. Raycroft’s system 
did not spread. Postwar consolidations and budget cuts closed the new physical and bayonet 
training school before it could produce many more certified trainers.15 Dreams for a 
comprehensive trainings system did not survive the era of normalization.16 Shutting off the 
inflow of new instructors proved fatal for the consolidation of Raycroft’s system in Army 
practice. Most of the instructors trained at Camp Gordon and elsewhere during the war were 
reservists or emergency officers who departed the shrinking interwar army. Without new, 
uniformed officers trained to replace them, physical training policy largely fell to regular officers 
brought up under Koehler at West Point and untutored in Raycroft’s system. 
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 Camp Benning’s Infantry School provided one exception to the gradual passing of 
Raycroft’s system and its training apparatus. There, Major General Charles Farnsworth, the 
school’s first commandant and a physical training enthusiast, promoted the Physical and Bayonet 
Training School.17 When the grand scheme for training officers of other branches withered, 
Farnsworth turned his attention to the infantry officers over which he had control. Having 
originally organized Drain’s Department of Physical and Bayonet Training, Farnsworth kept 
Drain and his instructors employed over the following year with courses for infantry school 
students that matched the program of instruction provided in September 1919. Farnsworth 
imagined this program expanding to offer four six-week courses annually at Camp Benning 
between October and June. In the summer months, Farnsworth intended to disperse his 
instructors throughout the northern military districts to assist in instruction and to inspect their 
physical training programs. Instructors were to make similar trips throughout the southern 
districts between each course iteration in the winter and spring.18 
 Farnsworth struggled to realize this dream in the face of fiscal constraints. In letters 
between Farnsworth and Raycroft, the former identified two problems. First, the War 
Department frequently turned down, without comment, requests for funds to dispatch instructors 
on assistance and inspection trips to regional departments. Camp Benning’s physical plant 
seemed to be the most critical problem, however. The frequency of rain during the planned 
primary instruction period between October and June was of special concern, so Farnsworth 
sought a large indoor assembly building where training could proceed regardless of weather 
conditions. Costs proved prohibitive. Given the small appropriations Congress allocated to the 
Infantry School in 1920 and forecasts of continued resource economization, Farnsworth believed 
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the funds required for construction would not be available for several years. On Raycroft’s 
suggestion, Farnsworth secured several steel and canvas hangars that partly addressed the indoor 
training space issue. Filling those buildings with exercise and sporting equipment was another 
matter entirely, and one still unresolved by mid-1922. Raycroft proved instrumental through the 
mid-1920s in helping furnish the Infantry School’s gymnasium by securing funds from those 
raised during World War I.19 Ultimately, the Department of Physical and Bayonet Training 
secured sufficient manpower and facilities to propagate much of Raycroft’s system in the 
infantry branch through the 1920s, but the courses failed to decisively shift the Army’s physical 
culture. 
 The survival of Raycroft’s system at the Infantry School made sense. The infantry branch 
had taken an intense interest in physical training issues since the 1880s. These appeared far more 
frequently in the branch’s professional publications, such as the Infantry Journal, than in those of 
other branches. Furthermore, infantry officers took seriously the 1922 Training Regulations 10-
5’s insistence that athletics and physical training were key elements in every military training 
program.20 The Infantry School’s leadership saw itself filling a void in physical instruction left 
by Koehler’s retirement from USMA in 1923, but physical training at the Infantry School 
adhered to a gradually diminishing version of Raycroft’s model that included competitive sports, 
calisthenics, and apparatus work. Even if time constraints reduced the hours devoted to topics 
such as wrestling and baseball, the training philosophy remained true to Raycroft’s 
comprehensive concept: exercise was not for strength alone, but for its “military value, its 
hygienic or health value, its educational value, mental and physical, for its recreational value, for 
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its moral value, and for its social value.”21 However, the persistence of Raycroft’s philosophy 
and system in the Infantry School’s curriculum through the 1920s proved insufficient for 
sustaining Raycroft’s ideas in the wider Army physical culture. 
 
 Trends in Army physical training during the interwar years moved toward disaggregation 
and were abetted by organizational forgetting and complacency. Raycroft’s system was notable 
for its comprehensiveness. Calisthenic drills, athletics, close-combat work, and other varieties of 
functional fitness came together under physical training. In the pre-war Army, soldiers 
participated in all of these activities, but the activities were understood to be separate but 
complementary. Thus, Koehler’s manuals paid little attention to athletics, military sport 
developed haphazardly in a quasi-official status without a central proponent, and bayonet 
training appeared in separate manuals and occurred in hours outside the periods designated for 
physical training.22 These same features reemerged in Army physical training, and the Army’s 
physical culture, during the interwar years.  
 A visible manifestation of these trends appeared in the form of 1928’s Training 
Regulations 115-5. This manual was the first official Army physical training guide published 
since Koehler’s 1914 Manual of Physical Training. Raycroft’s 1920 Mass Physical Training had 
not achieved the impact hoped for by its author. Major General William Haan, Chief of the 
General Staff’s War Plans Division, had endorsed the Raycroft’s work, recommended its use in 
institutions providing physical training, and anticipated that it would “form the basis for the 
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training and instruction” of the Army “in the subjects included.”23 Yet in an effort to save both 
time and money, the War Department decided to publish Raycroft’s book privately. The manual 
thus failed to achieve official status within the Army. Mentions of Mass Physical Training 
disappeared from military professional journals by the mid-1920s and the authors of Training 
Regulations 115-5 made no reference to its privately published predecessor. Indeed, someone 
reading the Army’s official physical training manuals solely might never have an inkling of the 
Army physical culture’s wartime interregnum. 
 Training Regulations 115-5 might have ignored Mass Physical Training, but the manual 
exhibited a strong historical continuity with Koehler’s culture. Published on 10 September 1928 
upon the authority of Chief of Staff Charles Summerall, Training Regulations 115-5 explicitly 
superseded the 1914 Manual of Physical Training. Its preparation occurred under the direction of 
West Point’s superintendent, Brigadier General Merch Stewart.24 Koehler had retired in 1923 
and passed away in 1927, but the famous Master of the Sword’s influence remained significant 
in several respects. First, Koehler had directed all aspects of physical training at the Academy for 
nearly four decades. He had molded the institution’s physical culture and those men who took up 
his work after 1923. Institutional memories and culture virtually guaranteed that the Academy 
would look to its own heritage and practices, both inseparable from Koehler, when updating the 
Army’s physical training regulations. Second, Koehler exerted significant influence on key 
individuals such as Stewart, who was an 1896 Academy graduate and former student of 
Koehler’s.25 
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Stewart made his outlook on physical training clear in his 1913 book entitled The 
Physical Development of the Infantry Soldier. In it, Stewart championed the importance of 
systematic exercise for the infantry soldier. “War,” he noted, “is truly a struggle between life and 
death and, in war, death is caused equally as frequently by sickness and incapacity as by the 
bullets of the enemy.”26 Because the infantryman was an “independent fighting element” that 
bore a heavy “burden of combat and march,” he had to be fitted to carry on “when every muscle 
in his body cries out for rest.”27 Much like Koehler, Stewart connected physical fitness with 
other qualities such as will and discipline, then declared that exercise could develop all of them. 
Stewart’s concept of discipline aligned with Koehler’s; it was both the subordination of the body 
to man’s control and the subordination of the man to the team’s needs.28 Development of 
physical fitness, discipline, and other qualities occurred in three stages according to Stewart: 
strength and endurance first, then ease and grace, and finally self-confidence “which comes of a 
knowledge of his strength and capacity.”29 This progression paralleled Koehler’s pyramidal 
structure. Although Stewart did not advance a system of physical training, he directed readers to 
other manuals then in publication, all of which Koehler either authored or influenced. Stewart 
also revealed Koehler’s inspiration in quoting the Master of the Sword and proposing categories 
of exercise that matched those found in Koehler’s 1896 and 1904 manuals.30 Notably, Stewart 
also included functional fitness activities such as rushing, crawling, and aiming exercises, though 
these were included for the general physical development of infantry soldiers and did not appear 
in Training Regulations 115-5. Responsibility for restating the Army’s official physical culture 
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thus fell to a disciple of Koehler’s leading an organization that was a bastion of Koehler’s 
thought and practice even after the man’s departure.  
 Comparing 1928’s Training Regulations 115-5 and the 1914 Manual of Physical 
Training further reveals the direct lineage shared by both, along with Koehler’s posthumous 
influence. Little separates the two works in terms of format, organization, objectives sought, 
areas of emphasis, and recommended activities. Many of the demonstration photographs even 
appear to be unchanged. Like Koehler and Stewart before them, the authors of Training 
Regulations 115-5 offered a multi-level hierarchy of objectives sought through physical training. 
Physical fitness, according these authors, was the recruit’s baseline requirement that enabled him 
to execute all of his other duties. Through systematic exercise, the recruit could develop health, 
strength, and vigor. Learning to employ those physical qualities “to the best advantages for 
himself and for the mass for which he is a member” also developed “self-reliance, confidence, 
self-control, the courage to dare,” alertness, precision, and enthusiasm.31 These intangibles 
translated into the Koehler culture’s ultimate quality of discipline. Physical training in this mode 
therefore possessed a “disciplinary value” that was “at least the equal to is physiological or 
military value.”32 
 Further examples of physical culture continuities are evident in the methods employed to 
achieve physical fitness. The authors of Training Regulations 115-5 covered activities ranging 
from gymnastics, jumping, and climbing to rifle exercises, group games, and dumb-bell routines. 
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They also advocated inclusion of boxing, wrestling, and bayonet drills in a training program.33 
Yet the importance of all these diverse activities paled in comparison to the value accorded to 
traditional setting-up exercises. Unlike Raycroft’s dismissal of the setting-up exercises as 
kindergarten work, Training Regulations 115-5 asserted that the drills formed the “foundation 
upon which the entire course of physical training in the service is based” and that “their 
importance hardly can be overestimated.”34 The new regulations recommended that setting-up 
drills comprise a third of every morning’s physical training period, but its authors dedicated 
nearly two-thirds of the basic manual’s contents to the precise explication of each movement and 
its associated commands. As had their forebears, the soldiers of the 1930s were to flex, bend, 
thrust, hop, swing, and squat their way to fitness in mass formation and in response to 
commands. 
 A single addition to these “disciplinary physical training exercises” set the 1928 model 
apart from its 1914 predecessor: mass commands. Pioneered in an officer’s training camp in 
early 1917, mass commands required the men in formation to collectively give commands. 
Instructors issued a prompt for each exercise, then the men in formation responded with the 
preparatory command and cadence. The authors of Training Regulations 115-5 contended that 
this practice had “practically revolutionized the old method of recruit instruction, both as to the 
time required and the efficiency obtained.”35 With mass commands, the “volume and smash” of 
the combined voices “literally impel[led] every man to extend himself to the limit in performing 
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the movements snappily and precisely.”36 The value attached to these mass commands helps 
illustrate key features of the physical culture the Training Regulations 115-5’s authors 
propagated. Mass commands did not make the exercises themselves more strenuous, for 
instance. Instead, their value derived from enhancing the disciplinary quality of the drill and 
enhancing self-confidence. Soldiers felt a part of the whole organization, practiced precision and 
issuance of clear commands, and learned self-reliance and “assertiveness.”37 
 Other elements of continuity in the Army’s official physical culture included an emphasis 
on average unit fitness over maximal individual capacity, and a general wariness about the value 
of athletics as a part of the formal training program. The former is visible in the methods 
advocated, the disciplinary objectives sought, and the repeated goal of subordinating the 
individual to the unit. For instance, the authors of Training Regulations 115-5 summoned the 
inspiration of Koehler and Butts in asserting that athletics should have “an applicable value” and 
be “educational” instead of “spectacular” because it was the “ability of the average of the mass 
that determines the efficiency of a fighting machine.”38 Concerning athletics, Training 
Regulations 115-5 staked out a position more friendly to athletics than had its 1914 predecessor, 
which had included in its athletics chapter as many warnings about the potential evils of sport as 
it did instructions. The authors of Training Regulations 115-5 contended that use of mass 
athletics in the Army was “most desirable” on the grounds of both fitness and morale, which was 
in line with the Army’s World War I experience and the contemporaneous flourishing of sport at 
the U.S. Military Academy.39 However, the manual downplayed games such as football and 
baseball as a component of formal physical training. Instead, it stressed mass games and 
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individual contests such as relay races, cane wrestling, and other school-yard competitions that 
had featured in the 1914 manual. This was a far cry from the prominent place sport occupied in 
Raycroft’s manual, even if they shared an emphasis on the educational value of athletics.40 
 A few other matters differentiated the 1928 and 1914 manuals. For instance, running (or 
double-timing) appeared for the first time in Army physical training as a beneficial activity. 
Training Regulations 115-5’s characterization of running as being “invaluable in the 
development of endurance and organic vigor” diverged from the Manual of Physical Training’s 
claim about the extreme risk of injury associated with running and a concomitant warning that 
instructors “exercise the utmost care in its application.”41 The running addition probably does not 
reflect the influence of Raycroft’s culture, though. Running was not a major component of Mass 
Physical Training and even Koehler had come around to the practice, claiming in his 1919 book 
that, so long as care was taken with “green” men, no exercise could “develop condition, vigor 
and endurance, lung and leg power in general” as quickly.42 Training Regulations 115-5 also 
suggested two hour-long training sessions per day, the latter consisting of bayonet or other 
combatives training and mass athletics, instead of the single 45-minute drill suggested in the 
Manual of Physical Training. However, these differences did not represent a significant variance 
between the physical cultures each manual represented and promoted. Their definitions of 
physical fitness remained largely the same, as did the methods recommended to attain fitness.  
 Training Regulations 115-5 guided the Army’s systematic physical training practices and 
philosophy for eight years before the fourth chapter of the 1936 Basic Field Manual’s (BFM) 
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first volume superseded it.43 In reality, the BFM chapter was no more than a reprint of Training 
Regulation 115-5’s first part. The definition of fitness advanced by the new manual remained 
unchanged, as did the prescribed practices and model programs. In its official expression, the 
Army’s physical culture of the 1930s stagnated once it reverted to the Koehler mode. More 
change came five years later with the publication of Field Manual (FM) 21-20 in 1941. The new 
FM superseded both the 1936 BFM and part two of 1928’s Training Regulations 115-5.44 An in-
depth analysis of the 1941 manual will follow in the next chapter, but there are three important 
points of note here. First, FM 21-20 slightly modified the Army’s definition of fitness, but only 
in replacing the discipline capstone with a generic quality of “physical efficiency for military 
effectiveness.”45 Second, FM 21-20 continued to disaggregate physical activities in that sports 
and combative training did not qualify for coverage. Disciplinary drills in mass formation 
continued to dominate training practices. Finally, FM 21-20 exhibited a turn toward a more 
functional fitness-based physical culture with the inclusion of obstacle courses and survival 
swimming. This turn echoed a similar cultural shift around 1917 when the Army began seriously 
preparing for war. Yet at root, the new manual reflected the culture Koehler began fashioning 
nearly six decades earlier. Significantly, as historian Whitfield East observes, FM 21-20 would 
guide Army physical training for the next seventy years.46 
Though sports largely disappeared from manuals in the interwar period, they did not 
disappear from Army life or from the Army’s physical culture. The Inter-Allied Games of 1919, 
held in Paris, were perhaps the most dramatic representation of the importance Americans 
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attached to sport in the military at the time. Pulling together nearly 1,500 athletes from eighteen 
Allied nations and, on opening day, more than 30,000 spectators, the games both cemented the 
place of sport in the U.S. military and helped spread the cause of the “sporting life” to other 
nations recovering from the trauma of World War I.47 Reaffirming the place of sport beyond the 
spectacular displays of an Olympiad, Fort Benning completed construction of its Doughboy 
Memorial Stadium in 1925. During a speech dedicating America’s latest living memorial, Major 
General R. H. Allen declared that physical training and athletics had been recognized as “vital 
parts of all military training” and that neglect of either represented a “vital blow” struck at an 
army’s “efficiency as a fighting machine.”48 Summoning long-standing assumptions about the 
holistic development potential of physical training and sport, Allen declared that the playing field 
cultivated qualities key to past and future success: action, teamwork, fighting spirit, the will to 
win, tenacity, and steadfastness.49 
Athletic competitions remained a regular feature of military life in the U.S. Army in the 
interwar period, even if not on the Inter-Allied Games’ grand scale. Historian Wanda 
Wakefield’s survey of the accounts of retired officers who served as junior officers prior to 
World War II confirms this. Many recalled the great personal and professional importance they 
attached to sports. One, Lieutenant General Hobart Gay, even chose to remain in the army after 
World War I because he earned a spot on the Army’s prestigious polo team.50 Another, General 
Robert Porter, found that young officers had to involve themselves in sports if they wanted to 
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establish control and discipline in their units. “If he [the young lieutenant] was nothing but a 
bookworm,” Porter recalled, “he would have trouble getting through to some of these people [the 
enlisted men in the regiment].”51 Officers valued athletics for a variety of reasons. Sports kept 
officers physically fit, taught them lessons for their professional lives about leadership, built 
relationships between military personnel and local civilian communities, developed esprit de 
corps, and reinforced expectations of masculine behavior predicated on strength, aggressiveness, 
and competitiveness.52 Sports were significant in the enlisted man’s military experience too. 
Apart from regular periods of mass athletics, most units maintained competitive athletic teams. 
Post and unit newspapers along with more widely available military publications such as the 
Army and Navy Journal and Infantry Journal consistently dedicated considerable space to 
covering the records and exploits of these teams. 
Athletics also continued growing in popularity and importance at West Point during the 
interwar period. This growth occurred most explosively between 1919 and 1922 under the 
Academy’s dashing young superintendent, Brigadier General Douglas MacArthur. A long-time 
sports enthusiast himself, Macarthur believed that sports were crucial to the preparation of junior 
officers, especially in developing “the coordination of mental and physical effort, an appreciation 
of the principle of cooperation, the development of hardihood and courage, and the inculcation of 
an aggressive and determined spirit.”53 Along with the Academic Board, MacArthur oversaw a 
curriculum reorganization that instituted a mandatory intramural program for all cadets on top of 
the foundational training all Fourth Class cadets received through Koehler’s system. All cadets 
learned to play baseball, football, basketball, soccer, lacrosse, track, tennis, golf, and hockey in 
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six-week periods that culminated in intramural competitions. Cadets received grades for their 
participation and performance that contributed to their all-important class ranking, thereby 
formally incorporating sport as a requisite and essential element of officer education. MacArthur 
also expanded the Academy’s intercollegiate athletics program by adding several teams and 
taking controversial steps toward recruiting athletes. Even Koehler endorsed the Academy’s 
growing embrace of athletics as an adjunct to individual physical training, arguing that 
“participation in athletic competition is the best school for leadership, self-discipline and team 
work.”54 As before, however, Koehler qualified his support on the basis of his belief that the 
Academy was more capable than other institutions of resisting the evils often associated with 
intercollegiate athletics. 
However, athletics did not become an integral part of physical training in the wider Army 
as they had at West Point. Echoing elements of the official physical culture existing before 
World War I, the two activities were generally considered to be associated and complementary, 
but they were not effectively integrated. Allen gave voice to this in his 1925 stadium dedication 
speech when he noted that “official recognition” had long been given to disciplinary drill while 
athletics had “subsisted solely through the interest of its devotees.”55 While Raycroft explicitly 
recognized and encouraged the relationship between physical training and athletics, the Army’s 
physical training policies in the interwar period did not. Training Regulation 115-5 and the 1936 
Basic Field Manual recommended that leaders dedicate some time to mass athletics, which could 
include competitive athletics, but these manuals were primarily concerned with other forms of 
training. Athletics came under the purview of athletic officers, who were not necessarily the 
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same individuals leading comprehensive unit physical training.56 With the demise of the Physical 
and Bayonet Training School, no centralized institution certified individuals in the management 
of a comprehensive physical training program. Army policies also tended to regard athletics 
more in terms of recreation than training.57 So while athletics remained a vital part of the Army’s 
physical culture, that culture drifted toward disaggregation. Raycroft and his team pulled 
together physical training, athletics, combat sports, and more into a single program oriented on 
maximizing the individual’s combat efficiency. In the interwar years this comprehensive 
program fractured. The bonds between physical training, sport, and activities such as bayonet 
training weakened. The Raycroft interregnum in the history of the Army’s physical culture 
closed by the mid-1920s. 
 
While systematic training in the Army reverted to its roots in Koehler’s physical culture, 
other changes in the Army’s physical culture were afoot. Unlike in earlier periods, this change is 
best understood by considering first what officers were not discussing—namely, the basic value 
of physical training. Between the last quarter of the nineteenth century and America’s entry into 
World War I, professional military journals regularly featured articles or letters to the editor 
concerning physical training. Some reflected doubt in the force at large as to the desirability of 
regular, systematic training. Most made a positive case for training, often while positing a 
regimen or program. All implicitly or explicitly took a position on the value of exercise. After 
World War I, articles on physical training largely disappeared, even from the Infantry Journal, as 
the subject became more accepted and less controversial. Major General Allen’s 1925 dedication 
speech for the Doughboy Memorial Stadium at Fort Benning illustrated the widespread 
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acceptance in the Army: regarding physical training and athletics as “fundamental elements of all 
military training” was “no new doctrine,” Allen asserted, and they did not belong among the 
“many fads that have sprung up in our service like mushroom growths.”58 This directly 
contradicted the common accusation of a generation before that physical training was a 
dangerous fad best avoided. Though officers wrote less about whether or not to exercise, or even 
how to exercise, they did not forget physical training. Instead, they turned their attention to who 
should exercise and leveled a finger at the young American male. After World War I, a discourse 
of declension manifested concerning the American population’s physical fitness. In the process, 
physical fitness became closely associated with a concept of citizenship defined by obligations. 
The Army’s physical culture became a part of this discourse as both a means and end of fitness. 
 The discourse of declension concerning American men took root in draft rejection rates 
that many people, both within and outside the military, perceived as being alarmingly high. A 
thorough statistical analysis of draft rejections appeared in print in 1920 that was authored by 
Charles Davenport and Albert Love under the Surgeon General’s supervision.59 Both men had 
worked for the office of the Surgeon General during World War I compiling anthropometric data 
on draftees. Using this data, which local draft boards and camp physicians collected on more 
than 2.5 million men enlisted during the war, Davenport and Love found that approximately 46% 
of the recorded population presented a defect of some kind.60 The report’s authors divided the 
defects into eleven groups ranging from “mechanical” defects involving bones, joints, hands, and 
feet to “nervous and mental defects” and venereal disease. Recognizing that not all defects were 
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equally important, Davenport and Love also broke the defects down into the five categories 
established by draft and military officials during the war, two of which prevented the draftee 
from serving in the military.61 Counting only those totally rejected, and not those qualified for 
limited duties, Davenport and Love found that about 12% of all men examined were rejected for 
military service.62  
 Much larger figures concerning draft rejections circulated as early as 1918 and continued 
influencing the discourse on the topic through the interwar period. Most of these pegged the 
rejection rate at about one-third of men drafted.63 Extrapolating from these rates, commentators 
alleged a serious problem in American society that bordered on crisis. The most immediate 
concern was of a military nature. A great power needed to be able to field armies numbering in 
the millions to successfully fight industrial-era wars. The vast majority of those soldiers would 
be conscripts, and conscripts represented a broad cross-section of the nation’s manpower. Nearly 
all men were liable for service and therefore obligated to maintain a baseline of physical fitness. 
However, commentators also linked defects disqualifying men from military service to the 
capability of the nation’s labor force and the individual’s ability to live a full life.64 
A guilt-laden sense of crisis appeared to be particularly acute in the civilian physical 
education community. Thomas Storey expressed these sentiments in an address to the American 
Physical Education Association in April 1919 when he claimed that the war had “heartlessly, 
relentlessly and with calculating accuracy” revealed the quality of America’s peacetime physical 
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education.65 Noting the “army of young men” rejected for service, and using the 30% rejection 
rate, Storey harangued the American educational system for failing to teach hygiene and make 
students’ bodies fit for the “supreme obligation of citizenship.”66 The University of Minnesota’s 
John Sundwall advanced a similar argument about how the wartime experience demolished the 
myth of an American composed of a “superhealthy, superstrong, and superactive and vigorous 
people.”67 Sundwall, like Storey and others, laid much of the blame on the American educational 
system and urged colleges and universities to “accept their share of responsibility” and to “do 
their part in the physical regeneration of America.”68 Dudley Sargent, one of the venerable old 
fathers of physical education, lent his voice to the chorus too. In Sargent’s opinion, schools had 
not done enough to develop in American youth the “physical, mental, and moral qualities” that 
make good soldiers. Echoing concerns that drove the development of physical training in the 
Army and university a generation earlier, Sargent argued that physical educators had a duty to 
offset the deleterious effects of urbanization, industrialization, and undesirable immigration.69  
The authors mentioned above represent a small sampling of the many who expressed 
concerns about the educational system having failed American youth and the nation. One 
common theme in most criticisms addressed the narrowness of pre-war physical education in 
terms of both populations and subjects. According to statistics from the draft, some regions of 
the country produced more defective men than others. Statistical imbalances could be found 
between socio-economic classes as well. Thus, many educators called for making physical 
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education more accessible to all and, if possible, mandatory. For instance, George Fisher argued 
during the Athletic Research Council’s annual meeting in December 1919 that the physical 
education community had to capitalize on the “tide of popular sentiment” for physical 
preparedness. Harnessed, such a tide could bring compulsory training to all school children, and 
even to the workplace.70 This movement gathered steam. States “vied with each other,” in the 
words of one commentator, to pass physical education legislation.71 By 1934, thirty-seven states 
had mandated physical education as part of their students’ general education.72 Many educators 
also argued that physical education curricula could be broadened on the grounds that many men 
were rejected for issues such as venereal disease or other problems that could be reduced or 
eliminated through hygiene instruction.  
Another point of agreement shared by most critics of physical education was that the 
military succeeded where civilian institutions had failed. The YMCA’s James McCurdy, who 
spent time overseas with troops during the war supervising and directing recreational activities, 
wrote that “no man could have observed the Army … without having a deep impression of, and 
an overwhelming pride in, the deeds of valor of the American soldier.”73 McCurdy credited 
much of this to the Army’s ability to cultivate “physical efficiency” in its troops. In this, 
McCurdy believed that the Army “did a marvelous piece of work.”74 Similarly, Fisher claimed 
that the U.S. Army deserved credit for producing between three and four million soldiers who 
were “in better condition than any similar number of men have ever been at one time in the 
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United States.”75 Such sentiment existed in the popular imagination too. One ditty making the 
rounds in the nation’s newspapers in 1921 promised that the Army not only functioned as a 
melting pot for ethnically diverse American youth, but that it built men: 
Have you heard of our Army’s slogan? We shout it—THE ARMY BUILDS 
MEN! / We care not for features, they’re all of God’s creatures, they go to the 
‘melting pot.” Then / watch for the change that comes o’er them, / Are these the 
young lads whom you knew? / They are hearty and hale, each a red-blooded male, 
/ That’s what our Army can do. / Deep-chested, square-shouldered and active, / 
Erect and with twinkling glance, / Straightforward and true, we return them to 
you, / These boys but needed the chance.76 
 
Reciprocal relationships between civilian physical education and Army physical training 
are especially evident in this immediate postwar period. In 1917, the Army had called on civilian 
educators to help expand, improve, and man the institution’s physical training system. In doing 
so, Raycroft and his peers advanced a concept of using multiple activities, ranging from hygiene 
training and recreational athletics to disciplinary drill and boxing, to achieve higher-order 
educational outcomes. A few short years later, civilian educators looked to the Army as a guide 
and inspiration. They perceived that the Army had achieved a remarkable success in rapidly 
building healthy young men. As soon as the war concluded, civilian educators began to discuss 
the ways in which they could apply the Army’s model to improve childhood education. Given 
the distress over draft rejections, qualification for military service also became something of a 
standard for physical education outcomes. Wartime experience and Army successes also 
contributed to a renewed emphasis on training for citizenship within the physical education 
community. 
 Lessons civilian educators borrowed from the Army’s wartime physical training program 
included pedagogical methods and philosophies of education. For instance, systems developed to 
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rapidly train large numbers of new recruits yielded new pedagogical methods useful in primary 
and secondary schools. The boxing training program crafted by the Commission on Training 
Camp Activities’ (CTCA) special boxing instructors was a particularly useful case study. Indeed, 
many schools derived from this boxing programs new systems of mass instruction to teach the 
fundamentals of other sports to large bodies of students.77  
Not all attempts to align physical education with military needs were as widely embraced. 
A more controversial movement sought to replace physical education with military training, 
usually consisting of marching drill and the manual of arms, in schools. During the war, some 
schools moved to this model in an effort to better prepare their pupils for service. After the war, 
some colleges continued permitting military drill in place of physical education requirements. 
Some high schools did the same.78 In the minds of most physical educators, drill could not 
possibly replace the many activities needed to promote holistic growth and development of their 
students.79 For instance, James McCurdy opposed drill on the basis of it being too narrow a 
program that failed to address the problems identified through draft rejections, many of which 
required a health and hygiene program to remedy. McCurdy also believed that drill did not 
promote all-round individual improvement or the cultivation of “vigor” needed to meet the 
demands of modern war.80 Military authorities also opposed drill in school. Secretary of War 
Newton Baker did so explicitly in 1918, arguing that school-time drill contributed very little to 
the nation’s military strength.81 Echoing McCurdy, Colonel F. J. Morrow, a General Staff officer 
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responsible for education and special training, argued that drill alone could not “provide an 
adequate course of physical training.”82 Military training could supplement physical training, but 
it was not a replacement. The position of senior military officials on this issue highlights how 
much the Army’s physical culture had changed since the 1880s. Then, senior officers opposed 
systematic exercise and sport as wasteful—even dangerous—fads, and considered incidental 
training through drill and duty sufficient. By 1920, senior leaders had at least embraced the 
utility of systematic physical training, even if their conceptual horizons for such activities 
remained fixed along Koehler’s lines.83  
Debates over drill in the world of civilian physical education point beyond pedagogical 
practices to another common subject in the post-war discourse: the prevailing philosophy of 
education. A report authored by Raycroft in 1918 entitled Suggestions for Colleges from the 
Army Experience of Physical Training illuminated this subject’s core elements. In it, Raycroft 
recalled that he and his team approached the physical training problem with open minds, seeking 
only “those things which would give results in training recruits.”84 The basis for such a search 
had to be “straight thinking” that discriminated between “exercise and training or education.”85 
This differentiation was also key to making improvements in college physical education, 
according to Raycroft. What he meant was that too often Army officers and college faculty 
members alike regarded physical training as either purely for exercise or purely for recreation, 
and thereby lost sight of the educational value possible with the proper utilization of physical 
training activities.  
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Instead, Raycroft sought deeper development of character and of physical and mental 
attributes, and of attributes defined differently, through the application of a broader range of 
means in new ways.86 He expressly advocated using intercollegiate athletics rather than 
abolishing them, for instance.87 These ideas reflected the powerful influence in this period of 
educational developmentalism, which sought to facilitate a student’s holistic growth in order to 
make them creative and critical individuals.88 Raycroft’s critique, which was similar to those 
delivered by many of his contemporaries, was a standard critique because new ways and means 
could nearly always be identified and integrated. For instance, the National Education 
Association’s James Rogers delivered a similar critique more than a decade later, this time 
directed at the educators of the post-war decade. According to Rogers, too much stress had been 
placed on health education, and he hoped educators could remedy this by integrating many other 
activities residing under the big tent of physical education.89 What is notable here in respect to 
the reciprocal relationship between civilian and Army physical cultures is that the two moved in 
opposite directions in the interwar years. While civilian educators looked to the wartime 
experience and saw cause to expand, enlarge, and integrate activities, the disaggregation of 
activities came to characterize the Army’s interwar physical culture.  
Preparation for citizenship was another point of initial convergence, and some later 
divergence, between Army leaders and civilian physical educators. Citizenship, at this time and 
in this discourse, was defined by military authors and physical educators largely in terms of the 
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obligation for military service.90 Therefore, citizenship was in part predicated on fitness. In turn, 
fitness meant a baseline of strength and endurance, along with an absence of health-related 
disorders and deformations. These ideas stemmed from wartime mobilization efforts and the 
postwar concerns over high draft rejection rates. Educators and military leaders alike in the 
immediate postwar years came to count the population’s physical fitness as a leading 
consideration in national preparedness, and all contended that improving the population’s health 
and fitness could not wait for the emergency of a future war.91 Furthermore, as successful as the 
military may have been in building men, there were limits to what the military could do with the 
material it was given, especially in a time constrained environment. Real improvement had to 
come through the education system. As Morrow reasoned, no efforts directed toward promoting 
the “average citizen’s” fitness could be successful “unless they begin with the boys and youth of 
the country, in order to mold them during the plastic period of life …”92 
 The prominence of this “prehabilitation” in the physical fitness discourse within the 
Army denoted one of the most significant changes in Army physical culture in the interwar 
years. Content with the sufficiency of training in the military, Army leaders turned their 
attentions outward. Discussion in professional journals centered less on how soldiers should 
exercise. Instead, the matter of who should exercise arose most frequently. As demonstrated 
above, the “who” were young American men and boys, all of whom were theoretically liable to 
render military service with little forewarning. Civilian educators agreed for a time. However, by 
the 1930s educators rarely made explicit connections between military service and citizenship, or 
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between military fitness standards and expectations for physical education. For educators, 
preparation for good citizenship increasingly meant social development and the “health of the 
entire personality.”93 Participation in a democratic society required social skills, a capacity for 
“self-expression and self-realization,” education to make the best use of increasing amounts of 
leisure time, and the vigor and health to be happy and productive in a vocation.94 Military writers 
agreed with much of this, though they emphasized discipline and stuck to an explicit, direct, and 
close linkage between preparedness for service and citizenship. 
 One of the best sites to observe this tight linkage in the military’s concept of citizenship, 
and physical training’s place in it, was the Citizens’ Military Training Camps (CMTC) program. 
Comprised of three progressive, month-long summer training courses held at several military 
posts across the United States and run by active-duty service members, CMTC was designed to 
improve the nation’s military preparedness while teaching attendees to be better citizens. 
Specifically, the CMTC was supposed to bring together a diverse lot of boys and young men, 
develop them “physically, mentally, and morally,” equip them with some basic military training, 
and “teach Americanism in its true sense.”95 Those few who completed all three courses could 
become eligible for a commission in the Reserves. CMTC was a direct outgrowth of the pre-
World War I preparedness movement. Its leaders traced their heritage directly to the “Plattsburg 
Camps,” which had grown into a system of Officers’ Candidate Schools that operated between 
May 1917 and November 1918. Though technically created by the 1916 National Defense Act, 
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CMTC was not implemented until 1921. It remained in operation until 1940.96 Twelve camps 
comprised the CMTC system in its first year of operation, and together they graduated a class of 
nearly ten thousand.97 At its peak in 1927, the CMTC operated fifty-three camps and graduated 
more than 38,000 candidates.98 
 CMTC was a weak substitute for the universal military training program advocated by 
many officers and by groups such as the influential Military Training Camps Association, but it 
afforded the military an opportunity to perform some prehabilitation.99 In the Red Course, the 
first of the three courses and the only one completed by the vast majority of candidates, the 
program of instruction covered basic infantry training. However, physical training was often 
cited as among the most prominent subjects. Authorities believed that physical training in the 
camps served a dual purpose. First, improving every candidates’ fitness prepared them for 
service and corrected deficiencies that might otherwise “impair their worth as citizens of the 
nation.”100 Second, fit candidates would carry back to their communities the “right standards of 
physical life.”101 This latter argument was common in the rhetorical toolkit of systematic training 
advocates in the military.  
 Perceived need for prehabilitation justified the emphasis placed on physical training in 
the CMTC program. In the Red Course manual, the chapter on physical training opened with an 
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infographic map of the United States in which each state’s shade corresponded to its percentage 
of drafted men who had passed entrance examinations. Some basic analysis accompanied the 
map, pointing out differences such as the relatively better health of rural populations, native-born 
youth, and the Midwestern states over their counterparts.102 Though the manual’s authors did not 
use the language of crisis when discussing draft rejection rates, they did make a point about the 
cost of wastage using a bit of napkin math--a population of 100,000 native-born youth would 
yield 3,500 more soldiers than an equivalent population of foreign-born youth, and a 3,500-man 
regiment “stopped the last German drive on the Marne.”103 Colonel P. S. Bond, one of CMTC 
textbook’s lead authors, also penned a small book in 1920 making a case for universal military 
training. The CMTC textbook echoed many of the ideas and much of the language in this earlier 
book. In it, Bond made an even larger claim for the value of military prehabilitation: the nation’s 
“wealth…strength and…happiness” rested on the health and vigor of its citizens.104 Physical 
training and health education for military service therefore laid a foundation for America’s 
social, political, and economic health. 
 Promoters of prehabilitation made compelling rhetorical cases for their cause, though the 
precise nature of the deficiencies to be rectified through prehabilitation were not always clear. 
After all, many of the defects that had disqualified men from service were not remediable by way 
of exercise. A close examination of the draft statistics reveals that at least 47% of all defects 
identified concerned sense organs, “disease-groups” such as tuberculosis and venereal disease, 
developmental and metabolic complications, nervous and mental issues, and diseases of the nose, 
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throat, skin, or teeth.105 Even defects of the “mechanical sort,” which comprised the plurality of 
defects at 39%, often had little to do with a lack of proper exercise.106 The problem seemed be 
chiefly one of health and hygiene. Accordingly, much of the CMTC health program addressed 
these issues. For instance, attendees received examinations to identify problems that might 
otherwise have gone undiagnosed, and also received treatment.107 The CMTC curriculum 
included preventative health training on issues ranging from basic oral hygiene to venereal 
disease. Daily life in the camps taught healthy habits such as smoking cessation, eating in 
moderation, and keeping to a regular sleeping routine.108  
If wellbeing issues constituted the primary problem and a major focus of the CMTC 
curriculum, the emphasis placed on physical training might seem perplexing. However, recalling 
the definition of and value placed on physical fitness within the Army’s prevailing physical 
culture explains the desire to sculpt young attendees through exercise. Since at least the 1880s, 
advocates of systematic training claimed several functions for exercise. First, it strengthened and 
improved bodies. In this, there were assumed corollaries with the remediation of physical 
defects, even if the linkages were not made explicit. Second, training developed qualities beyond 
the physical. Koehler’s and Raycroft’s cultures converged on this, even if they differed on the 
qualities to be improved and the means to do so. Physical training was therefore a tool that could 
be instrumental in achieving prehabilitation’s broader goal of making better citizens. Part of the 
CMTC’s mission was to develop young men “physically, mentally, and morally.”109 Physical 
training could address all three. 
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 The system of physical training created for the CMTC largely mirrored practices in the 
Regular Army, though it differed on time allocation and some points of emphasis. Similarities 
included twice-daily sessions most days, one in the morning and one in the afternoon. As in the 
Army, morning sessions concentrated on calisthenic exercises and longer afternoon sessions 
afforded time for games or applied physical training. Morning calisthenics in the CMTC system 
simply combined the basic setting-up drill from Koehler’s earlier manuals executed in formation 
with, if the instructor wished, quick-time marching. This corresponded with the “Recruit Course” 
in the Army, which was an introductory series of exercises designed to prepare soldiers’ bodies 
for more advanced exercises.110 Though the morning calisthenics were intended to “accomplish 
an all-round development in which each muscle is properly developed,” the CMTC curriculum 
allotted only twenty minutes to morning drill.111 In reality, only minimal gains in muscular 
strength and endurance could be expected from such sessions. However, the stated object of 
physical training included three other goals that physical training simultaneously addressed: 
building mental alertness, filling candidates with “enthusiasm,” and providing discipline.112 
These latter goals accorded with the goal of training candidates for good citizenship, which 
CMTC authorities associated with discipline and “habits of obedience, dependability, [and] 
respect for proper authority.”113 Koehler had sought for decades to inculcate these qualities in 
soldiers and cadets. As he had often asserted, and as the authors of the CMTC textbook 
continued to assert, physical training was a means to those ends.114 
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 Afternoon sessions of mass athletics and group games competitions differed sharply from 
the practices of the Army’s earlier physical culture. However, this unabashed embrace of sport 
aligned with Army life in the interwar years. A plethora of stadia, gymnasiums, and playing 
fields sprouted at U.S. Army bases in the 1920s and 1930s. Sports featured prominently in the 
daily lives of most soldiers.115 Daily life in the CMTC was no different. In contrast to the twenty-
five minutes allotted for calisthenics, the CMTC schedule included at least three hours of 
athletics daily when not on the range conducting target practice.116 Off-duty recreational events 
offered even more opportunities to compete. According to the recollections compiled by 
historian Donald Kington, athletics were a highlight of many CMTC candidates’ time in the 
camps—more candidates recalled their time on the playing field than in the morning drill 
formation.117 The CMTC’s leadership also seems to have viewed sports as an effective tool for 
marketing the program to potential candidates. For example, the vast majority of illustrations in 
Bond’s promotional book Your Boy & the Other in Universal Training featured uniformed 
individuals playing sports or posing with sports paraphernalia. 
 Diversity characterized the opportunities available in these afternoon sessions. Many 
activities recommended were of the variety organized by the CTCA’s wartime athletic directors. 
In fact, the CMTC textbook even directed instructors to use Raycroft’s Mass Physical Training 
section on group games.118 Such activities included variations on tag, relay races, and ball-
throwing games. Mass athletics were even more popular than these group games. Units within 
each camp organized teams for baseball, volleyball, and other games that competed against one 
another in tournaments and, on occasion, against local civilian teams. Among these team sports, 
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none was more beloved than baseball. Sports involving one-on-one competition were also 
available. Many former candidates recalled boxing being the most popular of these, though more 
enjoyed spectating than fighting. The emphasis placed on athletics within the CMTC program 
was apparent in the large amount of space sports occupied in camp yearbooks and the numerous 
medals and awards distributed at graduation to recognize accomplishments on the playing 
field.119 
 Athletics were a significant part of the lived experience of military life for soldiers and 
CMTC candidates alike in the interwar years. However, there seems to have been comparatively 
greater importance attached to athletics in the CMTC system as measured by time allotted and 
emphasis placed relative to other forms of physical training. The privileged place of sport in the 
Army’s premiere prehabilitation program deserves some explanation, especially given the 
concurrent disaggregation of training activities occurring in the Army’s physical culture. One 
explanation has to do with timing. Movement toward creation of the CMTC began in the 
immediate aftermath of WWI. Its creators drafted much of the program’s curriculum in 1920 and 
1921 when Raycroft’s training system still existed in institutional memory—Mass Physical 
Training was published in 1920 and the Physical and Bayonet Training Course at Benning had 
recently graduated two classes of instructors. Clearly the CMTC’s creators knew of Raycroft’s 
new manual because they cited it as a reference in their own text.120 In its conceptual integration 
of athletics and other activities into a comprehensive system of training, the CMTC curriculum 
reflected the Army’s prevailing physical culture at the time of its creation. 
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 Objectives sought by the CMTC program also provide an explanation. Recruitment was 
an immediate concern. As noted above, the CMTC’s promoters used sports as a means to entice 
young men into the program. The prominence of sport also helped smooth concerns some 
parents may have held about sending their sons to military training. As one officer familiar with 
the program observed, one of CMTC’s goals was to assure the American public that “military 
training does not mean militarism.”121 More significant was the CMTC’s core mission to provide 
training in citizenship. The desired product was a good citizen, not a disciplined soldier prepared 
to either kill or sacrifice. Given prevailing ideas in military physical training and civilian 
physical education, sports were considered better able to cultivate the desired characteristics of a 
citizen than was drill, bayonet training, or gymnastics. Sports could make physical activity 
attractive in a way that drill could not. Athletics were more likely to encourage healthy life-long 
habits, even after candidates returned home. Also, physical educators maintained that sports 
developed qualities beyond the physical. Through participation in organized athletics, candidates 
might also learn social skills and how to put their leisure time to wise use. According to this line 
of argument, “the man who goes in for sane, healthful and clean recreation is always a good 
citizen” because he “works the same as he plays—fair, clean and above-board.”122 
 The CMTC program was not the only citizen-making initiative of the interwar years, 
however. The Great Depression created more grounds beyond WWI draft stastics for concern 
about the health and vitality of young American men by the mid-1930s. The effects of the Great 
Depression were devastating for many Americans. Malnutrition and sickness took a heavy toll on 
the many unemployed families. The effects were so severe that even when given work through 
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New Deal programs and other sources, many men had difficulty performing that work.123 
Perceiving simultaneous economic, masculinity, and ecological crises, President Franklin 
Roosevelt created the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) by signing Executive Order 6101 on 
April 5, 1933.124 Over the following nine years, more than 2.9 million single and unemployed 
young men in the CCC would plant trees, build roads, fight fires, construct bridges and dams, 
and stock streams.125  
 Although explicitly formed as a civilian agency sensitive to the period’s dominant mood 
of antimilitarism, the CCC became an unintentional site for martial prehabilitation. The War 
Department took a lead role in organizing and administrating CCC camps, especially in 1933. 
The Roosevelt administration tasked the War Department with inducting hundreds of thousands 
of CCC enrollees, screening them for medical conditions, and moving them to camps. Initially, 
Regular Army personnel also served as the leadership cadre for these camps. By July of 1933, 
more than three-thousand officers and five-thousand enlisted men of the Regular Army served in 
these capacities.126 Subsequent concerns about this mission’s impact on military readiness led to 
a sharp reduction in direct military involvement. Within two years, officers of the Organized 
Reserve Corps acting in a civilian capacity had mostly assumed duties as camp commanders and 
CCC enrollees themselves took over the roles once held by Army non-commissioned officers 
and enlisted men.127 Despite the War Department’s declining involvement, the CCC bore many 
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marks of military influence. For instance, enrollees learned to maintain a neat uniform and clean 
living areas, and to live in a regimented organization. The model of masculinity endorsed by the 
CCC was also highly compatible with military service. 
 At root, the CCC was, to borrow a term from Christina Jarvis, a “man-building 
agency.”128 Because manhood included several ideals, man-building proceeded along multiple 
lines of effort. First, man-building taught the value of productive work and equipped men with 
the skills necessary to find such work in order to realize a bread-winner ideal. As the 
organization’s second director remarked, when an enrollee planted 25,000 trees, he “feels like a 
man.”129 Second, man-building taught proper social behavior and instilled desirable character 
traits. The goal in this regard was to fashion better citizens and prepare men to become husbands 
and fathers. Traits targeted for cultivation included strong work habits, discipline, a love of clean 
living, self-reliance, tolerance, and attachment to family and religion.130 Third, man-building 
involved health interventions and self-care education. For example, enrollees received 
immunizations and physical exams in addition to being taught good dental hygiene practices, 
how to avoid venereal disease, and other useful lessons. This emphasis on health education 
aligned well with concurrent trends in civilian physical education. Finally, man-building 
involved building up and sculpting men’s bodies. The CCC celebrated changes in enrollees’ 
physical appearances time and again through both text and photographs. Where more than 75% 
of enrollees entered the CCC at weights below Army standards, only 4% left a year later at 
substandard weights.131 A year of hard work, clean living, and good eating sent men back into 
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society with “more weight on their bones, more strength in their backs and arms, and more hair 
on their chests.”132 
 Man-building in the CCC contributed to the project of prehabiltation desired by physical 
training advocates in the Army, even if direct Army influence on the CCC waned rapidly after 
1933. As a site of prehabiltation, the CCC was less explicitly designed to prepare young men for 
military service when compared with the CMTC. Yet the CCC did seek to improve the physical, 
mental, and moral fitness of potential future soldiers along lines advocated by Army officers in 
prehabiltation programs. The CCC’s physical culture differed from the Army’s in the interwar 
period in that it put less emphasis on cultivating discipline and obedience. Instead of the hour of 
drill and physical training soldiers were supposed to experience on a daily basis, CCC enrollees 
performed for only fifteen minutes.133 CCC enrollees were strongly encouraged to participate in 
afternoon athletics, however, much like CMTC attendees. This, combined with the strenuousness 
of their work, hardened bodies and imparted lifetime fitness skills.134 Health education and 
character development similarly seemed to promise a way to raise more men to basic enlistment 
standards, thereby reducing draft rejection rates in a potential future conflict.  
 
 Continuity chiefly characterized the Army’s physical culture in the interwar period, but it 
was continuity with the original Koehler school instead of the theory and practice the CTCA’s 
Athletic Division fashioned during WWI. Wartime experience confirmed the value and utility of 
both systematic physical training and athletics. No longer were Army officers questioning 
whether or not soldiers should exercise. No more accusations of dangerous faddishness turned up 
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in the discourse about physical fitness within military circles. In fact, discussion about physical 
training largely disappeared altogether from professional journals within five years of the 
armistice. Physical training did not disappear, though.  
Physical training remained a part of the daily experience for most soldiers, but the form it 
took looked backward to pre-war practices. The movement toward aggregation central to 
Raycroft’s physical culture reversed course. A central school at Camp Benning run mostly by 
former members of the defunct CTCA Athletic Division kept their theory and practice alive 
through 1919. The school proved unable to survive the harsh budgetary environment found in the 
interwar era of normalization and antimilitarism. Even Raycroft’s book, Mass Physical Training, 
succumbed to these pressures and failed to achieve official standing within Army doctrine. 
Though the Infantry School continued promoting an integrated system of physical training 
through the 1920s, neither it nor the Physical and Bayonet Training Course exercised sufficient 
influence to fundamentally change the Army’s physical culture. Instead, control of that culture’s 
central texts reverted back to West Point where Koehler’s influence persisted even after his 
retirement in 1923. The resulting physical training regulations of 1928 hearkened back to the 
1914 Manual of Physical Training in a remarkable example of organizational forgetting. As a 
consequence, emphasis returned to drill and discipline. Athletics remained a major part of most 
soldiers’ lives, but athletics were no longer so integrated with drill and other activities into a 
coherent, overarching training system. In place of the individual warrior, the disciplined cog in a 
military machine once again became the Army physical culture’s ideal product.  
 Prehabilitation was one significant change in the Army’s physical culture and the 
discourse surrounding it. The importance of prehabilitation was grounded in anxieties about the 
fitness of American men created by unexpectedly high rates of draft rejections between 1917 and 
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1918. It was further fueled by perceptions in the military and the civilian physical education 
community that the military had succeeded in sculpting fit bodies and minds where the 
educational system had failed. Warfare in an age of industrialization and mass conscription 
meant that states needed to be able to marshal the highest possible percentage of their male 
populations. Especially within the military, citizenship came to be defined chiefly by the 
obligations one owed, including military service. Because every male citizen was theoretically 
liable for combat duty on relatively short notice, every male citizen had a duty to become fit and 
healthy. Although calls for universal military training withered on the vine in the years 
immediately following WWI, other sites for prehabilitation emerged. One, the CMTC, was 
directly connected to preparation for military service. Another, the CCC, was less explicitly 
militarized, though it touched the lives of many more men and ultimately served as an 
unintentional agent for paramilitary training in the 1930s. The Army’s physical culture 
influenced physical training in both. However, both emphasized athletics at the expense of more 
formal training in the interest of developing qualities associated with good citizenship and 
instilling a lifetime interest in healthy activity. 
 At the close of the interwar period, those men most responsible for shaping the Army’s 
physical culture had jettisoned or forgotten most of the lessons learned through experience in 
WWI. Many military and civilian authorities had turned more attention to building up the bodies 
of American men in both real terms and symbolically, especially after the Great Depression’s 
ravages. Yet as war once again loomed in 1940, concern resurfaced about the adequacy of Army 
physical training and the Army’s organizational capacity for the production of trainers. That 
year, Brigadier General Lewis Hershey, director of the Selective Service, warned Regular Army 
officers to be prepared for an influx of draftees of lower physical quality than of the recruits they 
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had been used to receiving.135 The question was whether, in the event of a mass mobilization, 
Army physical training could prepare these men for the demands of expeditionary warfare on the 
modern battlefield. 
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Chapter 5: Physical Cultures for Total War, 1936-1946 
 While American soldiers and marines ground down their Japanese opponents on 
Guadalcanal, and mere days before the first American troops landed in North Africa, John B. 
Kelly insisted that Americans would have to “toughen up physically” if they expected to defeat 
their Axis enemies.1 Speaking at an Institute on Physical Fitness at Columbia’s Teachers 
College, the former Olympic rower and current director of physical fitness in the Federal 
Security Agency’s Defense, Health, and Welfare Division promised that his forthcoming 
program would make America’s youth fit for combat and industrial work. Kelly asserted that 
such a program was long overdue, delayed by public complacency and Congressmen who 
“haven’t been able to see their shoes for years.”2 World War II’s unprecedented scale and near-
absolute nature demanded the extensive mobilization of whole peoples and economies. Quantity 
of manpower, materiel, and production mattered a great deal in determining the war’s outcome, 
but quantity alone was not sufficient for victory. As historian Peter Mansoor writes, the “relative 
quality” of forces was “crucial to the ultimate outcome.”3 Systematic physical training appeared 
to be a way of addressing both the war’s quantitative and qualitative demands—better physical 
education and training made a greater proportion of the population fit to fight, and physical 
fitness improved the efficiency and effectiveness of military forces. 
 American military and civilian leaders perceived many problems and challenges in the 
realm of physical fitness, however. Fears about the quality of America’s raw human material 
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extant since the late 19th century, which were seemingly confirmed by high draft rejection rates 
in World War I, received additional support when millions of men fell short of Selective Service 
standards in the early 1940s following the physical ravages of the Great Depression. When Kelly 
bluntly stated that “everybody is too soft,” he gave voice to concerns shared by many American 
officers.4 Inside the Army, acceptance of systematic physical training was nearly total, but its 
form had changed little since Koehler’s days at West Point. As the previous chapter 
demonstrated, the Army’s physical culture and associated training system largely reverted to the 
old Turner model in the interwar years. No central school had survived that could have 
researched new systems or produced expert trainers. In short, the Army’s physical training 
challenges resembled those it faced during mobilization for WWI: a huge influx of personnel 
deemed to be of lower quality because of state-determined physical defects or poor physical 
fitness, a system best suited for maintaining minimum unit fitness and instilling discipline, and 
lack of an expansible instructor corps. 
 This chapter explores the ways in which the Army’s physical culture changed during 
World War II in response to that conflict’s conditions and demands as understood chiefly by a 
cadre of physical training reformers in the Special Services Division of the Army Service Forces. 
These reformers reoriented physical training on practical preparation for likely combat 
requirements, such as lifting heavy objects and moving rapidly over broken terrain, and 
producing measurable physiological outcomes. Additionally, mobilizing an army of millions 
inevitably depressed average recruit fitness levels. Thus, mobilization also spurred renewed calls 
for prehabilitation and for re-engineering physical training to rapidly make recruits combat-
ready. After examining the mini-crisis produced by mobilization, this chapter turns to focus on 
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the men most responsible for wartime physical training. Although uniformed officers owned 
physical training to a greater degree than they had during World War I, civilian outsiders once 
again took the lead in re-engineering the Army’s training system. These civilians applied 
scientific methods and empirical data, along with some of the latest trends in physical education, 
to craft a system geared more than ever toward generating physiological outcomes alone. Finally, 
this chapter considers the significance of women’s entry into military service through the 
Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps on the Army’s physical culture. Their entrance, and the 
separate physical training system designed to meet their perceived needs, revealed that the 
Army’s physical culture was fundamentally rooted in traditional visions of gender. 
 
 With war clearly looming in Europe, American political and military leaders in the late 
1930s increasingly turned their attention to planning for mobilization. Their efforts culminated in 
the passage of the Selective Training and Service Act in September 1940, which established the 
first peacetime draft in the history of the United States. Physical standards were an important 
screening component in the induction processes. In the Army, responsibility for determining 
those physical standards resided with the Surgeon General’s office. The Surgeon General’s staff 
drew on experiences acquired during World War I and subsequent planning for mass 
mobilization to craft Mobilization Regulations (MR) 1-9, “Standards of Physical Examination 
During Mobilization.”5 Issued on 31 August 1940, these regulations governed physical 
evaluations by draft boards until DSS Form 220 refined them in December 1941. MR 1-9 
established very high physical requirements because they were based on plans for an Army that 
was much smaller than that required by World War II. 
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 High standards generated shocking shortcomings once inductions began. Initially, 
responsibility for overseeing inductions fell to the Selective Service System, which Congress 
authorized on 16 September 1940, but local boards conducted the initial examinations. Men 
found fit for service then underwent examination by Army medical boards to receive a final 
determination of physical qualification. This system evolved between 1940 and 1945 to 
minimize the redundancy in dual examinations and to bring Army and Navy standards closer 
together, but the two-part process held throughout the war years.6 Between November 1940 and 
August 1945, this system examined an estimated 17,954,500 for induction into military service.7 
The American public was stunned to learn that, prior to the U.S. entering the war in December 
1941, rejection rates ran as high as fifty percent. Of the approximately two million men 
examined in 1941, nearly a million were rejected, and 45% of those were rejected for physical 
and/or mental defects.8 Though few sounding the alarm over national physical fitness made note 
of it, “physical defects” and “mental deficiency” were capacious categories. Many conditions 
ranging from musculoskeletal or cardiovascular defects to varicose veins or hemorrhoids could 
disqualify a man physically.  
 Debate raged in the public press about the significance of these figures to the nation’s 
health. Some government officials were prone to stoke fears of national physical unpreparedness, 
echoing the post-World War I crisis engendered by draft rejection rates of around thirty percent. 
For instance, the Selective Service System’s director, Brigadier General Lewis B. Hershey, 
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declared that the rejection of approximately forty-five percent of the first 2,000,000 men 
examined for induction was “an indictment of America,” and a “condition of which we 
nationally should be thoroughly ashamed.”9 Other voices, especially those in the medical and 
physical education communities, were more skeptical. Many skeptics pointed to the fact that 
American physical standards used for induction examinations in the early 1940s far exceeded 
those of 1917-18 and those used by other nations.10 Critics also observed that detecting 
instruments had grown more effective since 1917, so the screen’s filter was finer than ever.11 
Hershey acknowledged these factors but argued that Americans still had cause for concern. Even 
accepting the higher physical standards of 1940, Hershey claimed that “the fact remains that 
while we may be no worse now than twenty-four years ago, we seem certainly to be no better.”12 
 The armed forces’ voracious appetite for more and more men between 1940 and 1945 
constantly pressured the Surgeon General’s Office and Selective Service System to revise 
standards, examination procedures, and other elements of the induction process. Induction of 
“limited service” men was among the first steps taken in this direction. This policy took effect on 
1 August 1942 and permitted induction of men with physical defects in twenty categories 
ranging from men with 20/400 vision that could be correct to 20/40 with glasses, to those with 
the loss of one or both external ears.13 The limited service policy acknowledged that not all men 
rejected earlier were incapable of rendering military service. As one commentator put it, “only a 
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small proportion of the rejected men were like jalopies which can only wheeze along a little 
longer before they stop for good.” Instead, he maintained, most were “like cars in which the 
radiator is leaky, or the rubber worn off the tires in spots, or the battery low, or the valves pitted 
and noisy, or one of the sparkplugs cracked.”14  
Personnel policies further refined service classifications throughout the war years in 
acknowledgement of there being more than a binary categorization of ability. For example, 
Lieutenant General Leslie McNair of the Army Ground Forces (AGF) championed a physical 
profile system beginning in 1943 that rated men in six elements of physical conditioning.15 
Reception centers began employing this physical profile system experimentally in February 1944 
and it was fully operational by June 1944. Under this system, physical examinations of men 
produced ratings in each element between a high of one and a low of four. McNair intended to 
use measures of physical hardiness as signs of fighting capacity, then make these physical 
measures the primary criterion of assignment in the Army as a way of improving the quality of 
combat troops. The AGF staff coded every enlisted job in the ground forces and related service 
branches based on physical requirements to set minimum physical standards for each duty 
position in each type of unit. For instance, a basic standard existed for all buglers, but buglers in 
an infantry unit were held to more stringent physical requirements than buglers in a field artillery 
unit. However, these standards were not based on quantified measures of combat’s physical 
demands, but on estimates generated by the AGF staff.16 The physical rates also did not 
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correspond strongly with conditioning. They were instead based on criteria that screened for 
physical defects.  
 The federal government also launched efforts to rehabilitate some men. The pilot 
rehabilitation program, announced in October 1941, paid physicians and dentists to remediate 
physical defects found in 200,000 men identified by local draft boards.17 The program did not 
survive beyond 1942 due to a mounting shortage of civilian physicians, but the Army continued 
its efforts through the rest of the war years by inducting limited service men and rehabilitating 
them in the service. This growing recognition of various degrees of ability in the armed forces’ 
personnel procurement policies, and within the Army’s manpower allocation system, is notable 
in relation to the Army’s physical culture. A similar recognition of difference did not exist in 
systematic physical training policy and practice.   
 Fears about the nation’s health also prompted wider government prehabilitation and 
publicity programs. These programs began small in October 1940 when President Franklin 
Roosevelt appointed John B. Kelly, a famous rower and Olympic medalist in the 1920 and 1924 
games, to head the Civilian Defense Physical Fitness Program. Kelly initially struggled to make 
headway without funding or a staff, but his situation improved in August 1941 when Director of 
Civilian Defense Fiorello LaGuardia appointed Kelly the Assistant Director of Civilian Defense 
in Charge of Physical Fitness.18 Kelly built two coordination committees by mid-1942, one for 
schools and colleges and another to target recreational groups. A second element of Kelly’s 
program, the Sports Board, used celebrities such as Jesse Owens to promote physical fitness 
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initiatives.19 On 29 April 1943, Kelly’s influence grew further when Roosevelt established the 
National Committee on Physical Fitness under the Federal Security Agency.20 Kelly’s 
organizations in every incarnation were centers intended to stimulate state and local efforts, 
develop and distribute information and suggested programs, and popularize physical fitness. 
None of these organizations had much direct control over actual training programs, nor did they 
influence the Army’s physical culture. However, they helped push the issues of physical fitness 
and national health to the forefront of national consciousness and participated in the wartime 
militarization of physical education in American schools.21 These efforts enhanced the influence, 
limited as it may have been, of military prehabilitation programs such as the Victory Corps and 
Universal Military Training, both subjects of the next chapter. Prehabilitation campaigns also 
contributed to postwar concerns about the nation’s health in a competitive world. 
 Statistics frequently cited by Kelly’s committees and Selective Service leaders had little 
to do with the average American man’s muscular strength and endurance or his cardiovascular 
health, however. The most common problems encountered in examinations were “static” medical 
issues involving psychological health, dental defects, venereal disease, illiteracy, and hernias.22 
Critics, especially in the physical education field, pointed this out in the public discourse. For 
instance, one educator argued that “physical unfitness” was really a misnomer and that a new 
term such as “militarily unfit” might be more appropriate because, as an example, a man with a 
“malocclusion can hardly be termed, by any stretch of the imagination, physically unfit.”23 Yet 
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Kelly, Colonel Leonard Rowntree of the Selective Service, Hershey, and others spun the issue as 
one remediable by exercise. Rowntree observed that “many of the registrants were found to be 
pampered, soft, flabby and in need of conditioning.”24 Similarly, Lieutenant Colonel Theodore 
Bank, who largely assumed responsibility for Army physical training policy in 1941, argued on 
the basis of physical efficiency test results that the “lack of strength, endurance, agility, and 
coordination” in America’s newest soldiers was “shocking.”25 Bank also asserted that the Army 
had been “sadly handicapped” in preparing troops for combat “because of the physical weakness 
of the incoming men.”26  
Comments such as these delivered in government publications, the press, and 
professional physical education journals fostered the impression of a nation grown weak and 
soft. In reality, there was some truth to the allegations when comparing new recruits to the 
volunteers selected under a regime of high standards in the interwar years. Critics may have been 
correct that the nation itself was at least as healthy, if not more so, than it had been in 1917. But 
the Army faced an enormous influx of new inductees. Between 1940 and 1945 the service grew 
from a force numbering about 270,000 to one numbering more than 8,250,000. The sheer 
quantity of incoming manpower necessarily meant a decline in that manpower’s quality.27 With 
that in mind, we turn to examine how well equipped the Army’s physical culture was to prepare 
millions of new soldiers for the rigorous demands of modern mechanized warfare, and how the 
experience of preparing those men changed the Army’s physical culture. 
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Initially, the physical training component of mobilization training was supposed to follow 
interwar policy established in the 1936 Basic Field Manual’s (BFM) fourth chapter. In it, the 
Koehler culture appeared in full force. The 1936 BFM chapter on physical training was little 
more than a reprinted portion of the 1928 Training Regulations 115-5, which itself manifested 
only marginal changes from the Army’s original 1914 manual. But in the decade following 1936, 
Army physical training policy transformed. Policy transformation is important to the history of 
the Army’s physical culture because policy both represented and shaped the Army’s physical 
culture. Koehler’s culture and its emphasis on discipline, morals, and obedience gave way during 
World War II to a comprehensive training program predicated on scientific experimentation, 
empirical data, and physiological improvement. Tracing this transformation begins with an 
examination of the Army’s evolving policies. Unpacking vital elements of the physical culture 
that emerged in World War II follows, to include investigating changing definitions of fitness, 
evolving approaches to program development, preparation of physical training leadership, the 
ever-contentious place of sport, and the rise of efficiency testing. 
 Spring of 1941 brought the first evolution in policy with an updated version of the Basic 
Field Manual on physical training, this time with the designator FM 21-20. Increased attention 
paid in the manual to turning average recruits into trained soldiers indicates how the demands of 
mobilization prompted FM 21-20’s issuance. Responsibility for updating the policy fell to the 
United States Military Academy (USMA), signaling that institution’s continued dominance over 
the Army’s physical culture. Prepared under the direction of USMA’s Superintendent, Brigadier 
General Robert Eichelberger, FM 21-20 presented a program only slightly different from its 
predecessor’s. Its purpose centered on producing “a state of health and general physical fitness” 
that permitted a soldier to “perform the arduous duties required of him.” The “ultimate goal” of 
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physical training was thus the “physical efficiency which is essential to military effectiveness.”28 
This simple statement highlighted the increasing acceptance of systematic physical training in 
the Army. In the 1880s, many officers regarded physical training dubiously as a fad of 
questionable value and staying power. By 1941, physical training had come to be seen as an 
essential prerequisite in the process of transformation from civilian to soldier.29 
The authors of FM 21-20 graphically depicted physical efficiency as resting upon 
multiple layers of other qualities, skills, and activities. Disciplinary and setting-up exercises 
comprised the base layer. These were intended to prepare soldiers “mentally and physically” for 
training in basic skills such as marching, running, jumping, climbing, crawling, carrying, and 
throwing.30 Training to become proficient 
in those basic skills was supposed to be 
productive of endurance and agility, 
which comprised the next layer. Physical 
improvement and the awareness of it 
cultivated less tangible qualities such as 
confidence, courage, alertness, initiative, 
pride, and discipline underlying physical 
efficiency for military effectiveness.31 
Though graphically depicted for the first time and slightly re-worded, this physical efficiency 
concept was not substantially different from the pyramidal construct Koehler used in the 1880s. 
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Keeping with Koehler’s prioritization of psychological outcomes derived from physical exercise, 
the authors of FM 21-20 promised that the development of such qualities was “a certainty” that 
might “equal, if not surpass, the purely physiological value of the training.”32 
In pursuit of developing physical efficiency for military effectiveness in new recruits, the 
authors of FM 21-20 made several small changes to the Army’s interwar training policy. First, 
they added “disciplinary exercises” as a precursor to the old setting-up exercises. Practicing 
facings, rests, hand salutes, mark time marching, the position of attention, and the starting 
positions of setting-up exercises all fell under this header. Disciplinary exercises had “no 
particular value in physical development” but were still of “great importance in instilling in the 
men that sense of discipline which is necessary for the efficient conduct of the physical training 
instruction.”33 Second, the authors of FM 21-20 urged commanders to construct obstacle courses 
for practicing basic skills such as running, jumping, vaulting, climbing, and crawling. The 
recommended course included a hurdle, four-foot fence vault, panel dodge, seven-foot wall 
climb, low crawl, six-foot ditch broad jump, and a balance-beam. This bore a remarkable 
resemblance to the course recommended by Joseph Raycroft, the Commission on Training Camp 
Activities’s Athletic Division director in WWI, as both a “group game” and physical efficiency 
test.34 As had Raycroft, FM 21-20’s authors recommended progression in obstacle course usage 
that began with technique and worked up to timed runs under light combat loads.35 
In addition to disciplinary exercises and obstacle courses, the authors of FM 21-20 
recommended physical efficiency tests with minimum standards for average men. Commanders 
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could use these tests at regular intervals to determine the “condition and aptitude” of their 
soldiers, then design a physical training program based on the men’s strengths and weaknesses.36 
The recommended test battery included a 100-yard dash, running high jumps, broad jumps, and 
push-ups. Fourteen other test options with minimum standards ranging from baseball throws to 
half-mile runs also appeared in FM 21-20. Like the obstacle course, physical efficiency tests 
featured in Raycroft’s program but not in the 1936 BFM. However, Raycroft’s test battery was 
more explicitly oriented on practical combat skills. In addition to a 100-yard sprint and running 
broad jump, Raycroft had included fence climbs, obstacle races, grenade throws, bayonet drills, 
hand-to-hand fighting, boxing, and a smattering of athletic events.37  
Finally, the authors of FM 21-20 added a major chapter on swimming and life-saving 
techniques. Swimming had been a staple of West Point’s physical training regimen since Edward 
Farrow’s 1882 program and featured in the Army’s original 1914 manual, but swimming 
instruction had disappeared in the World War I-era training systems and in the post-war manuals. 
Citing the prevalence of “sub-marine attacks on troops ships” and “battles over flooded areas, 
and across streams and canals,” the authors of FM 21-20 argued that swimming had become a 
crucial skill all soldiers should possess.38 The 1941 manual established three general swimming 
goals: the ability to ford streams, participate in landing operations, and survive emergencies in 
the water. Soldiers met these goals by practicing six recommended activities: fundamental 
strokes, short distance swimming with arms or legs alone, short distance swimming under light 
combat load, fundamentals of water safety, life-saving skills, and “elementary experience” in 
competitive swimming.39 As with obstacles, the principle of progression was to be observed in 
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swimming instruction. Soldiers first learned basic techniques, then the distance to be crossed 
gradually increased along with the amount of clothing and equipment that the soldier wore.  
 While the official Army physical culture changed little through 1941, more substantive 
change began in early 1942. Impetus for this evolution originated from two organizations: The 
War Department’s Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation, and the Army 
Special Service’s Athletic and Recreation Branch. The former was established in February 1941, 
nearly ten months before the United States entered World War II, to plan welfare and recreation 
activities for the services and to coordinate those activities with civil agencies. The committee 
resembled the Commission on Training Camp Activities from World War I in some ways. 
However, its mission was not to take direct charge of activities, but rather to study issues and 
advise the services on provision of activities. From its inception, the committee looked with 
interest on the services’ physical training programs.40 Its first initiative in this area was an 
appraisal of the physical fitness program in use at the Naval Training Station in Norfolk, 
Virginia. A special survey team of six physical education experts conducted the study, including 
Joseph Raycroft as the committee’s chairman.41  
Between 19 and 24 January 1942, the team held conferences with the Naval Training 
Station’s leadership and physical training instructors, inspected documents and facilities, and 
observed operations. The station’s program had begun in May 1941 with the induction of twenty 
men trained in physical education. This initial group later developed an exercise and intramural 
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athletics program and systematized it for use in the Navy’s service schools. In July, the training 
station established a physical instructor school intended to certify physical instructors in the new 
system through a six-week course. Initially, classes of twenty men formed every two weeks. In 
January 1942 the quota increased to fifty students per class with classes forming weekly.42 The 
special survey committee examined this Norfolk system in light of the Navy’s need for men 
possessing not just health, strength, and endurance, but also “mental alertness, discrimination, 
initiative, determination and other like qualities.”43 Two months later, the committee issued an 
extensive report. Among the many recommendations was counsel to incorporate required athletic 
sports, recreational athletic sports, and systematic physical training into a comprehensive 
program. The latter included calisthenics, running, obstacle and apparatus work, “self-defense 
activities,” group games, relay races, combative contests, tumbling, and life-saving.44 
Additionally, the committee recommended an enhanced testing program to assess fitness and the 
appointment of a Director of Physical training with an expert staff to organize and direct a 
physical training program for the entire Navy.45  
These features are significant because the basic structure of the recommended Norfolk 
program also undergirded updates in Army policy in late 1942. For instance, the supplementary 
mandatory and recreational athletic programs became major features in the Army’s suggested 
system of daily physical training. So too did the diverse offering of calisthenics, grass drills, and 
guerrilla drills in regular conditioning periods. Later, the Army also introduced a more 
sophisticated testing regime along the lines recommended by the Norfolk survey group. 
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Transmission of thought and practice occurred chiefly through the Joint Army and Navy 
Committee on Welfare and Recreation. Following its study of the Navy program at Norfolk, the 
committee consulted with the Army Air Forces (AAF) in developing their program, then opened 
communications with the Army to assist the Army Ground Forces. This collaboration appears to 
have begun between March and April 1942 when the Joint Army and Navy Committee 
transmitted a copy of the Norfolk report to the Army’s Special Services Branch.46  
Of the joint board’s members, the University of Iowa’s Charles H. McCloy was 
especially influential in changing Army physical training policy. Born in 1886, McCloy studied 
at Marietta College, the Johns Hopkins Medical School, and Columbia University, earning his 
Ph.D. at the latter in 1932. Before becoming a professor of physical education at the University 
of Iowa in 1930, McCloy taught physical education and served in the YMCA throughout China 
and the United States. McCloy built a strong reputation in the physical education community 
through his contributions to the scientific measurement movement in the 1920s and 1930s.47 This 
movement sought to enhance physical education’s standing and respectability by producing a 
scientific body of knowledge derived from carefully constructed and validated experimentation 
and measurement. McCloy brought this empirical research methodology to his work with 
American military forces during World War II, first as a member of the Norfolk study team and 
later in 1942 as a lead technical advisor to the Army.48 
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McCloy’s efforts and those of other joint board members dovetailed with a concurrent 
movement inside the Army advocating physical training policy reform. This movement 
originated within the Special Services Division, spurred by concerns about the “combat physical 
condition” of ground troops.49 The Special Services Division was a component of the Army 
Service Forces (ASF), a new organization officially created in the War Department on 9 March 
1942 as a counterpart to the Army Ground Forces, though the Special Services Division itself 
had existed since 1941.50 The ASF’s mission required it to “provide services and supplies to 
meet military requirements” and to relieve the fighting arms of “the distraction and effort 
required by supply, procurement, and general housekeeping duties.”51 While the ASF’s chief 
function was the purchase, storage, and distribution of supplies, it also assumed responsibility 
over many other functions such as pre-military training, manpower mobilization, and the 
direction of morale, welfare, and recreation activities. The latter fell under the purview of the 
ASF’s Special Services Division (SSD). 
Stimulus for investigation and reform of Army physical training came chiefly from 
Lieutenant Colonel Theodore “Ted” Bank, the SSD’s Athletic and Recreation Branch chief. 
Bank was a decorated combat veteran who had enlisted in the Army in 1916 at age 18, fought 
along the Mexican border and in France, received a wound in combat, and was awarded the 
French Croix de Guerre for his bravery.52 After World War I, Bank attended the University of 
Michigan where he was the football team’s starting quarterback in 1920 and 1921. Bank 
                                                 
49 Brig. General F. H. Osborn, Memorandum, Subject: Physical Conditioning and Physical Efficiency 
Tests, 13 April 1942; Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation, General Subject Files, 1941-
1942, box 10; Joint Boards and Committees, RG 225, NACP. 
50 The Special Services Division is also sometimes referred to as the Special Services Branch. “Division” 
will be used in this paper for the sake of consistency. John D. Millet, The Organization and Role of the Army Service 
Forces (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1998), 348. 
51 Ibid., 36-38. 
52 East, A Historical Review and Analysis of Army Physical Readiness Training and Assessment, 111. 
207 
 
subsequently enjoyed a successful career as a football coach at Tulane University and the 
University of Idaho but remained in the Army Reserves. In February 1941, the Army ordered 
Bank back to service as a Captain.53 By the time his early 1942 plans for testing the physical 
fitness of ground troops gained traction, Bank had been promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. Within 
two years he achieved the rank of Colonel.  
In the spring of 1942 concerns about the physical fitness of American soldiers came to 
Bank’s attention. Explaining why soldiers lacked fitness was Bank’s first concern. Whether this 
was a case of recruits coming in to the service below standards, as Kelly’s committees, 
Rowntree, and Hershey claimed, or a problem with retrogression after basic training seems to 
have been unclear. Bank, in partnership with the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare 
and Recreation, intended to answer this question by testing a cross-section of ground troops’ 
physical condition. Bank proposed testing newly inducted men, soldiers in an infantry division 
who had recently arrived from a replacement training center, veteran infantrymen and field 
artillerymen from eight different divisions, veterans in two armored regiments, and veterans from 
three different parachute battalions. Ten exercises ranging from chin-ups to zig-zag runs 
comprised the test battery, along with measures of height, weight, chest expansion, and 
abdominal girth.54 Bank received permission to conduct the tests from Army Ground Forces in 
mid-April 1942 and brought in three other men to form his team: statistician Abram Jaffre of the 
Special Service’s Research Division, Arthur A. Esslinger of Stanford University’s Department of 
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Physical Education, and Charles McCloy of the joint board.55 Making use of his experience in 
scientific measurement, McCloy served as the experiment’s general director.56 
Findings produced by this team informed a major revision to Army physical training 
policy. Between 10 May and 4 June, Bank and his fellows visited eleven Army installations 
across the country and administered tests to more than five-thousand troops. McCloy completed 
a preliminary statistical analysis by the end of June and shortly thereafter proposed test 
standards.57 Ownership of responsibility for revising physical training policy was unclear, 
however. In April, the joint board had recommended that this revision take the form of a manual 
to be used by the Special Services Branch School when training its athletic officers.58 Bank 
disagreed, arguing that responsibility for the manual should fall to the Chief of the Special 
Service instead of to the school, and that the manual should be published as a technical manual 
for general use.59 Bank’s argument ultimately carried the day.  
The discussion of ownership is significant because it reveals that the Army still lacked a 
central proponent for physical training policy. Koehler had long urged the creation of such a 
center and suggested that the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) could fill the role. Raycroft had 
likewise advocated a center, but his was modeled on Britain’s Aldershot. Raycroft’s dream 
withered in the interwar years and responsibility drifted back to the USMA by default. Mass 
mobilization in the early 1940s again exposed the need for a center external to the USMA, but 
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ownership of physical training policy remained uncertain. After his exposure to this confusion, 
McCloy pulled no punches in evaluating the consequences: physical training in the Army was “a 
terrible mess” and in need of someone at the top to “get the thing straightened out.” McCloy 
perceived “a lot of jealousies” and “ambitious strivings for position” that resulted in ground 
troops “really getting nothing.”60 
Resolution of the central proponent problem, at least during the war years, came in 
November 1942 with the publication of Training Circular (TC) 87. The circular aimed to 
precisely address the needs of Army Ground Forces troops that the summer’s testing and data 
collection efforts had uncovered. TC 87 was grounded in empirical data and brought some 
cutting-edge ideas about physical training to bear on the specific problem of readying troops for 
combat. As historian Whitfield East observes, TC 87 and its “outcome-based” program made FM 
21-20 and its “process-based” program look outdated, even though the field manual was little 
more than a year old.61 With TC 87, Bank and the ASF’s Special Service Division asserted their 
control over Army physical training policy, and ultimately over the official physical culture.  
Work continued on the system and the policies codifying it throughout the war. In May 
1944, Bank and his team published War Department (WD) Pamphlet 21-9 as an “illustrated 
amplification” of TC 87.62 The pamphlet added some commentary about TC 87’s history and the 
necessity of physical training, plus illustrations of a variety of activities, but it did not 
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substantively alter any part of TC 87’s system. When WD Pamphlet 21-9 entered circulation, its 
creators were already at work revising 1941’s FM 21-20. Publication of the new FM, which 
superseded the old FM 21-20, TC 87, and WD Pamphlet 21-9, came in January 1946. 63 The new 
manual represented a fuller expression of the TC 87 system, though it also reflected more of the 
USMA’s influence than did its wartime predecessors. Taken together, the three documents 
published between 1942 and 1946 modified the Army’s existing physical culture in many ways. 
Features of the evolving physical culture included: a revised definition of fitness; an orientation 
on the components of fitness that make a soldier-combat ready reminiscent of Raycroft’s WWI-
era physical culture; an emphasis on scientifically determined and measurable outcomes; an 
integration of training and athletic activities; and leadership by a corps of trained amateurs. 
Many of these features followed from the revised definition of fitness advanced by 
McCloy, Esslinger, and Bank. As noted above, “physical efficiency for military effectiveness” 
was the goal of the system presented in 1941’s FM 21-20. Physical efficiency sat atop layers of 
qualities such as health, confidence, courage, and alertness. Those qualities derived from bodily 
endurance and agility that practice of basic physical skills such as marching, jumping, climbing, 
and crawling built. Below it all lay a foundation of disciplinary and setting-up exercises.64 1942’s 
revised concept situated physical fitness as a component of “total military fitness,” a composite 
of technical, mental, emotional, and physical fitness. Technical fitness referred to basic tactical 
training and the ability to employ arms and equipment. Mental and emotional fitness, or morale, 
involved a sense of mission, a will to fight, and healthy habits of thinking.65 Physical fitness, 
according to the authors of WD Pamphlet 21-9, was “evidenced by a body which can retain 
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normal responses to stimuli in the face of fatigue and exhaustion” and continue to “function 
effectively” under the many stresses placed on it by the “routine and emergency tasks of war.”66 
Such bodies manifested five elements: freedom from disease and defect, strength, endurance 
(both muscular and cardio-respiratory), agility, and coordination.67 Physical fitness in turn 
complemented the other elements of total military efficiency, entwining physical and mental 
health. 
Combat framed this new definition of fitness. Each element related to battlefield or 
combat support tasks, whether it be lifting heavy objects, persisting through fatigue, or 
manifesting sufficient speed, agility, coordination, and flexibility to “handle oneself in tactical 
operations.”68 This physical culture did not concern itself much with discipline and obedience, 
reflecting contemporary thought in the physical education profession and Army officers’ 
experiences leading conscripted citizen-soldiers in World War I, but rather aimed to optimize the 
individual soldier’s physical capacity. Indeed, TC 87 and WD Pamphlet 21-9 explicitly 
concentrated on cultivating and measuring the individual soldier’s physical capabilities. While 
1946’s FM 21-20 revived a few reminders about the need to improve the mass’s total military 
fitness and to measure a unit’s quality by the “over-all picture” derived from the condition of all 
its members, it retained an emphasis on individual optimization.69  
Notably, this new definition of fitness only included measurable physiological outcomes. 
The earlier Koehler-based definition of fitness included qualities such as confidence, courage, 
discipline, and alertness as components of physical efficiency. By 1946, these qualities, along 
with basic military skills such as swimming, running, and jumping, were recognized as “valuable 
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products” of a good physical training, but no longer as fundamental elements of fitness.70 This 
change generated massive repercussions within the Army’s physical culture. Among these, the 
greatest was liberation of physical training from a dual mission of developing both discipline and 
physical capacity. This created opportunities for new fitness activities, both in the system as a 
whole and in the daily program. The authors of WD Pamphlet 21-9 called for instructors to 
abandon the old “extreme formalism” that made the “chief objective” of physical training 
“discipline rather than physical fitness.” Instead, the authors charged instructors with selecting 
conditioning exercises and conducting them “so that they impart the utmost physiological 
benefit.” Insistence on accuracy and precision was only valuable if they assisted soldiers in 
deriving the “maximum physical benefit from the exercises.”71 Soldiers undergoing physical 
training must have appreciated the change. Instead of repetitive execution of the same old 
setting-up exercises, they were supposed to experience a varied program of work intended to 
deliver bigger physiological results faster than ever before. 
Empirical evidence supported claims of improved results under the new program. 
Between the time Bank’s team collected its data in the summer of 1942 and TC 87’s publication 
in November of that year, four infantry companies piloted the TC 87 program over a six-week 
period. Two companies used the new system under close supervision while the other two 
functioned as an experimental control group using “traditional calisthenics, jogging and obstacle-
course running.”72 The companies tested the strength, agility, endurance, and coordination of 
their soldiers at the beginning and end of this six-week period.73 The results showed an 
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improvement of only 3.5% in “total physical fitness” among the control groups, but an increase 
of 23.25% in those following the TC 87 system.74 Differences in outcomes were especially 
evident in the events of most obvious combat relevance such as the pick-a-back and dodging 
runs.  
While the definition of fitness underwent substantial change around 1942, other elements 
in the Army’s physical culture displayed continuity. For instance, the need for physical fitness in 
warfare communicated by physical training advocates remained consistent despite technological 
change. As did early proponents of physical training such as Herman Koehler, Edmund Butts, 
and James Pilcher, the WWII-era authors connected military physical training to the practices of 
the ancient Greeks and Romans. Like their turn-of-the-century predecessors, the new authors 
also evinced some Social Darwinist belief in the strength of a people being dependent upon the 
strength of its military aged males, and of the pernicious effects of “soft luxurious living” on that 
strength.75 Channeling many of their predecessors’ concerns about weak men and the widespread 
fear of the American man’s declension as revealed in draft rejection rates, the new authors 
assumed that the Army’s raw material was of a less-than-perfect quality. For instance, WD 
Pamphlet 21-9’s authors asserted that physical fitness testing had revealed “clearly the declining 
strength, endurance, agility, and coordination of the past two or three generations” owing to the 
“weakening influence of our modern machine civilization.”76 Opinions shared by the propagators 
of Army training policy changed little by 1946, as shown by FM 21-20’s warning that “few 
recruits” would enter the service “physically fit for the arduous duties ahead of them.”77 
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“Modern machine civilization” may have reduced the average American man’s fitness in 
the opinion of this physical culture’s producers, but they also believed that mechanization had 
“accentuated rather than minimized” the importance of physical fitness in war.78 Authors of the 
Army’s new manuals directly connected advances in the “strength, speed, power and endurance” 
of military machines to the physical demands placed on soldiers. Every technical improvement 
demanded a corresponding improvement in the quality of the humans operating the machines.79 
This argument echoed those made by proponents of the offensive in the years prior to World War 
I who asserted, in the words of historian Antulio Echevarria, “that the human element must be 
strong enough to provide a vigorous complement to the newfound power of military 
technology.”80 Bank and his team gave several explanations for such an association. First, 
mechanized warfare increased the tempo of combat, putting a premium on endurance. Second, 
most fighting still occurred between infantry troops. The “grueling ordeal” of war still involved 
making assaults, running and crawling, jumping in and out of “fox holes, craters, and trenches,” 
and “lifting and carrying heavy objects.”81 Bank also often employed as rhetorical devices 
emergency situations that might confront even tank operators and pilots—tanks break down and 
planes crash behind enemy lines.82 Finally, the new producers recognized a tight linkage between 
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physical fitness, mental health, and morale. Troops in better physical condition were better 
equipped to withstand the stresses of war, and thus better equipped to sustain their will to fight.83 
The perceived gap between declining fitness and increasing physical demands was a core 
feature of the Army’s official physical culture between 1942 and 1946. The training system that 
the culture produced reflected this perceived gap. Bank openly blamed America’s physical 
educators for the weak bodies entering service in the 1940s. Their shortcomings “handicapped” 
the Army in its efforts to make new recruits combat-ready.84 Bank, McCloy, Esslinger and their 
team envisioned overcoming this handicap with a more efficient training program. They also 
assumed that achieving the “total conditioning of all the men” required many different types of 
activities because no single one could adequately develop all components of fitness.85 As a 
result, their training program integrated many activities into a comprehensive training program 
based on empirical research intended to produce specific, measurable physiological outcomes. 
Measurement itself was not a wholly new or novel feature of the Army’s physical culture, 
but the characteristics measured in 1942 differed from those measured in earlier decades. For 
instance, Koehler collected data on members of the U.S. Military Academy Corps of Cadets 
since 1885. Koehler’s measures focused on anthropometric features such as height, weight, and 
waist size. Koehler also assessed strength by using pull ups, dips, grip tests, and weighted back 
and leg lifts.86 No absolute standards existed against which these measures could be compared. 
Instead, Koehler used data to track change over time for individuals and groups. Koehler’s 
methods aligned with trends in physical education at the turn of the century. Dudley Sargent, a 
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pioneer of physical education and testing alike, similarly tracked anthropometric data such as 
height and chest girth and measured strength with simple tests such as the vertical jump.87 
Testing and measurement recommendations did not appear in the Army’s original 
physical training manual in 1914, but Raycroft championed individual efficiency tests beginning 
in 1917 to identify “weak and inefficient men.”88 Raycroft established minimum standards for 
his 100-yard sprint, running broad jump, 8-foot wall climb, hand grenade throw, and standard 
obstacle course tests. Again, this comported with contemporary trends, this time emphasizing 
“physical efficiency” and “motor ability” over anthropometric measures.89 Testing disappeared 
from the Army’s system in the interwar years but resurfaced in the 1941 edition of FM 21-20. 
Meanwhile, interest in research-based test batteries increased in the civilian physical education 
world. Charles McCloy made one of the most significant contributions to this movement by 
publishing a widely-used test battery in 1934 to measure athletic power that focused on general 
motor ability and strength.90 The differences between Koehler’s measurements and McCloy’s are 
noteworthy. The former measured body shape and size in the interest of promoting symmetrical 
development. The latter measured physical capabilities and charted performance on a graduated 
scale built upon empirical research. This change is evidence of how the Army’s physical culture 
transformed over time to stress physiological outcomes such as strength, endurance, and 
efficiency over physical appearance and the moral qualities assumed to be connected with it. 
Turning to the quantification of fitness and standardizing, then policing normalized “fit bodies” 
also mirrored trends in U.S. government advisory state actions since the early 20th century that 
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were designed to encourage citizens to become healthier.91 In turn, differences in measures and 
objectives influenced the character and composition of physical training systems. 
Between 1942 and 1946, the test batteries recommended in published training manuals 
changed very little. Both TC 87 and War Department Pamphlet 21-9 proposed the same seven-
event battery that four companies had piloted in 1942: pullups, 20-seconds of Burpees, squat 
jumps, pushups, a 100-yard “pick-a-back” run, situps, and a 300-yard run.92 FM 21-20 
recommended the same battery, but without the Burpees and pick-a-back run. FM 21-20 also 
offered an indoor test battery that was identical to its outdoor battery except that a shuttle run and 
60-second squat thrust test replaced the 300-yard run.93 This battery differed from Raycroft’s in 
that it did not feature events that measured skills. For instance, Raycroft included a grenade 
throw and an obstacle course run. Instead, in line with McCloy’s scientific measurement work, 
the World War II-era batteries were designed strictly to measure various elements of physical 
fitness such as strength, agility, coordination, and endurance. These batteries also aligned with 
tests used by many physical educators, so “valid standards” were available by which soldiers 
might be evaluated and by which point scales might be formed.94 Uniformity was essential to this 
testing regime because a lack of consistency compromised the value of collected data. Thus, 
extensive instructions accompanied each event and several paragraphs urged the use of impartial 
judges, a consistent order of events, and other methods of controlling variables external to the 
soldier’s physical capabilities.95 However, the manual’s authors lacked the authority to mandate 
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use of a standard test battery. The best they could do was strongly recommend their battery and 
provide some criteria for selecting a different battery if desired. 
Physical efficiency testing yielded a bevy of benefits according to the authors of War 
Department Pamphlet 21-9. Among these benefits was a tendency toward intensification of 
training programs when definitive measurements enabled commanders to compare the condition 
of their units with others.96 Here the pamphlet’s authors likened physical directors to physicians. 
As the latter diagnosed patients before prescribing a course of treatment, the former could use 
measurements to tailor programs to the “physical assets and liabilities” a unit’s men possessed.97 
As the testing regime demonstrates, the system inaugurated in 1942 by TC 87 provided Army 
leaders with many tools to leverage when crafting a tailored course of treatment.  
These tools were more diverse and more practical in terms of ease of use than those 
available in all previous systems except for Raycroft’s. For instance, the original 1914 manual 
put ten categories of activities at an instructor’s disposal, but one differed little from the setting-
up exercises except for the addition of weights, four others required gymnastic apparatus and 
advanced skills, and one was athletics (about which little was said and little expected in terms of 
systematic training).98 In contrast, TC 87’s seven activity categories were more diverse and 
easier to execute in austere environments: calisthenics, guerrilla exercises, grass drills, 
combatives, running, relays, and marching.99 To these FM 21-20 (1946) added log and rifle 
exercises, a “strength course” using machines units could manufacture, and obstacle and 
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confidence courses. No activity in TC 87 required additional equipment or apparatus, which 
increased the likelihood of instructors actually using all of the manual’s tools. 
 Following from framing fitness in terms of combat, the activities presented in TC 87 held 
obvious practical utility for soldiers preparing to fight on the modern battlefield. Movement 
toward these more functional activities echoed similar wartime trends between 1917 and the 
early 1920s.100 Calisthenic exercises executed in formation, in response to commands, and with 
an emphasis on precision still formed the core of the program. However, these exercises were 
generally more dynamic than their setting-up drill ancestors.101 Also, unlike Koehler with his 
setting-up exercises, the authors of the World War II-era program did not claim that the 
calisthenic drill alone was sufficient to get men in to fighting trim. Instead, calisthenics merely 
formed a foundation upon which other activities built.  
Those other activities were numerous. Among them, two new exercise categories 
featured prominently in the system: guerrilla exercises and grass drills. The former ostensibly 
were “designed to prepare and train soldiers for guerrilla warfare,” though the actual connection 
to guerrilla warfare is unclear.102 However, the drills did develop agility, coordination, and 
endurance by making men move in new and different ways. For instance, duck waddles, crouch 
runs, and various crawls built muscles and skills needed to move under fire. “Double exercises” 
such as fireman’s and cross carries both cultivated components of physical fitness and prepared 
men to move casualties. Grass drills, borrowed from football conditioning programs, similarly 
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cultivated endurance and agility while teaching practical skills such as dodging, transitioning 
from the prone to standing and vice-versa, and moving between positions of cover.103 Running 
and swimming, two other major exercise categories in the TC 87 system, were similarly justified 
by appeals to battlefield demands instead of discipline-building. On bayonet training, the new 
system departed from Raycroft’s. In fact, Bank specifically excluded bayonet drill from the 
Army’s physical training program.104 Although Bank did not explain this decision, the focus he 
and his co-authors placed on purely physical conditioning likely reduced the value of bayonet 
drill, which had been primarily intended to develop psychological qualities and specific skills. 
Guidance provided in TC 87 and WD Pamphlet 21-9 on combining activities into a 
comprehensive training program exceeded that given in any previous manual. Apart from the 
strict order and composition of the calisthenic drill, physical training directors could tailor a 
program to meet their unit’s needs. Bank, McCloy, and their team advanced three principles that 
should guide the construction of such a program: periodization, progression, and overload. The 
first was a familiar feature in the official Army approach to systematic training. Periodization’s 
specificity and structure in the 1942 system was new, however. For example, the 1914 manual 
offered different setting-up drills for the “recruit” and “trained” soldier but did not explain the 
difference between these categories or give much guidance on modifying the program beyond 
employing a different setting-up drill.105 In contrast, TC 87’s authors identified three stages in a 
conditioning program. They also gave specific advice on how to approach training in each phase 
in such a way as to put most men in good condition within twelve weeks. In the first stage, 
dubbed the “toughening phase,” men spent one or two weeks mastering good form between 
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liberal rest periods to remedy muscle soreness. In the second phase, which lasted between six 
and eight weeks, rapid physiological adaptation brought big fitness gains, though those gains 
plateaued at the end of the phase. In the final “sustaining phase,” little improvement was thought 
possible, so instructors were supposed to spend most of their time and effort maintaining men at 
their “peak of physical condition.”106  
Similarly, the principles of progression and overload were not novel. Yet their precise 
articulation and the detail of the accompanying guidance signaled the TC 87 system’s greater 
sophistication and its application of current practices from the physical education and athletic 
training fields. While both the 1914 manual and Raycroft’s Mass Physical Training urged 
progressive fitness development, neither went beyond advising instructors to tailor their daily 
routines to the condition and needs of their charges, or to make each day’s work “dovetail into 
the next.”107 In contrast, TC 87 gave specific guidance on increasing intensity and load over time 
across a training program and within each activity type. The manual’s authors also defined the 
“overload principle,” referring to the fact that muscles developed proportional to the demands 
placed on them. Unlike warnings against “overdoing” found in Koehler’s manuals, TC 87’s 
authors asserted that there was “no easy road to the attainment of excellent physical condition” 
and that exercises had to be strenuous and repeated “until it hurts.”108 For example, instructors 
might increase the number of repetitions conducted or reduce rest periods as a means of 
progressively overloading the troops under their care. 
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Unit trainers received much more specific direction on incorporating periodization, 
progression, and overload into their programs than had their pre-1942 predecessors. TC 87 
contained a twelve-week model schedule that allotted minutes to various activities on a day-by-
day and week-by-week basis. With the exception of the calisthenic drills, instructors could select 
which exercises to do in each activity category with reference to the manual’s insights into the 
relative intensity of exercises and how to best increase intensity over time.109 The quality and 
quantity of program construction guidance continued growing in the 1946 version of FM 21-20. 
In it, McCloy, Bank, and company expanded on earlier ideas, gave more specific examples of 
how to leverage progression, addressed the problem of maintaining physical fitness in combat 
areas, and offered a second model schedule for a unit’s maintenance phase.110 
In addition to reflecting movement in the Army’s physical culture toward a more 
scientific basis and the influence of McCloy and his fellow physical education professionals, the 
high level of detail also helped offset the lack of a qualified physical trainer corps. The qualified 
instructor issue runs as a thread of continuity throughout the evolution of the Army’s systematic 
training-based physical culture. Koehler had put forward West Point as an Aldershot alternative, 
but no “post-graduate” program ever materialized. Raycroft maneuvered between 1917 and 1920 
to establish a school that would certify physical trainers, but his pilot program fell victim to 
interwar budget reductions. In contrast, Bank seems to have simply accepted this state of affairs. 
Writing in 1943, Bank characterized the Army physical training program as “decentralized.” 
Physical training specialists simply did not exist. Even if they did, not even 10,000 would be 
enough to meet the needs of the growing Army by Banks’ calculations.111 Thus ownership by 
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commanders and amateur-led training were by necessity features of the Army’s physical culture 
in the World War II-era. 
As Bank noted, Army policy as expressed in FM 21-10 and elsewhere made commanders 
responsible for the fitness of their men. Usually this responsibility devolved to company 
commanders.112 Most officers had little experience in planning and executing a physical training 
program beyond their physical education as youth, participation in athletics, and exposure to the 
subject during their commissioning training. West Point graduates would have been relatively 
advanced amateurs in this area, as Koehler had originally intended them to be. All would have 
undergone rigorous training and most would have led training sessions during their cadet careers, 
even if they had not planned a program. Similarly, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) 
cadets would also have participated in a physical training program, though likely not in one as 
comprehensive as the Academy’s. Enlisted men converted to officers by way of Officer 
Candidate Schools (OCS), which commissioned more than 150,000 between 1942 and 1945 in 
the Army Ground Forces alone, received only rudimentary training.113 The curriculum governing 
these schools’ operations provided only general training geared to produce competent platoon 
leaders within, at most, seventeen weeks. Physical drill, which candidates executed daily, was a 
part of that curriculum. Typically, physical drill training involved little more than a few 
candidates from each platoon in an OCS class leading drill daily using FM 21-20 as a reference 
and receiving critiques on their performance from peers.114 OCS, ROTC, and the USMA all 
provided experience in physical training as session leaders or participants, but none qualified 
men to build programs from scratch. The 1942-46 manuals, with their detailed guidance and 
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user-friendly system, were thus keystones in the Army’s physical culture. They were crucial both 
to the provision of consistent, effective, and efficient training across the Army, and to the 
propagation of the Army’s physical culture. 
While physical training was a commander’s responsibility in the Army’s World War II-
era physical culture, and while minimally trained amateur officers planned and executed most of 
that training, some specialists were available to assist. These specialists came from the Special 
Service, which was organized under the Army Service Forces described earlier. The Special 
Service held responsibilities that had been divided between the Morale Branch and Commission 
on Training Camp Activities (CTCA) in 1917-1918. Specifically, the Special Service was 
responsible for “thoroughly planned and systematically promoted” initiatives to sustain good 
morale and a healthy sense of duty in Army commands.115 The Special Service’s diverse 
portfolio ranged from library management and theater performances to soldier publications, 
educational activities, and athletics. The Service’s Athletic and Recreation Branch, headed by 
Bank, provided trained athletic officers and enlisted assistants to field army, corps, division, and 
often regimental headquarters staffs.116 By 1944, Special Service companies extended these 
services to forward echelons by supplementing organic Special Service staff with additional 
technicians and equipment.117 Whether assigned to headquarters staffs or Special Service 
companies, Athletic Officers and technicians usually possessed both a background in athletics 
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and training in implementing the Army’s physical training system. The Special Service 
companies in particular were capable of taking charge of a physical training program in the field 
and executing it in line with TC 87.118 Essentially, these Special Service officers were uniformed 
versions of the CTCA’s Athletic Directors, similarly able and willing to “give help and 
leadership” to officers responsible for physical training.119 
That the Army’s only body of physical training specialists actually had the specified 
mission of planning, developing, stimulating, and supervising athletic events illuminates a key 
feature of the Army’s World War II-era physical culture: the entwinement of athletics and 
systematic training. The contentious place of sport represents a thread of continuity in the 
Army’s physical culture stretching back to the earliest days of systematic training in the late 19th 
century. Characterized as a movement from “indifference to obsession” by one historian of sport 
and the military, sport originated as a potentially dangerous distractor but assumed a central role 
in the Army’s physical culture by 1942.120 Historian Wanda Wakefield even posits that sports 
and athletics were “intended to permeate the lives of the off-duty soldier or sailor” during World 
War II.121 According to Wakefield, ubiquitous sport served four functions: a distraction for 
soldiers, an assurance to civilians and soldiers alike that America fielded an army of citizen-
soldiers, a tool for identifying and selecting the “best men” in the military’s hierarchy, and a 
means of entertaining large populations.122 Bank would have added a fifth—building and 
sculpting soldiers’ minds and bodies in a way that enhanced work done by systematic training. 
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Bank envisioned athletics and systematic physical training as coequal parts of a larger 
“total physical conditioning program” for the Army. Bank held that adding sport enabled the 
physical training program to “contribute substantially to mental and emotional fitness.”123 A 
strict definition of physical fitness that sought bodies capable of retaining “normal responses to 
stimuli” and functioning “effectively” under great stress had concentrated the physical training 
program on generating physiological outcomes that were empirically measurable.124 However, 
earlier beliefs in the ability of exercise to develop less measurable mental, emotional, and 
character traits had not disappeared. They just migrated to the domain of sport. Thus, sport was 
considered an amplifying adjunct in pursuit of physical fitness, but a critical line of effort in 
developing the “mental and emotional” components of “total military fitness.”125 Neither 
systematic training nor athletics could replace the other, but together they were synergistic. 
Bank’s explanation of the Army’s physical training program to civilian educators illustrated his 
concept of exercise-sport harmony. Where he pitched the value of exercise in terms of raw 
performance on a test battery, Bank framed athletics’ value as a crucial “morale-building” 
activity and as a way of training soldiers “in the elements of combat.”126 The “intangible 
benefits” of sport included characteristics familiar from earlier formations of the Army’s 
physical culture: comfort with bodily contact, confidence, aggressiveness, initiative, 
determination, and teamwork.127 Furthermore, Bank and his team believed that sport’s popularity 
helped cultivate soldier interest in the physical training program. Soldiers would “gladly engage” 
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in purely conditioning activities, according to FM 21-20’s authors, if “they know they will be 
able to play speedball, soccer, touch football, or push ball afterwards.”128 
Training Circular 87’s system and that of its successor, FM 21-20, operationalized the 
balanced value placed on systematic exercise and sport. Both manuals’ recommended programs 
began with a heavy emphasis on basic calisthenics and conditioning exercises. But by the twelfth 
week of the program, games occupied more than 55% of the total time allotted to physical 
training weekly under War Department Pamphlet 21-9, and 38% under FM 21-20.129 Not all of 
these games were of the popular spectator sport variety owing to the need of justifying games “in 
terms of the contribution they make to physical conditioning.”130 Many were, however, and the 
training system also strongly encouraged participation in recreational athletics outside of 
programmed training time.  
Bank’s insistence that athletics serve the masses instead of the elite few was also 
consistent with earlier formulations of sport’s value in the Army physical culture, if not always 
in actual practice. In fact, Bank made “Athletics for All” an explicit goal for his division of the 
Special Service and for the physical training program.131 While Athletic Officers were supposed 
to organize some competitive teams, mostly for the purposes of building esprit d’corps and 
providing men with heroic examples, they were chiefly charged with maximizing participation. 
This emphasis increased throughout the war as illustrated by the September 1944 revision of the 
Special Service Officer technical manual, TM 21-205. That manual dropped the assumption that 
all men were familiar with athletics. Instead, it urged Athletic Officers to conceive of their 
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mission more broadly: to welcome newcomers to sport, to offer alternative activities to the major 
sports, and to incentivize participation with prizes.132 
 
None of the features of the Army’s World War II-era physical culture discussed to this 
point were revolutionary. However, one new development did require a fundamental 
reevaluation of fitness definitions and practices—the inclusion of women. The creation of the 
Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) in May 1941, renamed the Women’s Army Corps 
(WAC) in July 1943 when the WAC became a part of the Regular Army, prompted questions 
about physical training. For instance, how should fitness for women be defined? How should 
women exercise? To what ends should women’s minds and bodies be sculpted? Should the 
answers to these questions be different from those given for men? The solution, a wholly 
separate physical training system, illuminates the balancing act involved in leveraging women’s 
service without severely destabilizing gender roles. The separate system also reveals that the 
Army’s physical culture was fundamentally rooted in traditional visions of gender. 
 The process of crafting a training program for the WAAC’s new inductees generally 
started with men’s basic courses, then substituted “practical courses” designed to address likely 
duties in place of men’s “combat courses.”133 Physical training was one area where this trend did 
not hold. Out of concern expressed by the WAAC staff that men’s physical training might be 
harmful to women, the WAAC’s leadership opted to craft a different system from the ground-up. 
The nature and character of such a system proved to be contentious topics.134 Physical cultures 
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help explain the prickly quality of this debate. After all, members of the WAAC staff and 
leadership were not just debating the most efficient and effective way to improve the physical 
capacity of their organization’s members. They were also struggling over the very definition of 
fitness, along with its purpose and value. Physical training in the U.S. Army had pursued 
objectives beyond simple physical conditioning since its inception. Character traits, moral 
qualities, and a man’s identity as a soldier and member of a unit were widely regarded as valid 
physical training outcomes. Civilian physical educators had also sought to use exercise and sport 
as a means of socialization and of educating the whole person through the body. Similar 
entanglements and intersections informed the creation of the WAAC’s physical training system.  
 Fort Des Moines’ parade ground was the primary workshop on which a series of trainers 
constructed a distinct physical culture for the WAAC. Credit for the first comprehensive effort to 
define both a culture and associated system belongs to Catherine Van Rensselaer. Appointed the 
WAAC’s director of physical education in 1942, Van Rensselaer brought to bear professional 
credentials and more than twenty years of experience as a civilian physical educator.135 Her task 
was to craft a physical training system, implement it with the WAAC’s first few officer training 
classes at Fort Des Moines, then hand the program off to graduates who would staff the school’s 
physical training section. Assisted by three other civilian instructors, Van Rensselear developed 
an exercise regimen comprised chiefly of rhythmic exercises in the Danish gymnastics mode 
complemented by a smattering of games and sports.136 According to Van Rensselear, nothing in 
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her system was “strikingly new.”137 Very little differentiated these exercises from the old setting-
up drill or even the new calisthenic drill in terms of format. Instructors led formations of 
inductees through a series of bodyweight exercises executed in response to commands. However, 
the exercises were not especially vigorous. 
 Many inductees who experienced Van Rensselear’s system were critical of it. Historian 
and WAC officer Mattie Treadwell divided criticisms into two categories. One body of criticism 
held that exercises were “positively harmful to women over the age of 18.”138 A second body of 
criticism charged Van Rensselear’s system with not being strenuous enough. Many of the voices 
advancing the latter position, characterized by Treadwell as the “strength-building school,” 
belonged to newly commissioned officers with backgrounds in physical education.139 Chief 
among them was Captain Donna Niles, a former physical educator at Northwestern who boasted 
a Master’s degree from Columbia and additional education from the University of Wisconsin and 
Northwestern.140 After graduating from the WAAC school in its first officer class in August 
1942, Niles became chief of the school’s physical training section and, six months later, director 
of the WAC’s Well-Being Division. Owing to Nile’s power, the strength-building school’s 
influence on the WAC’s physical culture remained dominant throughout the war years.  
 Behind the disagreements over how women should exercise lay a fundamental 
disagreement over the nature of and need for physical fitness in the WAAC, though both the 
early and later cultural producers approached fitness along primarily functional lines. Van 
Rensselear conceived of a woman’s duties in the narrowest sense. Assuming that most of the 
work expected of a woman would “be the desk variety of job,” Van Rensselear rejected strength 
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training. Instead, she aimed to “keep them fit” for their duties.141 The exact nature of that 
“fitness” is unclear, but recreation, endurance, flexibility, and mental well-being seem to have 
been key components. Niles similarly approached fitness from a functional perspective, but she 
set the bar above desk work to account for more rigorous requirements and the possibility of 
emergencies.142 According to Niles, the nation was engaged in a total war and such a war 
demanded that women replace men so the latter could join the fighting ranks. Women had to be 
ready to take on most non-combat military duties “alone and unaided” at any time. A woman 
who “lacks strength, who tires easily, whose mind and body do not work in swift accord, and 
who is constantly prey to illness and moods” could not fulfill these obligations.143 A fit female 
soldier in Nile’s schema was not an “Amazon,” but she had the physiological foundation needed 
to accomplish any job, appeared competent, possessed “mental, emotional, and physical 
stability,” and took ownership of her physical development.144  
 Niles’ made known her concept of fitness in vivid, clear terms in FM 35-20, a physical 
training manual published in 1943 for the Women’s Army Corps. From page one, the manual 
argued that women must be fit to “perform a soldier’s noncombat duties.”145 Therefore, a fit 
woman needed a “strong body and steady nerves,” plus an “appearance” that gave “assurance” in 
her ability.146 Ultimately, a WAC member’s fitness was contingent on three constituent areas: 
physical, mental, and appearance. In the physical realm, strong bodies exhibited the qualities of 
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strength, stamina, coordination, and stability.147 These corresponded closely with WD Pamphlet 
21-9’s constituents of men’s physical fitness, though the WAC’s quality of stability emphasized 
daily performance and presence to a greater degree than did WD Pamphlet 21-9’s “freedom from 
disease and physical defects.”148 Training these physiological characteristics by way of 
systematic exercise was also supposed to cultivate muscular tone, stability, “efficient 
elimination,” resistance to illness and deprivation, improved posture, stamina, and general well-
being.149 Thus physical exercise simultaneously addressed mental health by relieving tension and 
generally toughening women to meet the daily grind of office work and light labor. 
Foregrounding appearance, the third constituent of WAC fitness, represented a break 
from trends in the wider Army physical culture and contributed to the distinctiveness of the 
WAC’s. For men, appearance was a minor consideration and a by-product of exercise by 1942. 
Physical fitness was supposed to make them capable of marching long distance, driving vehicles 
over rough terrain, making assaults, fighting in hand-to-hand, carrying heavy objects, and 
maneuvering across broken terrain.150 WD Pamphlet 21-9 briefly addressed posture, justifying its 
importance as giving “the impression of strength, control, confidence and vitality,” but made 
little other mention of appearance.151 However, appearance was front and center for women. 
According to the WAC’s physical training manual’s authors, being fit was not enough—women 
also had to appear fit and capable. Appearing fit and capable required clear complexions, healthy 
facial coloration, no excess fat, toned muscles, poise, and grace without reliance on “synthetic 
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beauty” products.152 “The Army will judge you by your appearance,” advised the manual’s 
authors, because “a smart, soldierly carriage usually means smart, soldierly performance.”153 In 
short, they needed to be Hollywood starlets, or at least models of middle-class, college 
respectability. 
FM 35-20 summarized WAC physical fitness with a cautionary message accompanied by 
photographs: “don’t be a Josephine Jerk.”154 Josephine Jerk was the “limp number in every 
outfit” who dove into her daily exercises with “the crisp vitality of a damp mop.” Her joints were 
“all limber in the wrong places” and she was built unlike other women in that her body had “a 
posture all its own.” Because of weak muscles and bones, Josephine counted on “her girdle to 
hold her up” and could not sustain effort in a tough activity such as mopping for more than ten 
minutes. Josephine Jerks were downright dangerous because they “hinder[ed], rather than 
help[ed], the war effort.”155 Here were all the features of WAC physical fitness on display in a 
negative example. Josephine lacked strength, stamina, coordination, and stability of both mental 
and physical varieties. Her mental well-being was simply not suited to enduring the long-haul of 
a total war. On top of it all, Josephine appeared comically incompetent more often than not.  
Similar to the Army’s TC 87 system, the WAC system divided physical training in to two 
categories: systematic conditioning exercise and recreation. Unlike in the Army’s system 
introduced by TC 87, the two activities were not valued equally in the WAC. Niles characterized 
the former as the “vitamins” of the system and the latter as the “dessert.”156 Niles conceived of 
her mission as bringing “huge numbers of women” to fitness by the “quickest and most direct 
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means.”157 Sports did not meet these criteria because she believed few women had much 
knowledge of or experience in athletics, thus they were unlikely to get much exercise out of play. 
Furthermore, the non-physical qualities sport was supposed to develop in men such as aggression 
and leadership held little value in the WAC’s physical culture.158 Hearkening back to the 
Koehler-era, the producers of the WAC’s culture accordingly viewed sport mostly as a site for 
recreation and incidental development, but not as a crucial tool for developing fitness. 
Three phases dictated the type and amount of exercise under the WAC system: basic, 
specialist, and field training. In the basic and specialist training phases, which might last as little 
as five weeks, the system was supposed to introduce women to the essentials of physical 
conditioning and “throw the responsibility for maintaining physical fitness squarely up to each 
woman.”159 Between forty minutes and one hour daily were to be spent in training and 
recreation, totaling five hours per week. In this time women learned the four basic cadence 
series, which were sets of warmup exercises, began mastering levels of the strength progression 
series, executed a foot-strengthening exercise, and played various games to develop agility, 
balance, and coordination. The strength progressions comprised the bulk of a daily training 
period. Each series targeted a different area of the body: shoulders and arms, abdominal, back 
and neck, and legs. Seven progressively more difficult exercises made up each series, 
culminating in four exercises: full-dips (push-ups), sit-ups, wing lifts, and running.160 With the 
exception of wing lifts, these culminating exercises were all basic exercises every male recruit 
was expected to be able to execute in the TC 87 system. A WAC spent nearly her entire period of 
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service after initial entry training in the field training phase of physical conditioning. Here, 
officers were supposed to ensure that women spent fifteen minutes daily on conditioning 
exercises, chiefly composed of the cadence series and strength progressions. This aligned with 
the daily fifteen minutes of calisthenics required of men, though the TC 87 system also called for 
35-45 more minutes every day of rigorous athletics and games.161 Tension release activities, 
unarmed self-defense, and functional swimming were also recommended as part of the WAC 
physical training system, especially during the field training phase, but they were largely 
optional except for in deploying units. 
Notably, the WAC system put the onus for physical fitness on the individual to a much 
greater degree than did its Army counterpart. While the TC 87 system in both its 1942 and 1946 
forms sought to optimize the individual’s physical capabilities to a much greater extent than did 
the preceding Koehler-culture’s systems, neither fingered the individual soldier as responsible 
for his own fitness. The manuals discussed ways to get men to buy in to the training program and 
participate, but commanders and physical training instructors held responsibility for their men’s 
interest and for the overall fitness of their units.162 This was a thread of continuity that ran back 
to the earliest days of systematic physical training in the Army—fitness ultimately mattered 
because it made units more efficient and effective in battle, even if the relative value of the 
individual’s warrior qualities changed over time. In contrast, the WAC system’s authors never 
wrote on the importance of unit fitness. Instead, what mattered was the individual woman’s 
readiness to take over a man’s non-combat job. Though company commanders and school cadre 
bore responsibility for training programs, every individual woman was “responsible for her own 
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physical fitness” in the “final analysis.”163 Echoing the hopes of the Army’s earliest systematic 
training advocates and of World War I-era social reformers, Niles and the WAC organization 
hoped that their charges would go on owning their physical fitness after their terms of service. 
Women might take their new knowledge, training routines, and appreciation for the benefits of 
exercise home to their families to become “more useful and happier member[s] of tomorrow’s 
world.”164 Niles went further, expressing a dream that the WACs might totally change America’s 
cultural views on women’s physical fitness.165 In doing so, Niles indicated the great gap between 
the physical culture she wanted to construct and the civilian lives of most Americans. 
 The degree to which women actually took ownership of their physical fitness, or at least 
sought to maximize their physiological capacities, is not clear. Some WACs certainly realized 
Niles’ best hopes. However, the value of physical fitness in the WAC’s passive culture at the 
unit-level does not seem to have aligned in most cases with the official physical culture. Many 
WAC company-level officers complained that the exercises were “too strenuous” and not as 
valuable as recreational activities for desk-bound workers.166 Company commanders also 
complained bitterly about the requirement for 15-minute daily drills, mostly citing difficulties 
with finding suitable training spaces. When the Army’s Military Training Division mandated 
physical tests every three months to enforce training, complaints came from as high as the 
WAC’s director, Colonel Oveta Culp Hobby. Such complaints alleged that men had no similar 
requirement for regular testing, that standards were too high, that women’s bodies were not 
suited to perform these exercises supposedly designed for men, and that women simply did not 
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need strenuous training to execute their duties.167 A poll of WAC company commanders found 
95% opposed to a systematic training program, preferring recreational sports to strength-building 
calisthenics.168 Niles and some allies in the Surgeon General’s Office continued pushing 
systematic training and ultimately won the debate. Through the end of World War II, the 
Military Training Division continued requiring daily calisthenics and regular testing.169  
Ultimately, the WAC’s official physical culture and the system of exercise supporting it 
represented a fundamentally gendered project. While the system was ostensibly designed to 
prepare women specifically for their duties, job requirements alone were insufficient to explain 
the need for a totally separate system of exercise. After all, many more men than women served 
in the same rear-echelon support roles that the WAC was meant to take on. More than 1.7 
million men served in the Army Service Forces at the ASF’s peak strength.170 Adding to this the 
number of men in the Army Ground and Army Air Forces serving in support roles with a 
marginal likelihood, at best, of seeing combat, takes the total above one-third of the Army’s total 
strength in World War II. Yet no similarly duty-specific system emerged for this population. 
Instead, the Army’s physical culture treated every man as a potential combatant, and so officially 
maintained a single system of exercise that was historically centered on the infantryman.  
A better explanation for the existence of an alternate physical culture for women comes 
from historian Leisa Meyer. In her book Creating GI Jane, Meyer argues that the creation of the 
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WAAC crystallized public fears about undermining the “established sex/gender system.”171 
Difficulties in constructing the new category of “female soldier” in American society provoked 
grave concerns about military service depriving women of their femininity, turning them into 
victims, or encouraging sexual deviance. These anxieties manifested in a slander campaign 
against the WAC spread by word of mouth and the mainstream press in 1943 and 1944.172 Meyer 
argues that the WAC’s leadership, and especially Colonel Hobby, developed a strategy of 
attempting to comprehensively control the construction of the “female soldier” in order to 
safeguard both the organization and individual women. Respectability and minimization of fears 
over sexual, gender, race, or class hierarchy subversion were central narrative elements of that 
strategy.173 The WAC’s physical culture and the internal disagreements over its systemization, 
especially discontent over Niles’ emphasis on strength-building and strenuous work, support 
Meyer’s conclusions. Physical training was meant to literally sculpt female soldiers in line with a 
desired model—respectable, capable, and feminine. Stressing individual ownership and meeting 
the individual woman’s needs elided concerns about the organization forcibly reshaping women 
along undesirable lines. Underscoring training for desk work reassured audiences that women 
would not be masculinized in preparation for combat. Even Hobby’s resistance to strenuous 
exercise and testing—“Are they trying to make Amazons of our women?”—reflected a concern 
with keeping the female soldier feminine.174 
 Simply in its existence, the separate WAC physical culture and its associated training 
system revealed the degree to which the wider Army’s physical culture was gendered. Building 
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men had been a central element in the discourse around systematic physical training in the Army 
since the earliest advocates and cultural producers began beating their drums. Much of the 
impetus for physical training had emerged from fears about the ability of modern man to meet 
the evolving demands of the modern battlefield. Early advocates framed many of the expected 
benefits of systematic physical training in terms of improving American society by way of 
improving men’s bodies, minds, and characters.175 Thus, when women’s entrance in the military 
posed questions about definitions of fitness, the means of pursuing it, and the ends toward which 
minds and bodies should be sculpted, the answers required a separate physical culture.  
Such a response highlights one of this work’s central themes, which is that much more 
was always at stake in physical training than simply maximizing the physical capacity of 
individual bodies. In this case, physical training helped reinforce gender hierarchies and define 
the idea of a “female soldier.”176 The gendered nature of the Army’s physical culture in 1942 has 
ramifications today. Since women entered the Army, ideas about fitness and exercise were 
framed in terms of what men and women could or should do, not what soldiers could or should 
do. This mode of thinking buttresses perceptions of women as second-class or less-capable 
soldiers. Such perceptions are an obstacle to the integration of women into combat arms roles. 
Though the Army’s physical culture has propped up this obstacle since 1942, the culture’s 
present movement toward strictly duty-defined fitness standards may be a powerful means of 
reducing that obstacle’s stature in the future. 
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Beyond questions about the place of women, the Army’s physical culture changed during 
World War II in significant ways. However, even that significant change was characterized more 
by steady evolution than sudden revolution, unlike developments between 1917 and 1920. Many 
changes aligned with existing trends, or at least had precedents in earlier periods. For instance, 
definitions of fitness became more oriented on combat efficiency. Likewise, the system of 
exercises created to develop that fitness became more combat-oriented. The Army’s physical 
culture moved in a similar direction during World War I under the guidance of Raycroft and his 
CTCA team. Sport’s contentious place and value in the Army’s physical culture also followed a 
familiar trajectory toward a more formal, entrenched role in developing “total fitness,” if not 
physical fitness. However, some irony exists in the fact that parties responsible first and foremost 
for athletics, such as Colonel Bank of the SSD’s Athletic and Recreation Branch, assumed 
control of systematic training when athletics had once been considered an adjunct to, and 
possible distraction from, physical training in Koehler’s original formulation. Still, many of the 
basic concepts that had framed sport’s value in those early days continued to do so in the 1940s: 
maximum participation, emphasis on the average many rather than the elite few, and 
development of non-physical characteristics and qualities.  
A familiar sense of crisis at the intersection between perceived masculine decline and 
growing combat demands continued informing the way the physical culture’s producers viewed 
their challenge. Bank’s judgment that World War II-era recruits were “not physically fit” and 
that they manifested a “shocking” lack of strength, coordination, agility, and endurance echoed 
19th century warnings about masculine decline in American and European societies.177 However, 
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this time Bank and others like him read revelations about the high rates of rejection in both world 
wars’ drafts as validations of such concerns. A familiar sense of crisis produced a familiar 
mission—to rapidly bring vast classes of low-quality recruits and conscripts up to a standard of 
fitness sufficient for competition against veteran opponents in mechanized combat in a conflict 
approaching absolute war, even if relatively few soldiers would engage in combat. 
More significant change came in the form of an increasingly scientific approach to 
defining, building, and measuring physical fitness. Studies conducted by McCloy, Bank, and 
their team leveraged empirical research to produce a precise definition of physical fitness based 
on five purely physiological factors: freedom from disease, strength, endurance, agility, and 
coordination.178 This culture’s producers reoriented physical training to “impart the utmost 
physiological benefit”, largely omitting immeasurable qualities such as general health, self-
reliance, and courage.  179 Cultivation of such qualities did not completely vanish from the list of 
systematic training’s promised outcomes, but it was a task mostly left to sport. As in World War 
I, outsiders drove this change. Uniformed officers owned physical training policy to a much 
greater degree than they did in World War I. However, some like Bank were just called to 
temporary service and the people most responsible for crafting the new training system were 
civilian experts. Men like Charles McCloy brought the latest methods and ideas in civilian 
physical education to bear on the problem of military fitness as they understood it and a 
reformulation of the Army’s official physical culture resulted.  
Ultimately, cultural change during World War II resembled the type and pace of change 
observed during World War I, though the relative magnitude of change from the respective pre-
war cultures was smaller. The next chapter examines the degree to which post-war cultural 
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reversion would prove consistent too, along with probing the degree to which the Army’s 
physical culture adapted to expectations of war in a nuclear world. 
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Chapter 6: Hard Bodies for a Cold War: Conditioning and Prehabilitation, 1945-1958 
Sixty-five men with a stake or interest in physical training converged on Georgia’s Fort 
Benning in April 1958 to evaluate the state of the Army’s physical culture and discuss its future. 
Ranging in rank from Second Lieutenant to Colonel, most conferees represented Army service 
schools, field units, and the military medical community. Additional notables included 
Lieutenant Colonel Frank Kobes, West Point’s Director of Physical Education, and a civilian 
contingent that included, among others, Dr. G. Ott Romney from the newly formed President’s 
Council on Youth Fitness, Dr. Ray Duncan from the American Association for Health, Physical 
Education, and Recreation.1  
Such a gathering was historic and unprecedented in the Army’s seven-decade-long 
history of systematic physical training. Brigadier General Stanley Larsen, the United States 
Army Infantry School’s (USAIS) assistant commandant, framed the convocation’s purpose and 
objectives in a short welcoming statement. He told those gathered that he and others at the school 
were “very much disturbed” by the idea “apparent in countless public statements, articles in the 
press, and occasionally through some official action” that the ground soldier was “obsolete.”2 
Larsen rejected the notion that “we may push a button and some wonderful machine will win a 
war for us.” Instead, he argued that regardless of the type of weapons possessed or their 
destructive power, the “final decision still rests with the ground soldier.”3 Problematically, 
however, evidence seemed to suggest that fitness among the American populace was on the 
decline. The “era of exertion and hardship” of America’s forefathers and given way, Larsen 
alleged, to “an age of ease and comfort” enabled by technology and consumerism.4 Larsen thus 
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charged the conferees with finding ways to improve the soldier to match improvements in 
technology and organization, and to reverse the perceived deterioration of the Army’s and 
possibly the nation’s manpower. 
In his articulation of the problem, Larsen called upon narratives that recurred often in the 
history of the Army’s physical culture stretching back to the inception of systematic physical 
training. Larsen asserted the continuing preeminence of the individual soldier in the face of new 
technologies that seemingly rendered the soldier insignificant. He argued that scientific study 
and systematic training could improve the Army’s human materiel to match and complement its 
inanimate implements of war. He found a disturbing intersection between these battlefield 
demands and a declining state of fitness, toughness, and ruggedness among the nation’s potential 
soldiery.  
As with previous discussions of physical fitness, a specific historical context informed 
Larsen’s return to familiar narratives in 1958. The Army’s search for relevance on the imagined 
battlefield of the future formed one major component of that context. This search precipitated 
soul-searching over organization, doctrine, and tactics throughout the force and culminated in the 
adoption of a new structure for infantry and airborne divisions, dubbed the pentomic concept, in 
the mid-1950s. New battlefield demands suggested the need for a new type of soldier and the 
need for physical training to sculpt that soldier, as had also happened in the late 19th century. 
Simultaneously, a new wave of concern crested in American culture over the fitness of the 
nation’s youth. First, the Army’s performance early in the Korean War and narratives about 
disappointing American prisoner of war behavior later in the war seemingly revealed 
inadequacies among the soldiery. Soon after, the 1955 Kraus-Weber report seemingly revealed 
dire inadequacies among American youth as a whole.  
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As had the earliest advocates of physical conditioning, the dominant producers of the 
Army’s physical culture advanced systematic training as a solution to perceived problems and 
challenges, but they modified the existing culture to fit their contemporary context. Physical 
culture producers generally maintained the culture’s evolutionary trajectory as set in 1942, 
despite more revolutionary technological, organizational, and doctrinal change initiated by the 
Army in the mid-1950s.5 For instance, the culture continued tilting toward emphasis on 
individual over unit fitness. Familiar tensions also persisted in areas such as the place of sport, 
the definition of fitness, the inclusion of explicit combat skills in physical training programs, and 
the need for centralized specialist training. In the midst of cultural change, responsibility for 
training, doctrine, and policy within the Army frequently changed hands. Tracing those transfers 
of ownership matters because control meant power to influence, even dictate, aspects of the 
Army’s official physical culture to suit the needs and fit the perspectives of the owning parties. 
Finally, the Army remained committed to prehabilitation, but the character of prehabilitation 
projects changed over time. Concerns about the decline of American fitness in a general sense 
informed the Army physical culture’s evolution, and they kept the attention of military and 
political leaders on the bodies of the nation’s youth. Were those bodies strong enough to win the 
Cold War? This chapter explores change between 1945 and 1958 in the Army’s official physical 
culture, in the ownership of the policies that shaped that official culture, and in the character of 
prehabilitation projects. 
 
Perceiving change over time in the Army’s official physical culture during this period 
requires an understanding of the broader military and political context. Having just concluded 
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World War II with new wonder weapons capable of destroying whole cities, many Americans in 
the government and public began doubting the need for maintaining large conventional forces. 
Nuclear bombs seemed to limit the Army’s utility in war, or even as a tool of national policy.6 
The size of the ground forces contracted accordingly from a wartime high of approximately 
eight-million to 591,000 in 1950. Naturally, most senior Army leaders disagreed. Convinced that 
ground forces remained relevant, Army doctrine writers retained through the 1950s an emphasis 
on maneuver, decisive engagements, destruction of enemy forces, and the offense in general.7 
Selling the Army’s relevance to lawmakers and the public and staking out claims to resources in 
fierce inter-service, bureaucratic competition largely defined the Army’s history in the 1950s. 
Eventually these activities involved organizational and doctrinal changes aimed at restructuring 
ground forces around nuclear weapons. Claims of significance also tended to cite the soldier’s 
centrality in warfare. Good soldiers were fit soldiers according to after action reviews from 
World War II and anecdotal recollections alike.8 Although unit physical training tended to 
become less rigorous between 1945 and 1950, Army authorities at least continued paying lip 
service to the necessity of conditioning soldiers physically for combat. 
Into this environment came the 1946 edition of Field Manual (FM) 21-20: Physical 
Training, assembled under the direction of the Office of the Surgeon General. Superseding the 
1941 manual of the same title, as well as the wartime Training Circular (TC) 87 and War 
Department Pamphlet No. (WD Pam.) 21-9, the new FM 21-20 elucidated the Army’s official 
physical culture at the dawn of the Cold War era. The new edition of FM 21-20 was an odd 
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document in several regards. On one hand, the majority of the manual recapitulated the work of 
Charles McCloy, Theodore Bank, and company as presented in TC 87 and WD Pam. 21-9. For 
instance, the authors of the 1946 manual used the same definition of fitness as a factor of total 
military fitness and comprised of five components. Likewise, they provided the same rationale 
for the value of fitness in an age of mechanization.9 FM 21-20 also advanced a training program 
similar in terms of scope and organization, plus an identical testing regime based on the data 
collected by Bank’s team in 1942. This is not surprising given that Bank, McCloy, and their 
partners were engaged in crafting the new FM 21-20 through the end of the war. 
On the other hand, FM 21-20 recommended additional activities that had not been part of 
physical training doctrine or policy for years. Some, like boxing and hand-to-hand fighting 
techniques, are understandable in light of past wartime tendencies to incorporate practical close 
combat skills into physical training. The reappearance of tumbling is more puzzling. 
Cartwheeling and back somersaults last appeared in 1928’s Training Regulations 115-5. Even 
then they were a relic of the earlier Koehler-culture. Gymnastics’ temporary return illuminates 
the enduring influence of the Army’s original systematic training culture and of West Point’s 
physical education department. The return may also be indicative of difficulties in forming 
coherent policies when responsibility for those policies did not consistently belong to a body of 
subject matter experts. Bank, McCloy, and company had crafted a training system during the war 
based on their research. However, responsibility for the new FM 21-20 formally belonged to the 
Office of the Surgeon General, which had not been involved with physical training during the 
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war and did not utilize specialized physical educators.10 The result was an amalgamation of old 
and new activities. 
Despite these additional activities, the actual training system contained in FM 21-20 was 
essentially the same as the system Bank and McCloy created. In fact, none of the additional 
practices received time allotments in either the recommended 12-week introductory schedule or 
the maintenance program.11 Drill Number One, known as the “Army Dozen,” and its lesser 
known brother, Drill Number Two, remained the foundational set of conditioning exercises. 
Guerrilla exercises, grass drills, rifle and log exercises, and running added interest-sustaining 
alternatives and supplements. Likewise, FM 21-20 followed the gospel of overload and 
progression. McCloy, Bank, and their team introduced these concepts from the world of physical 
education in TC 87. The former referred to the need for muscles and bodily systems to work near 
their limits in order to grow. In other words, strenuous exercise had to continue “until it hurts.”12 
Programs obeying to the latter principle intensified work over time, beginning from a moderate 
foundation. This system recommended structuring programs over three phases: toughening for 1-
2 weeks, slow improvement for 6-10 weeks, and sustaining or maintaining beyond that.13  
The definition of fitness advanced in 1946’s FM 21-20 adhered strictly to the WWII 
model and, unlike some of the recommended methods, showed no signs of reverting to the 
Koehler-culture’s model. In the WWII model, physical fitness included five specific, measurable 
physiological components: freedom from disease or anatomical defect, strength, endurance 
                                                 
10 Annex F – Training Literature and Training Aids, p. 1, enclosed in Physical Training Research and 
Development Studies – A Study of the Adequacy of the Present Army Physical Conditioning Program (Adequacy 
Study), October 1955; Research and Development Project Case Files – 1955; R&D Case Files; U.S. Army Schools, 
Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, box 67; Records of the United States Continental Army Command, Record 
Group 546 (RG 546), National Archives Building, College Park, MD (NACP). 
11 Field Manual 21-20: Physical Training (1946), 36-38, 43. 
12 War Department Pamphlet No. 21-9: Physical Conditioning, 61. 
13 Field Manual 21-20: Physical Training (1946), 33-34. 
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(muscular and cardio-respiratory), agility, and coordination.14 Such a narrow and explicit focus 
on these factors differed significantly from the abstract qualities and traits such as smartness, 
activity, precision, self-respect, neatness, and grace sought by earlier physical cultures. 
According to the 1946 manual, outcomes such as development of basic military skills, self-
confidence, and a will to win remained likely and valuable by-products of physical training, but 
not goals in and of themselves.15 Where earlier cultures had emphasized unit discipline as a 
product of physical training, this culture concentrated on the physiological components of fitness 
belonging to the individual soldier. One place where this concentration on the individual soldier 
is most explicit and visible is the manual’s rejection of “extreme formalism” in training, which 
produced discipline. Instead of discipline, the culture promulgated in the 1946 FM 21-20 
prioritized “the utmost physiological benefit.”16  
Stagnation in the Army’s physical culture set in between 1946 and 1950. This mostly 
resulted from the Office of the Surgeon General’s ownership of physical training policy and 
doctrine through 1950. Without a body of specialists and experts focused on physical training, 
the Office of the Surgeon General was unlikely to innovate new practices or integrate 
developments from the world of civilian physical education. The 1950 revision of FM 21-20 
demonstrates stagnation. That manual changed practically nothing from its 1946 predecessor 
except for removing hand-to-hand fighting techniques, wrestling, and tumbling, and adding a 
chapter on “mass games.”17 The addition of mass games is also indicative of a general trend at 
the unit level between 1945 and 1950 toward preferring recreational athletics over strenuous 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 2-3. 
15 Ibid., 4. 
16 Ibid., 12. 
17 For a description of "mass games," which were differentiated from organized athletics by their ease of 
organization and minimal equipment requirements, see Department of the Army, Field Manual 21-20: Physical 
Training (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 227. 
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conditioning. As one later analyst put it, the “recreational tail” was “allowed to wag the physical 
conditioning dog.”18 A general postwar malaise as units hemorrhaged many of their best veterans 
and shifted to a peacetime footing was at least partly responsible for this trend. However, it was 
also partly the result of deliberate policy decisions that originated in an August 1944 conference 
called to develop plans for an Army athletic program in support of the post-war demobilization 
period. Representatives of the Special Services Division’s Athletic Branch and several civilian 
sports authorities recommended that programs be put into place that were chiefly designed to 
help commanders maintain a “high state of morale.” Furthermore, they recommended that 
“purely military instruction” be reduced to the bare minimum necessary and that as much of the 
training day as possible be devoted to “comprehensive educational, athletic and recreational 
programs.”19 This preference for recreational athletics over conditioning persisted throughout the 
Army until the Korean War.20 
Ironically, a central school existed at the time that could have helped counteract 
stagnation: The Physical Training School (PTS). The PTS and its successors eventually took the 
lead in guiding the evolution of the Army’s official physical culture, but its influence up to 1950 
was minimal. Originally located in Lexington, Virginia, the PTS had prepared Special Service 
personnel to organize athletic activities and implement physical training during the war. Between 
January and February of 1946, the school moved along with its fourteen faculty members to 
                                                 
18 Memorandum, Subject: A Study of the Adequacy of the Present Army Physical Conditioning Program, p. 
3, 6 October 1955, enclosed in Adequacy Study, October 1955; Research and Development Project Case Files – 
1955; R&D Case Files; U.S. Army Schools, Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, box 67; United States 
Continental Army Command, RG 546, NACP. 
19 Quoted in Staff Study: Institute of Physical Fitness (Ft. Benning: United States Army, 1970), Appendix I 
to Annex B - 1944 Conference on Physical Training. 
20 This corresponds well with a general “postwar lethargy” in the 8th Army between 1945 and 1949 that 
historian Thomas Hanson found in his study. See Thomas E. Hanson, Combat Ready? The Eighth U.S. Army on the 
Eve of the Korean War (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2010), 14-15. 
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Camp Lee, Virginia and under the aegis of the Quartermaster School.21 At this point, the school’s 
mission was twofold. First, it trained nearly 1,200 officers annually as “Physical Training and 
Athletic Directors” capable of “organizing and administering efficient programs” in their units 
with a concentration on organized athletics similar to the Special Service officers of World War 
II. Second, it trained an equally sized pool of enlisted men as “instructors and assistants” to 
Physical Training and Athletic Director officers.22 The PTS’s leadership conceived of their 
mission narrowly. They did not provide input on physical training doctrine or policy revisions, 
nor did they conduct research. Between 1946 and 1952, the PTS concentrated exclusively on 
training Athletic Officers and their assistants. 
The school’s mission began broadening with the Army Ground Forces (AGF) assumption 
of responsibility for the PTS from the Army Service Force in September 1946. Shortly thereafter, 
AGF directed another move because winterizing Camp Lee’s facilities proved prohibitively 
expensive. AGF briefly considered Fort Benning for the school’s new home but settled on Fort 
Bragg because better facilities were available there.23 Along with the move, AGF reoriented the 
PTS on training and conditioning for combat over recreation. Additionally, the AGF expanded 
the PTS’s mission by assigning it responsibility for collecting and maintaining data pertaining to 
the “methods of unit physical training and conditioning,” for preparing material on conditioning 
for Mobilization Training Programs, and for preparing students specifically to supervise unit 
                                                 
21 Colonel S. M. Prouty to the Quartermaster General, Subject: Establishment of Course for Directors of 
Physical Training and Athletics at the Quartermaster School, 30 November 1945; School Organization – Physical 
Training School, 1946-1953; General Orders and Organization Planning Files (GOOPF), 09/05/1946 – 07/28/1966; 
Fort Bragg, North Carolina/Physical Training School (PTS), box 1; United States Continental Army Command, RG 
546, NACP. 
22 Table of Distribution, Physical Training School; GOOPF, 09/05/1946 – 07/28/1966; PTS, box 1; United 
States Continental Army Command, RG 546, NACP. 
23 General Jacob L. Devers to Major General Thomas B. Larkin, 20 September 1947; Physical Training and 
Athletic Director’s Course, Schools Division – 1947; Army Field Forces HQs, General Staff, G-3 Section, Training 
Group, Schools Division, Classified Decimal File, 1942-48, box 150; HQ Army Ground Forces, RG 337, NACP. 
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conditioning programs.24 The school had yet to gain control of physical training doctrine and 
policy, which the Office of the Surgeon General still owned. However, AGF’s changes 
positioned the PTS to potentially become the Army’s repository of specialized knowledge on the 
subject of physical training and conditioning and thus the Army’s chief physical culture 
producer. 
A catalyst for change in some aspects of the Army’s stagnating physical culture arrived 
with intervention on the Korean peninsula. Combat in Korea’s rugged terrain demanded that 
soldiers be well conditioned.25 In this environment, an awareness manifested among combat 
commanders and top Army leaders of a gap between battle demands and the American’s 
soldier’s physical capability. American setbacks on the battlefield, discipline problems 
throughout the force, and prisoner of war behavior interpreted as inappropriate came to be 
attributed inside and outside the army to soft soldiers drawn from unworthy youth.26 Perhaps the 
most disturbing reports of all in the ideologically charged Cold War environment concerned 
American prisoners of war. Numbering more than seven-thousand total, these prisoners suffered 
a mortality rate of 38%. This far exceeded the rate of prisoner deaths in previous American wars. 
Furthermore, approximately a third were found to have collaborated with their captors. Few 
escaped, few resisted, and twenty-one even chose to remain in North Korea after the war.27  
                                                 
24 Ransom to Colonel Hendrix, 29 October 1947; Physical Training and Athletic Director’s Course, Schools 
Division – 1947; Army Field Forces HQs, General Staff, G-3 Section, Training Group, Schools Division, Classified 
Decimal File, 1942-48, box 150; HQ Army Ground Forces, RG 337, NACP. 
25 In one example of many, I Corps’ Major General John “Iron Mike” O’Daniel ranked physical 
conditioning as a top priority alongside maintaining offensive mindedness and discipline in a September 1951 
meeting with his subordinate commanders. HQ, I Corps, Corps and Army Unit Commanders Meeting, June 9, 13 
June 1952; Folder 3 - I U.S. Corps Commanders Notes, 1951-1953; Box 1 - Correspondence, 1943-1953: North 
Africa, Italy, Korea; Lt. Gen. John W. O'Daniel Papers; Citadel Museum and Archives, Charleston SC.  
26 Linn, 69-72; Shelly McKenzie, Getting Physical: The Rise of Fitness Culture in America (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2013), 44. 
27 Charles S. Young, Name, Rank, and Serial Number: Exploiting Korea War POWs at Home and Abroad 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 3-5; McKenzie, 44-46. 
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In trying to rationalize early failures and ugly reports, an explanatory narrative developed 
among government officials, military leaders, and veterans’ organizations that chiefly assigned 
blame to junior soldiers and leaders at the regimental level and below.28 According to that 
narrative, the young generation fighting in Korea had been ruined by a high standard of living 
and pampered into failure. Young soldiers were soft, deficient in grit and ingenuity, and so 
lacking in character as to be susceptible to “brainwashing.”29 This narrative differed slightly 
among analysts who treated the young generation more fairly and who instead stressed failure to 
properly train for war.30 But whether America’s “soft” youth or poor training were to blame, 
explanations nearly always involved critiques of physical fitness. This interpretation of the 
Korean War experience became a hallmark of arguments for the importance of physical training. 
For instance, when the authors of the 1957 Field Manual (FM) 21-20: Physical Training urged 
units to develop “vigorous and continuous” training programs, they pointed to the “alarming 
number of casualties” in Korea that they attributed to “the inability of the U.S. soldiers to 
physically withstand the rigors of combat over rugged terrain and under unfavorable climatic 
conditions.”31 Four decades later, the authors of 1998’s FM 21-20 still referenced American 
failures in July 1950 as a reason to prepare soldiers for the physical demands of war.32 
Complaints that filtered back to the Infantry School from the front through 1952 
suggested that commanders “deplore[d] the physical condition” of men arriving in theater.33 
                                                 
28 Hanson, 5. 
29 McKenzie, 46; on the general political culture of the period characterized by an "excessive 
preoccupation" with masculinity and a "hard/soft dichotomy," see Kyle A. Cuordileone, "’Politics in an Age of 
Anxiety’: Cold War Political Culture and the Crisis in American Masculinity, 1949-1960," Journal of American 
History 87, no. 2 (2000): 515-45. 
30 East, 119. 
31 Department of the Army, Field Manual 21-20: Physical Training (Washington, DC, 1957), 10. 
32 Field Manual 21-20: Physical Fitness Training (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, 1998), iii. 
33 Infantry Instructors' Conference Report, 16-21 June 1952 (Fort Benning: The Infantry School, 1952), 36. 
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Furthermore, a study of World War II physical training programs released by the American 
Association of Health, Physical Education, and Recreation (AAHPER) in 1951 even challenged 
memories of high-quality training between 1941 and 1945. Zeroing in on a lack of command 
emphasis, the study’s authors found that commanders had offered “much ‘lip service’” to the 
importance of conditioning but little supervision or direction. By and large, company 
commanders, who were usually inadequately prepared to organize a physical training program, 
had been “free to carry on whatever activities they desired.” The result was a program inferior to 
the Navy’s and Army Air Force’s in many ways.34 Once again, wartime experience resurrected 
concerns about declining national fitness and insufficiently rigorous conditioning practices while 
turning attention back to combat-oriented physical training. As a result, Army leaders and 
physical culture producers alike sought explanations for physical failings. Was the physical 
training program itself inadequate, or was it just improperly implemented? 
Publication of the latest edition of FM 21-20 in November 1950 seems to have fueled 
dissatisfaction with the program. The new manual, still the Office of the Surgeon General’s 
responsibility, remained virtually unchanged from the 1946 version with two exceptions. First, 
its authors cut the sections on hand-to-hand fighting and wrestling techniques along with the 
anomalous tumbling chapter. Second, the 1950 edition included a new chapter on “mass games” 
such as kick-ball and recommended a “prominent place” for them in any training program.35 
These games were different from organized athletics in that they could be played with large 
numbers, required no advance organization, and needed very little equipment. Few required 
                                                 
34 Annex G – Command Emphasis, p. 3, enclosed in Adequacy Study, October 1955; Research and 
Development Project Case Files – 1955; R&D Case Files; U.S. Army Schools, Infantry School, Fort Benning, 
Georgia, box 67; United States Continental Army Command, RG 546, NACP. See also Staff Study: Institute of 
Physical Fitness, Appendix II to Annex B. 
35 Field Manual 21-20: Physical Training (1950), 227.  
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vigorous activity either. The manual perfectly captured major trends in the Army’s physical 
culture between 1945 and 1950: stagnation, a growing preference for recreational activities over 
conditioning, and the declining significance of combat-oriented training. Its release four months 
after American forces entered combat in Korea helped throw questions about the adequacy of the 
Army’s physical training program into sharp relief. 
In the near term, the Army leadership responded by doubling-down on their support for 
the existing physical training system and stressing to commanders the importance of 
conditioning in the Army’s physical culture. This move is most visible in the issuance of the 
highly directive Training Circular No. 27 (TC 27) in August 1951. The circular addressed 
concerns that FM 21-20 might not provide “adequate guidance and direction” for properly 
structuring a three-phase conditioning program.36 Issued over Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton 
Collins’s signature, TC 27 enunciated the Army’s physical training mission, policy, doctrine, and 
tenets of its official culture—but it did not change anything. TC 27 declared conditioning the key 
task in the service’s “physical training mission.” The circular’s authors identified three mission 
objectives. First, to “indoctrinate all personnel regardless of branch of service or present duty 
assignment” with the need for and importance of a “high standard of physical fitness and good 
posture.” Second, development of the “highest possible degree of physical fitness” in each 
individual soldier to adequately prepare him for his duties. Finally, to produce signal outcomes 
of a “well-conducted physical training program” such as self-confidence and the will to win, but 
especially the five physiological components of physical fitness.37 Ultimately, the circular 
                                                 
36 Annex F – Training Literature and Training Aids, p. 1, enclosed in Adequacy Study, October 1955; 
Research and Development Project Case Files – 1955; R&D Case Files; U.S. Army Schools, Infantry School, Fort 
Benning, Georgia, box 67; United States Continental Army Command, RG 546, NACP. 
37 Training Circular No. 27, Physical Training, 31 August 1951, enclosed in Adequacy Study, October 
1955; Research and Development Project Case Files – 1955; R&D Case Files; U.S. Army Schools, Infantry School, 
Fort Benning, Georgia, box 67; United States Continental Army Command, RG 546, NACP. 
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reiterated commanders’ responsibility for physical training, focused attention on systematic 
conditioning, and mandated adherence to existing policy.38 
Beyond the immediate reaction, Army Field Forces also began evaluating the physical 
training program by initiating studies based on complaints from the field.39 The Office of the 
Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF) turned to its specialists at Fort Bragg’s Physical Training 
School (PTS), who had already undertaken preliminary research, to conduct the study in April 
1952.40 Most of the complaints studied concerned the physical fitness test as prescribed in FM 
21-20. Commanders in the field provided numerous criticisms: scoring the test involved too 
much “subjective judgment,” the test did not measure “combat related physical skills,” men 
lacked motivation to complete multiple repetitions in some events, and the scoring table did not 
“accurately indicate physical capabilities and stamina” of personnel.41 Several of these 
complaints reflected long-standing tensions within the Army’s physical culture. For example, 
what should be the correct balance between developing combat skills and foundational physical, 
mental, and character qualities in a training system? On this specific issue, the complaints and 
study exposed the continuation of a historical divide between commanders in the field and 
physical training experts. Since the 1880s, commanders had tended to favor activities with 
                                                 
38 Specifically, TC 27 called attention to FM 21-20’s chapters 1-4 and 16. These chapters covered the 
definition of fitness, program planning, the set conditioning drills, and posture training. Exceptions to mandatory use 
of set drills with supplementary exercises such as guerrilla exercises were given to units finished with the unit 
training phase, those in post-cycle training, in stand-by status, overseas commands, and those units not engaged in 
field exercises of maneuvers who “have attained a high degree of individual physical fitness” already. Those units 
could enter a sustaining phase that emphasized “highly competitive intracompany and intercompany athletics” so 
long as a “short intense warm-up” using one of the set drills preceded each period. Ibid. 
39 Army Ground Forces (AGF), referenced earlier, became the Army Field Forces in 1948. 
40 Annex A – Authorization for Research Project, enclosed in Staff Study – The Army Physical Fitness 
Testing Program, August 1955; Research and Development Project Case Files – 1955; R&D Case Files; U.S. Army 
Schools, Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, box 67; United States Continental Army Command, RG 546, 
NACP. 
41 Memorandum, The Army Physical Fitness Testing Program, p. 1, enclosed in Staff Study – The Army 
Physical Fitness Testing Program, August 1955; Research and Development Project Case Files – 1955; R&D Case 
Files; U.S. Army Schools, Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, box 67; United States Continental Army 
Command, RG 546, NACP. 
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obvious combat relevance. The latter typically preferred activities geared more toward enhancing 
specific physiological characteristics in accordance with their concept of fitness.  
Conduct of the study involved a large amount of data processing. Between 8,000 and 
10,000 cards representing individual performances on conditioning tests required tabulation.42 
Interpreting and analyzing the information contained in the resulting mountain of IBM punch 
cards represented the largest data-driven analysis of fitness practices in the Army’s history. In 
addition to the PTS’s new responsibility for developing physical training policy and doctrine, 
this research project catalyzed an expansion of the school’s purpose and capabilities. Devers and 
his AGF staff had started recasting the PTS as the hub of the Army’s official physical culture in 
1946. The testing study furthered that reformulation. However, such an outcome was not initially 
intended as evidenced by OCAFF’s refusal to authorize new funds and personnel for the 
school.43 Conditions began changing when complications made completion of the study by its 31 
August 1952 deadline impossible. Initial screening of cards identified discrepancies, which 
required units to administer additional rounds of testing and data reporting. Accepted and 
corrected cards had to be punched on IBM cards that were in turn outsourced for tabulation and 
                                                 
42 Different numbers are given in various documents. For the 8,000-range estimate, see Tab D, Annex A – 
Total Number of Cases Used to Determine Tables, enclosed in Staff Study – The Army Physical Fitness Testing 
Program, August 1955; Research and Development Project Case Files – 1955; R&D Case Files; U.S. Army Schools, 
Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, box 67; United States Continental Army Command, RG 546, NACP. The 
10,000-result upper estimate comes from Memorandum – Projects Deemed Necessary by the Physical Training 
Department in Order to Fulfill the Mission of the Department; Research & Development Administrative Files – 
1954; U.S. Army Schools, Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, box 67; United States Continental Army 
Command, RG 546, NACP. A wide variety of units produced these cards. OCAFF directed each training center and 
training division to test four companies each three times. The first two tests, conducted in the second and fourteenth 
weeks of training, used the existing assessment test. The third used a new “Physical Achievement Test” designed to 
measure skills and conditioning in events more closely aligned with combat requirements, such as a five-second 
rope climb and a 150-yard man carry. Additional data came from PTS classes, the Airborne School, Ranger Training 
Centers, and various units. 
43 Colonel T. J. Smith to the Commandant, Physical Training School Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Subject: 
Research in Physical Fitness Tests, 29 April 1952, enclosed in Staff Study – The Army Physical Fitness Testing 
Program, August 1955; Research and Development Project Case Files – 1955; R&D Case Files; U.S. Army Schools, 
Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, box 67; United States Continental Army Command, RG 546, NACP. 
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analysis.44 The sheer amount of data processing required and the expertise needed to do it 
correctly eventually justified the creation of a short-lived Research and Analysis Department at 
the school in the summer of 1953.45  
Disruption arrived in August 1953. Less than a month after the U.S. signed an armistice 
in Korea, the Army decided to shutter the Physical Training School and reactivate it in a severely 
truncated form under the Ground General School at Fort Riley on 1 January 1954.46 A PTS staff 
study had narrowly averted such a fate in 1949 by arguing that the school had too much value as 
a professional physical training nucleus, as a crucial interface with the civilian physical 
education community, and as a more economical alternative to decentralized training.47 Similar 
arguments bolstered by concerns over the impact on ongoing projects such as the testing study, 
FM 21-20 revisions, and a training aid film failed to buy the PTS even a few extra months of life 
in 1953.48 Officially, a desire to seek “economy of manpower and funds” drove the decision to 
                                                 
44 Annex A – History of Study, enclosed in Staff Study – The Army Physical Fitness Testing Program, 
August 1955; Research and Development Project Case Files – 1955; R&D Case Files; U.S. Army Schools, Infantry 
School, Fort Benning, Georgia, box 67; United States Continental Army Command, RG 546, NACP. 
45 Captain Harold S. Tavzel to Commanding General, Third Army, 21 July 1953; School Organization – 
Physical Training School, 1946-53; General Orders and Organization Planning Files, 09/05/1946 – 07/28/1966; Fort 
Bragg, North Carolina/Physical Training School, box 1; United States Continental Army Command, RG 546, 
NACP. 
46 The Ground General School was organized in 1946 and outlived the PTS by only two years, closing in 
1955. The school’s mission included basic training for all officers, running an officer candidate school, and 
providing some instruction for intelligence officers. At the General School, the new Physical Training Department 
shrank to a mere two training officers, a single civilian physical education instructor, and two enlisted mathematical-
statistical research assistants. Lt. Col. L. E. Barber to Commanding General, Fifth Army, Subject: Establishment of 
Physical Training Department at the Army General School, 28 October 1953; School Organization – Physical 
Training School, 1946-53; General Orders and Organization Planning Files, 09/05/1946 – 07/28/1966; Fort Bragg, 
North Carolina/Physical Training School, box 1; United States Continental Army Command, RG 546, NACP. 
47 Lt. Col. Earl F. Klinck, Study for Continuation of Physical Training and Athletic Directors Course, 
undated; School Organization – Physical Training School, 1946-53; General Orders and Organization Planning 
Files, 09/05/1946 – 07/28/1966; Fort Bragg, North Carolina/Physical Training School, box 1; United States 
Continental Army Command, RG 546, NACP. 
48 Staff Studies of Problems 1-4, 31 August 1953; School Organization – Physical Training School, 1946-
53; General Orders and Organization Planning Files, 09/05/1946 – 07/28/1966; Fort Bragg, North Carolina/Physical 
Training School, box 1; United States Continental Army Command, RG 546, NACP. 
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close the school.49 That the school’s forecasted budget was a mere $300,000 for 1954 and its 
leadership offered to slash that in half speaks to the Army’s austerity under the Eisenhower 
administration.50 Two years later analysts studying the physical training program suggested a 
cultural explanation as well. According to them, the move signaled a return to “recreational type” 
activities reminiscent of trends after both world wars but at odds with the school’s intensifying 
systematic training association and its focus on conditioning.51  
Closure of the PTS had the potential to substantially alter the Army physical culture’s 
evolution. Perhaps the greatest potential impact followed from the erasure of institutional 
knowledge and expertise built since 1942. During World War II, the team led by Bank, McCloy, 
and Esslinger had reengineered physical training to be grounded in scientific, empirical study 
and to produce specific, measurable outcomes. After the 1946-1950 doldrums period, the PTS 
staff had begun reviving this approach. Their methods when studying tests and in revising 
training policy make this apparent. When the PTS officially closed on 1 January 1954 these 
projects were still ongoing and so transferred to the new General School section.52 However, 
none of the experts transferred with their projects except for a single civilian training instructor, 
                                                 
49 Circular No. 72, Physical Training Proficiency, 19 August 1953; Research & Development 
Administration Files – 1954; U.S. Army Schools, Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, box 67; United States 
Continental Army Command, RG 546, NACP. 
50 Captain Harold S. Tavzel to Commandant, Physical Training School, Subject: Staff Study—Problem 1, 
25 August 1953; School Organization – Physical Training School, 1946-53; General Orders and Organization 
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51 A Study of the Adequacy of the Present Army Physical Conditioning Program, 6 October 1955, enclosed 
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Mr. James Dawson.53 Potential for a return to the doldrums without a central body of expertise 
was real. Similarly, closure of the PTS eliminated the Army’s sole mechanism for training and 
certifying specialists in advocating, planning, and executing physical training in accordance with 
published doctrine. Without these specialists, efforts to align unit programs with the official 
Army physical culture and administer them optimally would suffer. 
Damage from a loss of expertise was partially averted in the fall of 1954 when the rump 
General School’s Physical Training Department, including Mr. Dawson, once again packed up 
and moved, this time to the U.S. Army Infantry School (USAIS) at Fort Benning. Infantry 
branch members had long been among the most vocal advocates of systematic physical training. 
Infantry officers wrote extensively about physical training in service journals around the turn of 
the century. An infantry-centric conception of combat demands had tended in most periods to 
dominate discourse within the Army’s physical culture. After WWI, the USAIS had been home 
to the short-lived Physical and Bayonet Training Course administered by former members of 
Raycroft’s organization. Thus, the seriousness with which the USAIS leadership took its 
renewed ownership of physical training doctrine and policy is unsurprising. The school delegated 
responsibility for monitoring and implementing physical training Army-wide to its Combat 
Conditioning Committee under its Ranger Department. Five functions defined the committee’s 
mission: preparing and delivering training at the USAIS, preparing materials for non-resident 
instruction, preparing staff studies for the Army, authoring Department of the Army physical 
training publications, and conducting continual evaluation, research, and development of the 
                                                 
53 James Dawson became the sole human continuity between the PTS and its later reincarnation at the US 
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Commandant, Army General School, Subject: Establishment of Physical Training Department at the Army General 
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physical training program.54 Though the committee lacked the PTS’s robust staffing, its 
resources were superior to the General School department’s and it enjoyed the active support of 
the influential USAIS. Because of the infantry’s understanding of combat and its relationship to 
physical fitness, USAIS’s ownership of policy and doctrine also helped tilt the Army’s physical 
culture away from recreation and back toward conditioning and combat applications. 
Transfer of personnel and responsibility to the USAIS coincided with a convergence of 
concern throughout the Army and in wider American society over the fitness of the nation’s 
soldiers and citizens. In the summer of 1955, the infamous Kraus-Weber report reached 
President Dwight Eisenhower’s attention courtesy of John Kelly, the former chairman of the 
WWII Committee on Physical Fitness who worried that America was becoming a “nation of 
weaklings.”55 More will be said of the Kraus-Weber report later. However, its central claim was 
that American youth compared very unfavorably with their European peers in measures of 
strength and flexibility. Eisenhower’s concern spurred several government and private initiatives 
to address the nation’s apparently flagging fitness levels. Echoing the president’s alarm, 
incoming Army Chief of Staff General Matthew Ridgway expressed his suspicion in August 
1955 that the Army was “not conducting a realistic physical conditioning program” and that 
insufficient emphasis was being placed on “soldierly posture and correct dietary habits.”56 
Ridgway therefore directed the Continental Army Command (CONARC) to study the adequacy 
of the existing physical training program and its execution in the field. CONARC in turn 
assigned responsibility for the study to the Infantry School. Simultaneously, CONARC also 
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directed its six Army Commands to conduct similar studies and forward their results to the 
USAIS.57 Issued in October 1955 along with the long-delayed physical fitness test report, the 
resulting study was a sweeping reassessment of the Army’s physical culture. 
In the end, USAIS researchers returned a full-throated affirmation of the Army’s official 
physical culture as it existed in 1955. With the exception of “certain modifications,” researchers 
determined that the existing physical training program and physical fitness test were “adequate 
for the attainment of proper physical condition.”58 Findings related in the study’s final report 
reinforced central tenets of the existing culture. Conditioning came before all other activities, for 
instance. Measurable physiological outcomes were valued most while traits such as self-
confidence and discipline stayed preferable byproducts, unlike in the culture’s earliest form. 
Sport remained a crucial part of the culture, but also secondary and supplementary to systematic 
training. Proper training required specialist instructors versed in the system, or at least competent 
amateurs able and willing to follow a program set down by experts. Conditioning could not be 
left up to individuals because expecting them to build and adhere to a rigorous, progressive 
program was “unrealistic and ineffective.”59 Instead, conditioning had to be a unit activity under 
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the direction of trained specialists. Finally, the findings stressed maximizing the individual 
soldier’s physical condition over unit fitness or discipline.60 As with the valuation of outcomes, 
this focus on the individual reflected continuity with programs developed during WWI and 
WWII, but a break from the original culture that Koehler dominated.  
Not all was well with the Army’s physical training program, however. The report’s 
authors did not dismiss concerns about Americans’ fitness or reports of dissatisfaction from the 
field. In allocating blame for perceived problems, the USAIS researchers fingered the population 
making many of the complaints. “The major barrier to the attainment of sound physical condition 
throughout the Army,” they concluded “is the lack of continued command interest.”61 While the 
authors acknowledged some underlying causes for deteriorating fitness such as a tendency during 
peace time to “fail to realize the need for a high state of physical fitness” and a “growing national 
tendency to avoid muscular activity both in our work and recreation,” they argued that 
commanders bore ultimate responsibility.62  
USAIS researchers expanded their case against unit commanders in blunt terms 
throughout the lengthy report. Physical training was a command responsibility according to 
Army doctrine and policy.63 Yet too often commanders failed to prioritize training, organize it in 
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a productive way, or hold their trainers accountable for proper implementation. As a result, unit 
programs were often too easy and did not follow the core doctrinal principles of progression and 
overload. Consistency across a unit program was often problematic. For example, commanders 
might run a vigorous conditioning program for three months, then almost completely ignore it 
for the rest of the year.64 Competing requirements had a tendency to impinge on training time, 
which was already inadequate according to the report’s authors and remained so according to 
60% of officers surveyed in 1958.65 Physical training sessions also regularly departed from 
doctrine. Instructors, whose lesson plans were apparently rarely subject to inspection, tended to 
improperly arrange activities. For example, they might schedule an hour of guerrilla exercises 
when ten minutes was the recommended maximum, or spend a whole week doing nothing but 
Drill One followed by a week on the obstacle course and so forth.66 At the level of unit 
commanders and their staffs, insufficient knowledge and training exacerbated the problem of 
insufficient command emphasis according to the USAIS researchers. Guidance and planning had 
to be “based on scientific knowledge” and come from “technically trained leaders,” but senior 
commanders often left physical training completely up to company commanders who often 
lacked “the proper concept of physical conditioning.”67 Graduates of the recently shuttered PTS 
could have offset commanders’ unfamiliarity with the program, but researchers found that the 
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graduates were rarely utilized appropriately.68 The quickest fix according to the study’s authors 
was to sell commanders on the physical training program and convince them of its necessity 
“despite the fact that, like taking medicine, it is somewhat disagreeable.”69 Unit commanders 
who insisted “on superior care for the mechanical implements of war” and who knew entering 
battle with “rusted, dilapidated equipment” would be “suicidal” had to be convinced of the need 
to place equal emphasis on their human implements of war.70 
The problem was not so much about buy-in to the need for physical fitness, but that many 
officers did not buy in to the Army’s conditioning program due to skepticism or ignorance. 
Skepticism arose from what the authors called an “improper” or “inadequate concept of physical 
conditioning.” Many commanders simply did not know the principles underlying an effective 
program. Others confessed faith in the old alternative to systematic conditioning—the belief that 
“ordinary tactical training activities” provided sufficient exercise.71 This latter concept might 
have seemed especially attractive because commanders faced so many competing demands when 
building their training calendars, according to the study. Accomplishing two objectives with one 
event would be appealing. Researchers also found that senior commanders rarely inspected their 
subordinates’ physical training programs. This sent a message that physical training was less 
important than other competing demands and allowed company commanders to deviate from the 
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standardized conditioning program without correction.72 On top of all this, existing Army 
regulations did not require the conduct or documentation of standardized physical fitness tests, so 
few mechanisms existed to enforce compliance.   
Researchers recommended numerous solutions to these problems. The most 
straightforward was to simply insist on command emphasis from the top down. Several others 
involved improving training and access to specialist knowledge, such as increasing time spent in 
advanced courses on teaching officers to develop and supervise conditioning programs. But 
perhaps the most powerful approach was to force officers to invest personally in their own 
physical fitness. To accomplish this, researchers counseled that raters and indorsing officers 
should comment on an officer’s “physical condition for combat service” when completing his 
annual evaluation. Such a comment would become part of an officer’s permanent record.73 This 
requirement took effect a year later through a revision of Army Regulation 623-105.74 Likely as a 
result of this study, the Army issued Army Regulations 600-160: Maintenance of Physical 
Fitness and Detecting and Correcting Physical Abnormalities Among Officers two months later 
on Chief of Staff Maxwell Taylor’s authority. Although concerned chiefly with “physical or 
mental abnormality” that might disqualify an officer for “full military duty,” the regulation 
required officers to exercise and commanders to examine their subordinates. Being “physically 
incapable of performing the duties of his office, rank, grade, or rating” exposed an officer to risk 
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of separation from the service for physical disability.75 Although the regulations stopped short of 
requiring officers to participate in a systematic conditioning program, they mandated weekly 
exercise and reemphasized the significance of fitness to individual officers. Officer fitness as a 
vector for stressing fitness throughout the force echoed turn-of-the-century initiatives from 
President Theodore Roosevelt and General Franklin Bell, though this time disciplinary measures 
and regulations took precedence over inspiration and exhortation.  
While command emphasis could do much to align unit practices with the Army’s official 
physical culture, researchers argued that trained specialists were also necessary to advise 
commanders, design unit programs, and inspect organizations for compliance. Thus, closure of 
the PTS in 1953 received heavy criticism in the 1955 study.76 In the short term, the Army could 
leverage its existing specialist corps certified by the PTS before its closure if units took time to 
identify them and assign them appropriate additional duties. But this was not a long-term 
solution. Once again, producers of the Army’s physical culture argued that a central school was 
necessary. USAIS could build cultural continuity and develop doctrine and policy, but the 
probability of disconnect between policy and practice remained high without certified instructors 
to implement policy or officers qualified to plan and supervise unit programs.77 In lieu of a PTS-
style central school, the study’s authors offered a compromise in the form of Army Area physical 
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training courses. Pointing to a one-week course operated by Fifth Army at Fort Riley and another 
at Fort Belvoir’s Engineer School, researchers suggested that such courses could at least prepare 
unit personnel to lead physical training sessions.78 Yet such schools would eventually run out of 
trained staff without a central school and they did not prepare leaders for program development 
and supervision. The central school argument failed to gain traction, however. Comprehensive, 
skill identifier-granting training for specialists by a central agency would not return until the 
creation of the Army’s Master Fitness Trainer program in 1983.79 
Physical fitness testing remained a point of dissatisfaction in the field in 1955. In 
response, the study’s authors reasserted the need for testing, though they stopped short of 
recommending that tests be mandatory. They also recommended actions to address complaints. 
First, researchers completed the long-delayed study initiated in 1953 that had been plagued by 
data tabulation challenges and disrupted by moves between Forts Bragg, Riley, and Benning. An 
updated set of scoring tables resulted that established more realistic expectations, particularly in 
the 300-yard run event.80 Second, researchers responded to the “discontent of combat unit 
commanders” who felt that a “test better related to combat skills” was necessary with something 
new—the Physical Achievement Test (PAT).81 Five events made up the PAT: a 5-second rope 
climb, a 75-yard dash, a triple broad jump, a 150-yard man carry, and a one-mile run. The first 
four events were to be administered on a single testing day with mile run conducted the 
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following day or within four days if delayed by weather. Except for the man carry and rope 
climb, the PAT’s events came from the extended battery that Drs. Charles McCloy and Arthur 
Esslinger tested in 1942. The climb and carry events were borrowed from the British Battle 
Physical Training Test.82 In addition to the basic components of physical fitness, the test was 
designed to measure combat related skills. Its creators at the USAIS promised commanders of 
combat units that they could, “with some degree of confidence,” be sure that soldiers were well 
conditioned if they scored above average on both the standard fitness test and PAT.83 The PAT 
entered policy in 1957. It reflected an infantry-centric focus that had long been a dominant strain 
in the Army’s physical culture and only intensified under the USAIS’s influence. 
A final noteworthy element in the snapshot of physical culture that the 1955 adequacy 
study provides was the introduction of weight control as a concern to be addressed as part of a 
physical conditioning program. Sculpting appropriately sized and shaped bodies had been part of 
the Army’s physical culture since its inception. Early cultural producers such as Herman Koehler 
and Edmund Butts had celebrated the masculine, disciplined, uniformed body in their writings. 
Koehler was especially concerned with sculpting balanced bodies in the late 19th century mode, 
measuring cadets under his charge to track their progress. Height and weight standards were part 
of induction exams during both World Wars, though cases of underweight recruits were most 
prevalent during the world wars. Height and weight standards remained a part of induction 
exams during the 1950s too. However, the discourse around physical training policy and doctrine 
had rarely touched on the problem of overweight service members.  
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Conceiving of obesity as a problem that physical conditioning programs should address 
gained traction in the 1950s. Ridgway specifically expressed concern about “correct dietary 
habits” in initiating the 1955 study, for instance.84 Discourse about such weighty concerns also 
appeared in service journals. In one example, Major Albert Lockhart’s 1956 Infantry Journal 
Quarterly article “Overweight in Grade” offered advice to the “large segment of the Army 
engaged in sedentary duties” on a “chairborne tour” about how to lose weight and avoid a 
negative evaluation per AR 600-160. Writing as Major Pear Shape, a self-confessed “Fatso,” 
Lockhart related the trials and tribulations of an officer desirous of fitness but hamstrung by a 
packed schedule and competing demands. After an encounter with a general who informed him 
that “there’s a weight limit for jeeps,” Pear Shape found sensible ways to get fit, which he shared 
with his readers: train on your own schedule, seek competition, eat sensibly, stick with consistent 
and moderate exercise, and consult a doctor in case of concern.85 Escalating concern over weight 
put the Army at the front end of an American dieting movement in which men increasingly 
participated in the 1950s. Since the 1890s, dieting and slim bodies had come to be seen as a sort 
of moral compensation for consumerism or a way to display virtue. Overweight bodies became 
associated with ever more issues in the 1950s: psychological problems, heart disease risk, 
“softness,” and feminization.86 Physical training in the U.S. Army had always included moral 
and gendered aspects, so weight control made for a natural supporting activity. 
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Some harsh words, self-motivation, and a “custom-made conditioning program” of his 
own design might have been thought sufficient to remedy Major Pear Shape’s condition, but the 
average soldier with whom the Army’s physical culture had long been most concerned could not 
be entrusted with such responsibility. The 1955 adequacy study’s authors accordingly 
recommended that the Army systematically identify and correct obesity in the force. Their 
prescription was highly individualized and premised on a nuanced reading of the obesity 
problem. Noting that “true obesity” was “not too common” and difficult even for a physician to 
determine, the researchers recommended thorough evaluations of soldiers thought to be obese 
rather than simply relying on the height-weight tables.87 Assessing body structure came first in 
such an evaluation. Some soldiers might be “heavy muscled, heavy boned,” and without excess 
body fat despite breaking standards. Others of a lighter build might be within the weight table 
standard but possess “relaxed musculature and disposition of fat” and were therefore not to be 
“considered as normal in the true sense of the word.”88 Next, evaluators considered the soldier’s 
obesity history, disabilities, and eating, drinking, and exercise habits. Only after a full evaluation 
were commanders to prescribe a remedial program targeting the roots of the problem without 
endangering the soldier by demanding too much strenuous exercise too quickly.  
Several existing programs were endorsed by researchers as models, such as one in Fourth 
Army that involved coordination between commanders and installation surgeons. Another 
developed by XVIII Airborne Corps in 1953 received an explicit recommendation for Army-
wide adoption. The Airborne Corps’ program required commanders to send over-weight soldiers 
to the hospital for evaluation, then enter them into a weight reduction program supervised by the 
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unit’s medical officer. Every month, commanders reported to the commanding general the 
number of pounds lost by each soldier on their weight reduction programs.89 The report’s authors 
declared that “the smaller the waistline, the longer the life-line” and that the “degree of over-
weight” was “directly proportional to an individual’s efficiency, namely his physical stamina and 
mental alertness.”90 In doing so, they made a case for a soldier’s weight to matter like his 
strength, endurance, agility, and coordination. Surveilling and slashing excess fat became one 
more tool for strengthening a commander’s “control over the physical state of his command.”91 
Within a decade, the Army endorsed this concept by institutionalizing a weight control program 
and linking weight to measures of soldier and unit fitness.92 
While experts studied the physical training program’s adequacy and the next revision 
cycle continued for FM 21-20, the Army initiated a major restructuring of its combat divisions. 
Labeled the pentomic concept, the restructuring was supposed to give the Army a modernized 
face-lift and prepare it to fight on either an atomic battlefield or in response to limited 
aggression.93 Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor (1955-1959) in particular viewed the 
restructuring as a means of improving the Army’s relevance vis-à-vis the nuclear-capable Air 
Force and Navy. Historian Brian Linn has argued that the pentomic concept may also have been 
a scheme by Taylor to maintain or grow the number of Army divisions without additional 
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manpower.94 Whatever the motivation, the pentomic division created essentially by Taylor’s fiat 
in October 1956 replaced traditional regimental combat teams with five battle groups in Army 
divisions. Each battlegroup contained four or five maneuver companies, each comprised of five 
platoons.95 Theoretical research and highly controlled exercises informed this organization. 
Generally, Army thinkers concluded that nuclear weapons did not revolutionize the battlefield. 
Maneuver and conventional fighting remained necessary. As the authors of one widely circulated 
text for mid-career officers asserted, “no weapon, or system of weapons, can ever be a complete 
substitute for combat units. 'War without men,' 'pushbutton war'—all false shibboleths purporting 
to wage war without manpower—receive no support from atomic tactics.”96 However, using 
nuclear weapons and minimizing the effects of enemy weapons required new approaches to 
maneuver and organization. The Army emphasized three concepts in its adaptations to “atomic 
tactics”: dispersion, flexibility, and mobility. Dispersion on a nonlinear battlefield to deny the 
enemy quality targets, flexibility to sustain losses and still operate effectively in chaos, and 
mobility to rapidly mass and disperse.97 
If this was the future of general war between nuclear powers, then the soldier’s physical 
fitness remained valuable according to the Army’s top officers. Ridgway repeatedly predicted 
that wars would still be won by men instead of machines, even in the face of unimaginably 
powerful weapons.98 So long as armies met in conflict and war did not escalate to an exchange of 
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strategic nuclear weapons that would deny all parties victory, soldiers would still need to 
maneuver as part of units to defeat enemy forces and seize terrain. If anything, the atomic 
battlefield might demand more in terms of physical endurance. The Infantry School’s assistant 
commandant, Brigadier General Carl Fritzsche, made this case in a 1955 article. Fritzsche argued 
that soldiers and their leaders had to be prepared to “operate independently and at great distance” 
from bases and other units. They would also need to be able to operate for “extended periods 
under conditions unknown in the past,” which in turn demanded the “confidence necessary for 
success” that came through good health and physical conditioning.99 Furthermore, Fritzsche 
predicted that tactical nuclear weapons would accelerate the pace of hostilities, denying 
commanders the time to recondition men who had “grown soft.”100 Members of the Infantry 
School’s staff studying the pentomic concept buttressed Fritzsche’s prediction. By 1958, the 
school’s combat conditioning committee had concluded that the pentomic soldier would have to 
“move farther, faster, oftener” than his predecessor, yet retain a “reserve of strength from which 
to destroy or pursue enemy forces.”101 A 1958 survey of Army units reflected similar sentiments 
in the field. Of 83 units surveyed, leaders in 75% of them felt that the pentomic concept 
increased physical requirements.102 Physical fitness in this imagined future conflict remained 
imperative, and its development could not wait until that war commenced.   
In this period of organizational and doctrinal ferment the USAIS-owned revision of FM 
21-20 went into print, two years after the 1955 adequacy study and following more than four 
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years of delays. Breaking from previous practices, a new technical manual, TM 21-200, 
accompanied the field manual. Commanders and staff officers responsible for planning, 
preparing, supervising, and inspecting physical training programs comprised the field manual’s 
target audience. FM 21-20 covered subjects such as program planning and construction for 
various types of units, human physiology, and fitness evaluations. In contrast, TM 21-200 
targeted instructors with detailed information about executing particular exercises.103 Except for 
a formal weight control program, the new manuals converted into doctrine many features of the 
physical culture expressed in the 1955 adequacy study. The 1957 FM 21-20 and its associated 
technical manual reflected a physical culture premised on conditioning, focused on individual 
fitness over unit fitness, rooted in empirical research, and oriented on preparation for infantry 
combat.  
Historical awareness helped inform this physical culture. Not only did Army physical 
training have a relevant history according to the manual’s authors, but it was subject to 
historiographical interpretation. In relating a brief history of physical training between 1885 and 
1957, the specialists at the PTS and at USAIS who authored the manual identified trends and 
turning points, criticizing some and praising others. Their critiques and praises provide more 
insight into the physical culture they belonged to and helped shape in the 1950s. Their history 
began with the U.S. Military Academy’s hiring of Herman Koehler in response to a perceived 
glut of physical deficiencies among the men enlisted to fight the Civil War. Every conditioning 
initiative through WWI was, in their words, Koehler’s “personal endeavor.”104 Between 1914 
and 1957, the manual’s authors identified a boom-and-bust cycle. During WWI, WWII, and the 
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Korean War commanders specifically and the Army in general awoke to the need for rigorous 
conditioning through combat experience and encounters with an American populace made soft 
by “leisure living.” After each war, the Army drifted into complacency and prioritized recreation 
over conditioning.105 The authors characterized the need for individual soldier fitness as constant, 
perhaps even growing, throughout this period despite mechanization and technological advances. 
Sports also featured prominently in this short history. When praised, sport was employed as a 
“supplement to the conditioning of soldiers” as in WWI. When criticized, it competed with and 
eclipsed systematic conditioning. Other subjects for criticism included the old-fashioned brand of 
“formal calisthenics” that returned between the world wars, the dangerous practice of letting in-
expert commanders design their own programs, the inadequate corps of specialists available to 
support mobilizations for both world wars, and repeated failure to sustain “vigorous and 
continuous” programs at the unit level.106 On the other hand, the use of military and civilian 
specialists to craft a “modern program” during WWII earned praise, though the work of Raycroft 
and his team between 1917 and 1920 went unmentioned. The 1957 manual’s authors identified 
strongly with the WWII-era specialists responsible for the third watershed in the history of the 
Army’s physical culture—creating the first doctrine that “could be scientifically justified by 
testing procedure.”107  
Claiming to be heirs to this “new physical training concept,” the manual’s authors 
launched into the most technical treatment of physical training to appear in doctrine yet. Based 
on the premise that the human body, “like weapons and machines” must be “understood before 
proper techniques and care can be employed in conditioning it,” nearly a quarter of FM 21-20’s 
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pages were dedicated to a synopsis of body structure and functions.108 Readers could learn about 
anatomical terms (median plan, medial, lateral, superior, inferior, etc.), the body’s major bones, 
types of joints, muscle actions, major muscles, the functioning of the cardio-respiratory system, 
and more.109 Beyond the principles of overload and progression that had propelled the training 
system since 1942, the manual introduced a slew of new technical terms such as hypertrophy, 
crest loads, and stroke volume.110 One of the promises underlying this highly scientific approach 
to conditioning was that the system could build bodies better and quicker than could incidental or 
improvised training. Efficiency and effectiveness were especially valuable given the average 
recruit’s level of fitness, which was assumed to be very poor. Just as their predecessors had six 
decades earlier, these new advocates of systematic training guaranteed a rational and rapid path 
to making ready for battle bodies that had grown soft in civilized life. However, the manual’s 
highly technical treatise was something new, and it seems to have served two purposes. First, it 
was an educational tool meant to bridge the gap between a commander’s responsibility for and 
ignorance of his soldier’s physical conditions. Second, its content would have been daunting for 
lay readers, so the technical treatise reinforced the expertise of its authors and thereby may have 
helped sell the system to commanders. After all, could the average commander come up with 
something better if the human body was so complex? 
Selling the program would have been an important consideration given the 1955 
adequacy study’s finding that the system was sufficient, but that a lack of command emphasis 
compromised it. As observed before, top Army leaders and physical training advocates alike 
agreed in the 1950s that physical training was extremely relevant for the atomic battlefield of the 
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future. Given the Korean War example and expectations of future conflicts, commanders would 
not have time to bring their units up to sufficient levels of fitness before entering combat. 
Conditioning programs therefore had to be consistent and continuous. The authors of FM 21-20 
worked to communicate this need and to make it easy for commanders to establish such 
programs. Dividing the program across a field and technical manual is one example of this effort. 
Another can be found in the definitions of fitness each manual offered readers. Where the 
technical manual retained the five WWII-era components of physical fitness, the field manual 
simply located physical fitness as a constituent of total military fitness and made a case for its 
importance.111 In short, why should a commander care about conditioning? Because it prepared 
troops to meet the demands of combat, improved an individual’s sense of well-being, cultivated 
an appropriate soldierly appearance, and enhanced soldiers’ mental and emotional fitness, and 
thus unit morale.112 After making the case to commanders that they should care, the manual 
provided them example programs and guidance for crafting their own to meet a wide range of 
needs. Individual and unit training both received coverage. So too did programs for specialists 
and staff personnel that had often been trusted to develop and maintain their own fitness—a 
practice proven to be “unrealistic and fallacious.”113  
Another aspect of the Army’s official physical culture of the period that the 1957 system 
reflected was its orientation on conditioning for infantry combat. Though notable throughout 
both the field manual and technical manual, this orientation is especially visible in several areas: 
the place of sport within the training system, the technical manual’s revised depiction of fitness, 
and the Physical Achievement Test’s (PAT) addition. In regards to sport, the manuals’ authors 
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pushed back against the eminence of recreational athletics in the force. In the 1950’s, inter-unit, 
inter-post, and Army-wide competitions boomed. The athletically gifted and the many 
conscripted athletes were often placed on special duty and on traveling teams, denying them 
training as soldiers and corrupting unit training in many cases.114 Stewards of the Army’s official 
physical culture premised on systematic training and conditioning acknowledged the value of 
sport in building esprit de corps and as a “laboratory” for character development.115 The manual 
even included new information about organizing leagues and tournaments in off-duty hours. 
However, the manual’s authors maintained that athletics should be tightly controlled. Sports 
should “supplement the more vigorous conditioning type activities, rather than replace them.”116 
The primary purpose of physical training remained conditioning for combat, not recreation.  
A new visual depiction of fitness in the technical manual helped explain the renewed 
drive to reign in athletics. In it, a triangular formulation returned. A “combat ready” condition 
capped this new pyramid. Basic military skills and traits, such as aggressiveness and confidence, 
comprised the two sides supporting combat 
readiness. Bodily characteristics such as 
strength, endurance, agility, and coordination 
formed the foundation atop which everything 
else was built.117 The Army’s chief physical 
culture producers regarded athletics as 
insufficient for conditioning, and they framed 
combat readiness in terms of being able to 
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maneuver dismounted on the battlefield. Evaluating such combat readiness could be 
accomplished through the PAT. First proposed in the 1955 adequacy study, this battery tested 
skills such as rope climbing and partner carries in addition to raw physical fitness.118 To a 
degree, the PAT was a concession to commanders who were unconvinced that the regular 
physical fitness test measured a soldier’s preparation for combat.119 However, it also centered the 
definition of fitness in the Army’s physical culture on readiness for infantry combat. Rope 
climbing, dashes, and mile runs were hardly relevant to tank or gun crews. This orientation 
represented less a change and more an intensification of a long-term trend favoring infantry-
centric fitness and exercise concepts in the Army’s training system. A widely-held traditional 
conception of the infantry soldier as the Army’s basic element enabled the infantry branch to 
bolster this trend as the branch gained organizational dominance over physical training policy 
and doctrine in this period 120  
A final continuing trend of note within the Army’s physical culture was the progressive 
elevation of the individual over the unit as the locus of concern. Contrasting the 1957 FM 21-20 
with its predecessors a few generations removed underscores this trend. The Army’s first official 
manual, the 1914 Manual of Physical Training, encapsulated Koehler’s physical culture and 
concentrated on unit readiness. The expressed goal of the system that manual delineated was 
ostensibly the “development of the physical attributes of every individual to the fullest extent of 
his possibilities.”121 However, the purpose of such development was to form the soldier into a 
more effective cog in a larger machine. Discipline, precision, and subordination were highly 
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prized. As Koehler himself wrote, soldiers needed a spirit that reached “out beyond the 
individual” to make him “think of himself only in connection with the obligations” that the 
nation laid upon him. Physical training pursued physical and psychological objectives to render 
the soldier a “disciplined, interdependent and dependable” component of a larger unit.122  
Unit readiness was certainly still an element of the physical culture as of 1957. That 
year’s FM 21-20 stressed improvement of the average soldier over concentration on the elite 
few, for instance.123 Yet measurable individual fitness loomed larger than ever before. According 
to the field manual, commanders should care about fitness chiefly because it made the soldier 
better prepared for combat, not because it made for a more disciplined unit. The technical 
manual’s continued use of the five physiological components of fitness introduced in 1942 
prioritized individual readiness over unit readiness, as did the fitness tests. Similarly, its caution 
against extreme formalism was premised on formality’s tendency to stifle a soldier’s spirit and 
interest, and thereby his physical development.124 Individual health considerations such as proper 
diet and weight control also moved toward the foreground. Raycroft and his team had similarly 
articulated a greater focus on individual fitness in the culture and system they crafted between 
1917 and 1920. Though submerged in the interwar years, the individual returned to the spotlight 
in 1942 and grew more prominent through 1957 and beyond.125 In part, concentration on the 
individual resulted from a more scientific approach to physical training that lent itself to 
measuring and maximizing a single body’s capabilities. The move also aligned with tactical 
developments. Supreme valuation of discipline and unit effectiveness derived from the demands 
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of linear warfare that informed military thinking up to World War I. However, dispersed 
formations and individual movement techniques became more important as new weapons made 
the battlefield deadlier. By World War II, small unit success depended far more on the 
individual’s ability to move and fight under fire than it had in the late nineteenth century. 
Commensurately, the individual gained significance within the Army’s physical culture.  
Less than a year after the publication of the new FM 21-20 the USAIS convened a 
physical fitness seminar at Fort Benning to evaluate the suitability of Army physical training 
doctrine in preparing soldiers for the future atomic battlefield. Attendees included senior officers 
from field units and Army headquarters, representatives from various service schools, members 
of West Point’s office of physical education, civilian physical education specialists, and those 
USAIS officers most responsible for crafting training doctrine and policy. Objectives of the 
seminar included evaluating how civilian fitness affected the Army, determining relationships 
between physical fitness and total military fitness, determining the level of fitness needed under 
the new pentomic concept, and considering the best means for measuring fitness.126 Opening 
remarks by Brigadier General Stanley Larsen, the USAIS assistant commandant, made clear that 
the whole official Army physical culture was under consideration. In asking “what should we be 
fit for,” “how do we attain fitness,” and “how do we measure fitness,” Larsen asked attendees to 
grapple with the meaning, value, and methods of achieving fitness.127 
Few revelations emerged from the briefings and committee reports. Most reaffirmed core 
beliefs within the culture or were predictable given extant trends. Four prominent ideas captured 
in the final report help refine our understanding of the Army’s official physical culture as it 
existed at the dawn of an anticipated era of nuclear warfare, though. First, the attendees agreed 
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that individual physical fitness was more important than ever despite technological advances and 
increasing mechanization. Briefers repeatedly asserted that victory on the battlefield might come 
down to relative advantages in foot mobility, the soldier’s ability to “outmove and outfight” his 
opponent in adverse conditions, and characteristics such as self-confidence, aggressiveness, and 
a will to win.128 Furthermore, everyone needed to be fit to fight because Korean War experience 
and the pentomic concept suggested that the “rear area” had “been eliminated” in modern war.129 
These assertions were reminiscent of others made by systematic training’s original late 
nineteenth century advocates. They had also argued that an army’s human element must be made 
stronger to complement or overcome the power of emerging technologies.130 
Second, seminar attendees agreed that the current training system as expressed in FM 21-
20 and TM 21-200 was fundamentally sound and needed no revision. A survey of organizations 
in the field revealed that units agreed—95% responded that the existing literature was 
“excellent” or “good.”131 Yet not all was well. Those same surveys revealed that as many as 72% 
of units felt that their programs were inadequate for mobilization or combat training. A sampling 
of responses from a survey of individual officers produced a similar finding. Insufficient time 
allotted to training was most commonly cited as the reason for unsatisfactory programs.132 The 
cultural producers at USAIS recognized this gap between doctrine and implementation, the third 
prominent idea, as had their predecessors in the 1955 adequacy study. In the words of Lieutenant 
Colonel James Reilly of the combat conditioning committee: “without effective implementation, 
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strong command support and equally strong command supervision the program will fail in 
achievement of mission and objectives.”133 Recommendations for remediation once again 
included more command emphasis, more “positive control” through supervision and inspections, 
and specialist training for instructors and program managers.134  
Finally, seminar attendees agreed that the “Nation must be awakened to the necessity of 
youth fitness.” American youth, specifically young men, needed to be “conditioned to meet all 
demands of citizenship.”135 These demands were manifold but invariably included possible 
military service. In their recurrent concern about asymmetries between the demands of war and 
the American youth’s ability to meet them, Army leaders once more turned their attention 
externally to prehabilitation. Conditions had changed since the readiness camps and Citizens’ 
Military Training Camps (CMTC), however. Examining the development of federal 
prehabilitation programs since the interwar CMTCs will show how fears of totalitarianism and 
militarism, especially in the early Cold War years, reduced the appeal and utility of martial 
physical training for youth. Over time, the government had to devise new means and methods for 
sculpting young American bodies for battle.  
 
Perceiving change over time in prehabilitation programs requires rewinding to 1941. 
Prehabilitation was not a new concept then, but American entry in to World War II heightened 
the perceived need for it. Afterward, Cold War anxieties ensured that prehabilitation retained a 
place in American political discourse, especially because many cultural elites and political 
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leaders intuited a growing “muscle gap” and dangers inherent in a “depleted manhood.”136 
Interwar initiatives such as the CMTCs and Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) had been martial 
in character, the former intentionally so and the latter an unintentional site of military 
prehabilitation in that it salvaged men’s bodies and disciplined them. Both had also been citizen- 
and man-building agencies.137 World War II and post-war era efforts initially followed similar 
paths, but they encountered more limits than had their predecessors. Examining how these efforts 
changed over time and the boundaries each encountered reveals some constraints on federal 
power to control and shape citizens’ bodies. Such an examination also shows that while civilian 
physical educators easily and decisively influenced the Army’s physical culture at key points in 
its development, the Army possessed only a limited ability to influence wider American society’s 
physical culture. 
The urge to prehabilitate Americans had surged as the country moved toward war in 
1940. Of the first two-million men examined for induction through the Selective Service, boards 
rejected approximately 45% for physical or mental issues. While the Selective Service’s director, 
Brigadier General Lewis B. Hershey, scolded Americans over their softness for which they 
“should be thoroughly ashamed,” the presumed condition of Axis bodies also heightened 
anxieties.138 Militaristic German, Italian, and Japanese cultures had spawned youth training 
programs that appeared to discipline, harden, and toughen future soldiers. In fact, some 
explanations in America and Britain for early German and Japanese successes hinged on 
perceptions of superior soldiers conditioned for modern combat. Preparing America’s youth for 
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tomorrow’s battlefield or factory thus seemed necessary. The U.S. government encouraged this 
idea of “crisis” spurred by the “deplorable conditions in physical fitness which imperil our 
Nation.”139 John Kelly’s physical fitness organizations and his “Hale America” campaign were 
key sources for federal endorsement of the crisis narrative. From its origins in late 1940 to its 
sponsorship by the Federal Security Agency in 1943 and beyond, Kelly’s organization gradually 
acquired more resources and influence to advance its mission of promoting fitness. Kelly’s 
initiatives were always voluntary and advisory, but they sustained national attention on the 
bodies and minds of American citizens, especially young men of military age.140 
The federal government’s main prehabilitation effort emerged in September 1942—the 
Victory Corps. A joint effort of the Federal Security Agency (FSA), Office of Education, and 
armed forces, the Victory Corps aimed to prepare teenagers “for service tomorrow in the armed 
forces by preparing for service in the high school today.”141 Leaders in each sponsoring agency, 
such as the FSA’s Paul McNutt, expected the Victory Corps to turn high school students into a 
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trained reserve.142 Interested students enrolled first as general members and later transitioned into 
one of five special service divisions if they met certain qualifications. Each division aligned with 
either a branch of military service, community service, or wartime industry.143 Students could 
display their membership by wearing special Victory Corps caps, which they had to make 
themselves, or arm bands emblazoned with patches for their aligned division. Regardless of 
division, the Victory Corps pushed training in areas such as citizenship education, competence in 
science and mathematics, community service, and more. However, one of the program’s most 
“basic objectives[s]” was to “make the greatest possible number of pupils physically fit to carry 
on as members of the armed forces or as efficient workers.”144 The Victory Corps responded to 
physical educators’ requests for guidance by defining the citizen’s obligation to contribute in 
total war as the rationale for youth fitness, then suggesting a prehabilitation system. That system 
found full expression in the 1942 manual Physical Fitness Through Physical Education.145  
The Victory Corps’ system could be characterized as physical training rather than 
education because of its orientation on directly preparing young bodies for military or industrial 
service. According to military authorities, whatever physical educators had been doing in schools 
before 1942 was inadequate and in need of reform. Colonel Theodore Bank bluntly and 
frequently delivered this message. In one 1942 talk to midwestern educators, Bank told 
conference attendees that schools had “done a poor job of conditioning the youth of American 
during the last 20 years” and left educators with the impression that they had produced too many 
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recruits who were “puny,” and that the military needed more “with the muscles of a blacksmith, 
the agility of an acrobat and the stamina of a marathon runner.”146 The Victory Corps program 
aimed to remedy this situation with a holistic approach to fitness that encompassed conditioning, 
healthy lifestyle choices, medical intervention to remediate physical defects, and cultivation of 
character traits such as a “spirit of aggressive attack” and a willingness to “take physical 
punishment without flinching.”147 Although most youth of both sexes could participate in the 
Victory Corps, the program concentrated on producing “strong and rugged boys who [could] 
become excellent soldiers or sailors promptly after entering the armed services.”148 
Participation in the Victory Corps’ training program would have introduced healthy boys 
to the Army’s World War II-era physical culture. The Victory Corps’ system embraced both 
athletics, specifically the “vigorous and rugged” over the “recreational” varieties, and 
conditioning activities. As in the Army’s physical culture, the value of athletics was located 
mostly in the development of certain character traits such as the “spirit of competition” and the 
“will to win.”149 Conditioning activities occupied a vast majority of the manual’s pages 
concerning activities for boys. These concentrated on muscular endurance, strength, and agility, 
plus developing skills such as grenade throwing and basic drill. The Army’s Training Circular 
87 directly influenced the Victory Corps’ prescribed running, relay, conditioning, grass drill, and 
“ranger” exercises.150 Indeed, most exercises came straight from the Army system. A year later, a 
related manual written for colleges and universities extended this physical training and 
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acculturation system to the older brothers of prospective Victory Corps members too.151 The 
Victory Corps physical training system left a mark on high school physical education during and 
after the war. For instance, the Victory Corps’ physical training manual informed some revisions 
to instruction in schools, and the government’s emphasis on fitness resulted in both more hours 
dedicated to and increased enrollment in physical education classes.152 But the Victory Corps did 
not fundamentally modify physical education thought or practice to the degree that civilian 
educators had altered the Army’s physical culture in the past. 
In its close alignment with the Army’s physical culture and intended intervention in 
America’s schools, the Victory Corps represented the most direct and comprehensive federal 
attempt at creating a martial prehabilitation program to date. Yet despite the unusual pressures 
arising from the nation’s great struggle in World War II and anxieties about American unfitness, 
the Victory Corps floundered. Within a year, surveys revealed that only 22% of eligible students 
were enrolled. Most enrollees remained general members or participated in the community 
service division. Of this population, the three armed forces-aligned divisions each claimed less 
than 2% of total membership.153 No federal funding proved forthcoming. The Office of 
Education considered the whole program a “dead duck” by the summer of 1944.154 Postmortems 
emerged as early as 1943: some students considered the program childish; others preferred 
making immediate contributions to the war effort through community service; school 
administrators had too much pressing work and too little incentive to reform curricula that 
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already seemed sufficient; and finally, many educators and administrators feared the “Great 
Intrusion of the Federal Government” into education.155 The latter concern dovetailed with fears 
of militarism spurred by an organization to which comparisons with the Hitler Youth tended to 
adhere. Noted author E.B. White gave voice to this discomfort in arguing that “war itself is a 
Nazifying process,” so dressing students in uniforms seemed “somehow a symbol of defeat, not 
victory.”156 Even with the unusual demands on society imposed by fighting World War II and 
anxieties about national fitness, Americans rejected a prehabilitation program premised explicitly 
on preparation for military service.  
Universal Military Training (UMT), the next major federal prehabilitation effort, came 
into being even as the Victory Corps withered and World War II ground toward a conclusion. 
President Franklin Roosevelt first publicly urged a program of mandatory training in a speech to 
Congress in January 1945, though his was more an idea than a plan at the time.157 After 
Roosevelt’s death in April, his successor, Harry Truman, took up the message. Between 1945 
and 1948, and again between 1950 and 1952, Truman and his allies waged a campaign in 
Congress and with the public to create a compulsory service program. Such a program would 
require nearly all young men to spend a year undergoing military training after graduating from 
high school. Advocates of UMT, many of whom such as Henry Stimson and Robert Patterson 
were Plattsburgers or members of the interwar Military Training Camps Association, advanced 
two general arguments about its value. First, the possibility of conflict with the Soviet Union 
demanded constant preparedness to avoid a disastrous opening campaign in a future war. 
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Universal training could improve preparedness and create a large reserve without incurring 
enormous expenses.158 A second argument highlighted social benefits for American society in 
general and young men specifically. Training could impart useful skills, improve health, develop 
discipline and morality, and deepen citizens’ commitment to their civic duties. In the words of 
historian Michael Hogan, young men would emerge from the “democratic crucible” of UMT 
with “bodies hardened, skills honed, minds steeped in republican virtue, and values attuned to 
the defense of democracy in a dangerous, Darwinian world.”159 This narrative was especially 
prevalent in the 1945-48 campaign. 
Physical fitness was among the expected social benefits of UMT most often mentioned 
by advocates. Military officers frequently cited the need to enhance the conditioning of potential 
soldiers, usually with reference to past high inductee rejection rates. As it had since the late 
nineteenth-century when the U.S. Army discovered systematic physical training, convergence 
between the deep mobilization required to fight modern wars and the tacit obligation of citizens 
to be prepared for such service helped fuel the focus on fitness. Truman similarly emphasized 
improving the physical standards of the nation’s manpower in his messages to Congress 
beginning in 1945.160 In fact, Truman envisioned even greater possibilities for improving the 
nation’s physical standards than did military leaders. Where the Army only wanted young men 
who met standards for induction, Truman wanted to induct nearly every eighteen year-old male 
in order to remediate mental and physical defects. Truman had been shocked as an officer in a 
National Guard field artillery regiment and later as a U.S. Senator to discover just how many 
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Americans were physically unfit or lacked access to health care or physical education. Thus, he 
resolved to act in order to help Americans “make the greatest machine—the machine that God 
made—work as he intended.”161 Teaching the nation’s youth “what it means to take care of this 
temple which God gave us” was among Truman’s top priorities in UMT.162  
Despite the Truman administration’s efforts, UMT floundered in Congress amongst 
opposition spurred by concerns over costs, militarization, and the injustice of mandatory military 
service. UMT became a dead issue in 1948 after a 1947 blue-ribbon commission and an 
experimental Army UMT failed to meaningfully advance Truman’s agenda in the legislative 
branch.163 The Korean War reenergized UMT in 1950, this time focused more on military need 
and less on civic improvement. An absence of public support and incoming president Dwight 
Eisenhower’s antipathy to the program culminated in a March 1952 vote of 236-132 against 
UMT in the House.164 Outside Congress, educators comprised one of the groups most vocally 
opposed to UMT. One 1947 survey of professional groups revealed that as many as 75% of 
members were against any program of compulsory training.165  
Many physical educators likewise opposed UMT despite their relatively greater embrace 
of prehabilitation through the Victory Corps system, their profession’s history of involvement 
with the Army’s physical training program, and their acceptance of partial responsibility for so 
many rejected inductees. Some sense of the reasons for this opposition can be gleaned from a 
1945 series of articles published in the Journal of Health and Physical Education. In them, 
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authors took issue with the implicit assumption that one year of exposure to the Army’s physical 
culture could fix all the nation’s shortcomings in fitness. According to these authors, money for 
UMT could be better spent on increasing access, improving and adding facilities, and hiring 
more faculty to enhance physical education in primary and secondary schools.166 Others 
expressed wariness about militarism and linked UMT to compulsory service in the German 
military, echoing similar critiques of the Victory Corps. New York University’s Jay Nash 
captured this when he contended that America should not “experiment with the beginnings of a 
nationalized youth movement.” Instead, he reasoned, the nation should foster fitness, discipline, 
and citizenship in local communities to preserve the “grass roots of democracy.”167 Americans 
rejected a martial prehabilitation program even with Cold War tensions, recurring anxiety about 
American society’s physical decline, Korea’s sharp reminder about the continuing need for 
fitness in modern war, and a political culture that still defined citizenship reciprocally based on 
obligations. The Victory Corps and proposed UMT program alike felt too militaristic and seemed 
to pose too many threats to American liberties by way of control over young bodies.  
Still, interest in prehabilitation of some kind persisted into the 1950s. The reasons for this 
interest were both general and specific. Generally speaking, some consequences of material 
affluence and suburbanization overlapped with Cold War fears to create a moment of cultural 
anxiety that one scholar has dubbed the “muscle gap.”168 Historians have shown that Americans 
in the early Cold War period understood the consumerism, abundance, and easy, sheltered nature 
of suburban life as both symbols of American success and as vectors for the effeminization of the 
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nation’s youth.169 John Kelly, the famous Philadelphian who raised concerns about men in World 
War II, certainly thought as much. In a 1956 article, Kelly pondered whether America was 
becoming a nation of weaklings. His response was a resounding “yes.” “Already today’s 
youngsters are softer, weaker, and flabbier than the youngsters of certain foreign countries,” 
Kelly asserted, “and it is obvious that they are growing still softer every year.”170 These 
allegations of “softness” carried multiple meanings. In one sense, weak youth meant weak 
soldiers, which constituted a real problem when the nation contemplated a possible future war 
with the Soviet Union. In another, “softness” suggested potential for Communist penetration and 
subversion.171 “Muscle gap” anxieties had coalesced to such an extent by 1960 that president-
elect John Kennedy explicitly declared the nation’s “growing softness” and “increasing lack of 
physical fitness” a “menace to our national security.”172 
A few specific episodes that punctuated general cultural anxieties about softness and lack 
of fitness also sustained federal interest in prehabilitation. For example, the Korean War once 
again set off hand-wringing and soul-searching about the state of the union’s body politic. Of 
four-million men examined for draft registration between 1948 and 1955, approximately 52% 
were rejected on the basis of physical or mental issues.173 Those who donned Army fatigues 
hardly seemed a match for their supposedly hardier forebears. Commanders in Korea bemoaned 
the poor condition of new troops arriving in theater.174 Army commanders and national political 
leaders alike tended to attribute high rates of collaboration and death among the prisoner of war 
population, upward trends in courts martials, and an uptick in desertions to the soft new 
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generation.175 On the fields of friendlier strife, Soviet athletes performed well in the 1952 
Helsinki Olympic Games, then demolished the U.S. team at both the 1956 Winter and 1960 
Summer Olympics.176 Amidst this, the highly publicized Kraus-Weber report that exploded into 
America’s consciousness in 1955 seemed to lend scientific credence to existing beliefs about the 
nation’s unfitness. Hans Kraus, a sports medicine professor, and Sonja Weber, a posture expert, 
tested American youth in the 1940s and 1950s using a six-event battery. Kraus and Weber 
compared the results to those of Austrian, Italian, and Swiss children and found a concerning 
gap. Across the board, Americans performed far worse than their European peers. Sixty percent 
of Americans failed at least one test. Thirty-six percent failed at least one strength test compared 
to a European failure rate of only about one percent.177  
The Kraus-Weber report ultimately spurred federal action. At a White House luncheon in 
the summer of 1955 attended by dozens of sports celebrities, the same man who prodded 
Roosevelt to action in 1940 resumed his efforts with Eisenhower. John Kelly brought Kraus and 
Weber before luncheon’s attendees, who watched with mounting concern as the report’s authors 
detailed their findings. Eisenhower was purportedly shocked. According to one reporter, the 
presentation convinced the President that the fitness problem was “even more alarming than he 
had imagined.”178 Eisenhower’s mind supposedly went to his World War II experience, and 
specifically to his memory of draftee rejection rates.179 For Eisenhower, youth fitness had 
become an issue of national security. The subsequent federal response developed between 1955 
and 1956 through a series of conferences held at the nation’s military academies, foregrounding 
                                                 
175 McKenzie, 44-45. 
176 Richards, 437. 
177 Moran, 88-89. 
178 Robert H. Boyle, "The Report That Shocked the President," Sports Illustrated, 1955, 30. 
179 Ibid., 73. 
296 
 
the project’s martial implications.180 A consensus emerged from these meetings that the federal 
response had to avoid any whiff of totalitarianism.181 This reflected a desire to maintain contrast 
with the Soviet Union’s regimentation and to elide the taint of militarism. 
Executive Order 10673 inaugurated this new prehabilitation effort, a Cabinet-level body 
titled the President’s Council on Youth Fitness (PCYF), in July 1956. The PCYF did not 
intervene in America’s schools, nor did it promulgate a compulsory program, directly sponsor 
activities, or fund research. Instead, it was essentially a “public relations firm for the notion of 
fitness.” Shane MacCarthy, the PCYF’s director, described the council as “a catalyst, a 
stimulator, a coordinator, a persuader, an urger, an idea-dropper, a direction-pointer.”182 The 
PCYF and its full-time staff of four partnered with media outlets, the Ad Council, voluntary 
organizations such as the Boy Scouts, and local community organizations such as schools and 
churches. By leveraging its social and political capital, the PCYF attempted to popularize 
physical activity, defined broadly and liberally, and to inform and arouse the American public to 
the issue of youth fitness. Typical activities to which the PCYF committed itself included 
publishing informational pamphlets, providing staff for television interviews, sponsoring annual 
Youth Fitness Weeks, and encouraging the adoption of fitness as a theme for state, local, and 
private organizations’ events.183 
The PCYF labeled the product it marketed as “total fitness.” Dr. G. Ott Romney, the 
PCYF’s Deputy Executive Director, defined this concept to attendees at the 1958 USAIS 
physical fitness symposium as a combination of physical, mental, emotional, and social fitness 
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remarkably well-aligned with the Army’s own “total military fitness” concept.184 But as a 
prehabilitation effort, the PCYF represented an indirect approach. As Romney told the seminar’s 
gathered officers, the PCYF was “not born to implement the Defense program,” but any 
improvement of youth fitness was “bound to improve the preparedness of youth for military 
service.”185 Improving preparedness did not require young men to don uniforms or sweat through 
the Army’s daily dozen exercises. Instead, it encouraged activity, sport, and education to build a 
foundation that would prepare boys to “take basic training in stride” and to “accept the rigors [of 
service] with a grin instead of a whimper.” According to Romney, the PCYF was not in the 
business of crafting proto-soldiers, but it wanted to ensure that the military would not have to 
“cuddle and coddle carload lots of softies.”186 This approach characterized by its advisory, non-
compulsory, civilian nature and commitment to the general improvement of the population’s 
health proved more durable, widely influential, and popularly acceptable than earlier efforts. In 
fact, the PCYF is still active today as the President’ Council on Sports, Fitness, and Nutrition, 
having undergone several changes and expansion during subsequent administrations.187 
Mid-century prehabilitation programs hold many lessons for those seeking to address 
today’s fears about the woeful state of America’s youth and its potential soldiery. First, 
Americans have proven consistently resistant to overtly martial initiatives. Though relatively 
more tolerant in times of emergency such as World War II, American society consistently 
displayed deep suspicion of compulsory, nationally organized, and regimented programs. 
Second, martial concerns offered persuasive arguments for the need of youth physical fitness, but 
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prehabilitation programs oriented on preparing youth for military service specifically have 
enjoyed only limited reach and lifespans. Finally, the most successful programs have leveraged 
what historian Rachel Moran calls “advisory state” methods to sell, counsel, and inform 
Americans on the how and why of physical fitness.188 These programs did not just target future 
soldiers, nor did they train youth directly for military service. Instead, they aimed to cultivate a 
broad awareness of and desire for healthy lifestyles and physical fitness in American society. 
 
As they had since the 1880s, Army leaders’ interpretations of developments in warfare 
and American society contextualized the development of the Army’s physical culture between 
1945 and 1958. Many of these interpretations are familiar from earlier periods in a general sense, 
even if the details differed. One of the most significant concerned technological advances. When 
contemplating the nature of a potential conventional conflict featuring the use of atomic weapons 
and mechanized forces, Army leaders held to the trope of improving human resources to match 
or complement the capabilities of new military technology. In the face of weapons able to level 
entire cities and whose yields were measured by the kilo- and mega-ton, the soldier needed to be 
able to “move farther, faster, oftener” than his predecessor while retaining “a reserve of strength 
from which to destroy or pursue enemy forces.”189 Creators and interpreters of the Army’s 
pentomic concept and its physical training program alike agreed on this point. In addition to 
theoretical future scenarios, experience in the Korean War also informed these views. That 
conflict demanded a high degree of fitness from front-line combatants and support troops alike. 
Both groups had to operate over rugged terrain against tenacious opponents. Even those 
nominally behind the front had to be fit to fight because rear areas proved susceptible to attack, 
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especially in the war’s fluid early months. Furthermore, the Korean War pointed to 
psychological and ideological considerations in Cold War conflict that physical training might be 
able to help address. 
Another significant and familiar interpretation concerned the intersection between a need 
for fitness that was perceived to be increasing and the seeming decline of American men. 
Generalized fears about the deleterious effects of urbanization, industrialization, mechanization, 
and closure of the frontier had motivated the earliest systematic training advocates. Concerns 
about technology’s harmful consequences on the human body persisted. As the USAIS combat 
conditioning committee’s chairman put it: “Ironically, the important breakthroughs which we 
have achieved in weapons and equipment, and which magnify our combat capabilities, also 
reduce our capabilities by contributing to the softening and deterioration of the soldier.”190 
Between 1945 and 1958, evidence accumulated suggestive to many that the bodies of America’s 
military aged males left much to be desired. High draft rejection rates on physical grounds during 
World War II alarmed the nation. A lack of conditioning allegedly claimed lives in Korea and 
rendered servicemen pliant in imprisonment, susceptible to persuasion and brainwashing. 
Finally, the Kraus-Weber report raised concerns about the physical “unfitness” of America’s 
next generation of soldiers. Advocates of systematic training, those men most responsible for 
crafting Army policy, doctrine, and physical culture, sounded alarms over these perceived 
shortcomings repeatedly between 1945 and 1958. The presumed physical unfitness of American 
youth and of the recruit helped shape the Army’s physical culture and stimulate its leaders’ 
interest in prehabilitation to close the “muscle gap.” That approach to prehabilitation changed 
significantly over the 1940s and 1950’s, however. Where the Army once took the lead in martial 
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prehabilitation programs, it receded to the background in advisory state efforts following World 
War II. Though preparation for military service still motivated federal prehabilitation efforts to a 
large degree through the 1950s, broader and less explicitly martial health goals took priority. 
These made programs more publicly palatable, especially in the Cold War environment. 
Finally, developments within the Army’s physical culture in response to interpretations of 
context and transitions between wartime and peacetime followed some familiar patterns. For 
instance, the relative importance of recreation and conditioning in practice fluctuated with the 
former taking priority in peacetime. Similarly, the Army’s willingness to fund centralized 
schools for physical training specialists waned in the years following both World War II and 
Korea. Yet within the official physical culture, consistency rather than fluctuation characterized 
development. Creators of Army physical training policy and doctrine during this period 
consciously identified with the more scientific “new physical training concept” pioneered during 
World War II. Applying research methods and empirical data, specialists sought to create a 
system that could improve specific physiological characteristics effectively, efficiently, and 
safely. That system reflected a valuation of conditioning above all else. Though the official 
physical culture still accommodated beliefs about sculpting minds and spirits by way of exercise 
and sport, those outcomes remained ancillary to physical development as they had since 1942. 
Additionally, the individual soldier’s fitness continued accumulating attention within the official 
culture, though the most important individual remained the average man, not the elite athlete. 
With the growing focus on the individual also came a concern for health issues such as weight 
control. Lastly, the official physical culture also remained centered on infantry combat during the 
period. By and large, this had been the case since 1885, though explicit orientation on combat 
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intensified during wartime. By the mid-1950s, the Infantry School’s ownership of policy and 





Conclusion: Fashioning that “Certain Strength of Body and Soul,” 1885-1958 
Herman Koehler is widely regarded as the father of physical education at West Point. He is 
arguably the Army’s father of systematic physical training as well. Though best known at the 
Academy for his setting-up drill and gymnastic exercises, Koehler aimed for goals beyond 
simple muscular and cardiovascular improvement. Koehler sketched this higher calling in a 
remarkable 1916 letter to the Society of Directors of Physical Education in Colleges. In war, he 
wrote, “physical fitness is the factor upon which, more than any other, the efficiency of a 
fighting machine depends.” After fitness came “men, money, and materiel,” but most 
importantly “morale” because it alone could “determine and bring out the full and true value of 
these … physical components.”1 Elaborating on this body-mind-soul synergy, Koehler contended 
that “mere physical endurance, hardihood and force, will accomplish but little as compared to 
physical fitness plus the development of those mental qualities that guide and control this force 
intelligently.”2 The importance afforded the soldier’s quality in Koehler’s concept of war 
harmonizes with deep-rooted cultural beliefs in the American military tradition that situate man 
as the “dominant instrument on the battlefield.”3 Under this schema, improving the Army’s 
manpower was and remains imperative for success in war. Koehler regarded physical training as 
a key tool for cultivating a superior soldiery, but not just because it could produce soldiers 
capable of marching further or lifting heavier loads. Rather, his mission in physical training was 
multi-faceted and educative. This approach is the historical basis of the Army’s official physical 
culture. Physical training could build bodies, shape minds, sculpt character, forge units, and 
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make better citizens. A related and similarly complex understanding of fitness and exercise still 
informs the Army’s physical culture today.  
 This project set out to answer several questions about the development of the Army’s 
official physical culture between 1885 and 1958: in whose interests were bodies shaped? To 
what ends were they shaped? How did the shaping of bodies contribute to man-, soldier-, and 
citizen-making projects? Technological developments in the late nineteenth century spurred 
reengagement with these questions, as did the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the mid-1950s. 
For the most part, the Army’s answers to these questions changed over time in response to 
wartime experiences and trends in civilian physical education. Emphasis gradually shifted as a 
result of American experiences in the world wars from turning out disciplined human machine 
cogs to fashioning individual warriors, for example. The relative balance between valuations of 
impalpable character objectives and quantifiable physiological performance measures similarly 
shifted over time from the former to the latter. Likewise, the relative importance of combat-
related functional fitness grew during wartime and when physical training policy came under the 
Infantry’s control, but it generally declined in peacetime. Projects of man-, soldier-, and citizen-
making remained interrelated throughout, but their outward expressions in the form of 
prehabilitation programs morphed in response to resource constraints, popular acceptance, and 
expectations of a citizen’s obligation to potential military service. In studying these changes over 
time, three punctuated periods in the physical culture’s evolution become evident: Koehler’s 
disciplinary era, the combat-readiness interregnum of 1917-1919, and the scientific measurement 
school’s rise after 1942. Ultimately, the Army’s physical culture proved sufficient for adapting 
men to modern war. However, the cultural inertia it acquired coupled with repeated failures to 
sustain evolutionary progress in peacetime produced spasmodic change and forced those 
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responsible for physical training during World War I, World War II, and the Korean War to re-
learn old lessons. 
A specific historical context in the late nineteenth century informed the initial 
construction of a physical culture in the U.S. Army centered on systematic training. 
Understanding the foundations of that culture and explaining many patterns and dynamics it 
manifested later hinge on understanding its original context. In short, its essence emerged from 
changing battlefield demands wrought by new developments in military technologies and turn-
of-the-century intersections between social, intellectual, and cultural anxieties. Those anxieties 
were many and varied. For instance, urbanization and industrialization moved larger percentages 
of the nation’s population into environments and working conditions perceived by many at the 
time to be less healthy than rural alternatives. American men trapped in sedentary clerical jobs or 
mind-numbing factory work increasingly found achievement of Victorian manliness difficult. An 
insidious feminization by way of a “regime of sugary benignity” built on, among other factors, 
stronger mother-child bonds, growing numbers of women teachers, and fathers working outside 
the home further threatened claims to robust masculinity.4 With the closure of the frontier in 
1890, the Turnerian remedy of frontier settlement vanished as a means for revitalizing softening, 
overcivilized, and neurasthenic American men. Popular conceptions of manhood in decline 
boded ill in a world interpreted through a Social Darwinist framework. Soft men heralded trouble 
in the ongoing struggle for survival between embodied nations and races. Warfare represented 
the supreme distillation of such a struggle, and trends in that field driven by technological 
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advances suggested that future conflict would demand more of combatants. Smokeless powder, 
quick-firing artillery, rifling, high explosive, and other late nineteenth-century developments 
created larger deadly zones, emptier battlefields, and the need for more dispersion on the 
battlefield. Western experience in and study of wars between 1860 and 1914 generated 
transnational solutions to evolving battlefield problems that emphasized moral forces, the 
offensive, national will, and enhanced human materiel.5 In this schema, disciplined and resilient 
soldiers able to overcome the challenges of dispersed operations on empty battlefields and 
deliver superior moral force at a critical point formed the basis of a successful army.  
 In its quest to close the gap between the mounting demands of combat and American 
manhood’s perceived decline, the U.S. Army discovered systematic physical training. Precedents 
for martial, systematic physical training existed in most European armies by the mid-nineteenth 
century. The German model as captured in Turner gymnastics proved especially influential after 
1885 owing to the U.S. Military Academy’s Herman Koehler. However, early advocates of 
“scientific” physical training within the Army thought, wrote, and acted within a uniquely 
American cultural context. Muscular Christianity had advanced the idea of regeneration through 
bodily improvement since at least the 1850s. Exercise and sports crazes swept the nation 
repeatedly in the century’s latter half. Crucially, an impulse toward professionalization in the 
field of physical education also arose in the midst of these fads, movements, and obsessions. Led 
by pioneers such as William Anderson, Edward Hitchcock, Tait McKenzie, James McCurdy, 
Edward Hartwell, and Dudley Sargent, this emerging professional community forged a belief 
that exercise could simultaneously cultivate a person’s physical, mental, and moral qualities. 
Grounded in this wider culture, advocates in the Army perceived in systematic physical training 
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great promise as a rational and efficient means of improving human materiel. Exercise could 
make soldiers more disciplined, moral, manly, fit, and ultimately more likely to triumph in battle. 
 The Army’s first official physical culture centered on systematic training took shape 
between 1880 and 1914 within this broader cultural context. No individual could make a stronger 
claim to that culture’s paternity than Herman Koehler. Hired by the U.S. Military Academy 
(USMA) in 1885 as Master of the Sword, Koehler led a comprehensive reform of the Academy’s 
meager training program. Until his retirement in 1923, Koehler dominated physical training at 
the Academy. His influence grew rapidly in the wider Army as well. Because the Army never 
established a formal doctrine production or specialist training agency equivalent to Britain’s 
Aldershot, West Point became the default center for physical culture production. Koehler 
parlayed his work at the USMA into written form, such as his 1892 and 1904 manuals and 
multiple authoritative articles in publications such as the Infantry Journal. Other officers, nearly 
all former students of Koehler’s such as Edmund Butts and Enoch Gary, also produced manuals, 
spread the systematic training gospel, and published journal articles in this period. However, 
none achieved a degree of influence rivaling Koehler’s, none promoted ideas or systems that 
differed from his in any significant way and all bore the Master of the Sword’s imprint. 
Koehler’s ideas and system reflected his Turner roots. He sought whole body improvement for a 
broad population and to create disciplined soldiers chiefly through calisthenics, limited “heavy 
work,” gymnastic games, and apparatus work. The culture he crafted highly valued expert 
knowledge, equally prioritized development of physical and psychologic qualities, and 
emphasized unit fitness over optimizing individuals. Sport held an uneasy place within this 
culture, esteemed for its popularity and as a laboratory for character development but viewed 
with suspicion for its tendency to warp physical training around the cultivation of the elite few.  
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 Koehler may have been responsible for giving the Army’s physical culture its shape, but 
institutionalizing that culture depended upon others too. A gymnasium building spree authorized 
in the 1890s by Congress helped remedy the lack of facilities and apparatus on most Army posts. 
Many of Koehler’s apostles, all young graduates of the USMA, took charge of these facilities 
and of unit training. Yet as late as 1905, one post’s Superintendent of Athletics still complained 
that physical training was “unsystematic, irregular, and uncertain in the extreme.”6 Koehler and 
others identified a lack of command interest and emphasis as the chief culprit. Top-down 
directives from and the personal interest of successive Chiefs of Staff Nelson Miles, Franklin 
Bell, and Leonard Wood addressed this issue between 1895 and 1914. All three were also 
notable physical fitness enthusiasts. Bell and Wood in particular advanced the cause of physical 
training through their popularizing partnerships with President Theodore Roosevelt. Ultimately, 
the most important step toward institutionalizing this developing physical culture came in 1914 
with the Manual of Physical Training’s publication. For the first time in its history, the Army 
had an official physical training system. This system expressed and shaped the organization’s 
physical culture, and it was entirely Koehler’s creation. 
 Shortly after the Army institutionalized Koehler’s culture, America’s 1917 entry into 
World War I and the massive mobilization it entailed created conditions in which an alternate 
physical culture flourished for a time. Lacking an expansible instructor corps or central training 
school, the Army could not create a sufficient number of physical training specialists to make 
millions of men ready for combat. Into this gap stepped civilian physical educators and athletic 
coaches recruited and led by the Commission on Training Camp Activities’ (CTCA) Joseph 
Raycroft. These Athletic Directors worked under the broad CTCA mandate to mentally, morally, 
                                                 
6 Robert L. Bullard and H. S. Hawkins, "Athletics in the Army," The Journal of the Military Service 
Institution of the United States 37 (1905): 400. 
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and physically strengthen men called into service so that America might earn victory on the basis 
of its "man-power and manhood,” then return its citizen-soldiers better for their experiences.7 
Mostly practitioners of the “new school of physical education” perceptible by 1906, Raycroft’s 
team organized athletic competitions and councils in camps and divisions while crafting original 
physical training programs. These civilians, some of whom earned temporary commissions, 
brought their educative backgrounds to bear on the problem of training soldiers, motivated by a 
widely shared reverence for efficiency and interpretations of modern combat.  
Chiefly through Raycroft’s efforts, the ideas and practices advanced by the Athletic 
Directors cohered into a training system and a physical culture. This new culture proved more 
inclusive of varied activities, more focused on functional fitness as defined by combat demands, 
and more concerned with sculpting individuals into efficient fighting machines. Ironically, these 
civilians produced a grittier, more combat-oriented physical culture than had their uniformed 
forebears. Where the soldier of 1914 was disciplined, obedient, self-confident, and capable of 
above-average feats of strength and endurance, the fit soldier of 1918 was also supposed to be 
able to give and take punishment, fight barehanded and with bayonet, react to rapidly changing 
conditions, and play several all-American sports. By the end of the war, Raycroft’s culture 
seemed poised to eclipse Koehler’s as the Army’s official physical culture, but this did not come 
to pass. His Athletic Directors returned to civilian life in 1919. His central school withered and 
died by late 1919 due to post-war budget reductions. His 1920 book Mass Physical Training 
went in to private publication instead of gaining sanction as official Army doctrine. Without 
doctrinal entrenchment, a school, or a cadre, Raycroft’s culture withered. 
                                                 
7 Edward Frank Allen, Keeping Our Fighters Fit for War and After, ed. Raymond B. Fosdick (New York: 
The Century Co., 1918), 16. 
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 Koehler’s physical culture regained power as Raycroft’s faded. Cultural continuity with 
the pre-war years returned in a remarkable case of organizational forgetting as career officers 
reasserted their influence. Koehler himself had educated many of these men, and most spent their 
entire professional lives wholly within the physical culture Koehler had produced. Meanwhile, 
responsibility for updating physical training policy and doctrine reverted back to West Point. 
There, Koehler’s influence remained strong even after his retirement in 1923 owing to 
organizational practices and the institutional leaders he had trained. As a result, 1928’s Training 
Regulations 115-5, 1936’s Basic Field Manual, and 1941’s Field Manual 21-20 all reflected 
Koehler’s culture. An emphasis on subordinating the body to man’s control and the 
subordinating the man to the team’s needs returned to replace the war-time accent on sculpting 
individual warriors. The almost complete failure to learn from its experiences in physical training 
during World War I represented a major failure for the Army. Once more, the organization’s 
official physical culture asserted a “disciplinary value” in physical training that was “at least the 
equal to is physiological or military value.”8 Yet in this era of “normalization,” two changes bear 
mention. First, systematic physical training had achieved nearly complete acceptance within the 
Army. Second, sport’s popularity exploded in the interwar Army even as the official physical 
culture walked back endorsements of athletics. Later systematic training advocates came to see 
this is as a problem. 
 As America inclined toward war in 1940 and began mobilizing, the Army encountered a 
physical fitness problem set reminiscent of 1917’s. Passage of the Selective Training and Service 
Act in September 1940 compelled millions of men to stand before medical boards between 1940 
and 1945. Depending upon the year, anywhere from a third to a half of these men would be 
                                                 
8 War Department, Training Regulations No. 115-5: Physical Training (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1928), 2. 
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rejected. Resultant lamentations over the declining quality of America’s manpower belied the 
later “Greatest Generation” moniker. Once again, the Army faced the challenge of turning a huge 
influx of lower quality personnel into a fighting force capable of overcoming a veteran foe. Once 
again, the Army initially had to do this with a system best suited for maintaining minimum unit 
fitness and instilling discipline, and without an expansible instructor corps. As in World War I, 
the Army brought in civilian physical education and athletic coaching experts. However, this 
time many donned uniforms immediately and much of the work happened “in-house” instead of 
being out-sourced to a civilian agency like the earlier CTCA.  
Outside experts, most notably Theodore Bank and Charles McCloy, reshaped the Army’s 
official physical culture as had their WWI-era predecessors. Similar to cultural changes wrought 
between 1917 and 1919, WWII-era cultural change stressed individual soldier readiness over 
formality and discipline. However, the new system inaugurated by 1942’s Training Circular 87 
was predicated more on empirical data-based research and concentrated even more exclusively 
on physiological performance measures. Sport occupied a greater role in in this official physical 
culture than it had in the interwar version, but traditional concepts still framed its use: maximum 
participation, emphasis on the average many rather than the elite few, and development of non-
physical characteristics and qualities. But even in this new formulation, physical training was 
meant to do much more than build strong bodies. For instance, the Army’s physical culture had 
always included a gendering function, an impulse to build better men. Women’s large-scale entry 
into military service during the war revealed the continued existence of this gendering function. 
Despite the fact that many men and women performed similar duties, Army and Women’s Army 
Corps leaders opted to construct for women a completely separate physical culture and 
associated training system. Within this culture, physical fitness came to be defined mostly by an 
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ability to fulfill explicitly non-combat jobs and to look good doing it. Fit bodies were necessary, 
but they were to be distinctly feminine bodies too. 
 After 1945, the Army’s official physical culture largely stayed true to the trajectory that 
Bank, McCloy, and their team first traced. The combat-ready individual continued receiving 
priority over the disciplined machine-cog of Koehler’s culture. Outcomes such as basic military 
skills competencies, self-confidence, and a will to win remained likely and valuable by-products 
of physical training, but not goals in and of themselves. Fitness continued to be defined by 
cultural producers largely in terms centered on infantry combat. These latter-day cultural 
producers of the 1950s considered themselves inheritors of the “new physical training concept” 
inaugurated in 1942, which they claimed was the first system “scientifically justified by testing 
procedure.”9 This culture proved durable despite post-war drawdowns, shocks from the Korean 
War, and attempts to reconceptualize the Army as a relevant player on a potential atomic  
 Beyond 1958, the Army’s official physical culture has continued evolving in response to 
familiar stimuli. For instance, trends in civilian physical education, fitness research, and athletic 
training remained influential. This influence is evident in the greater significance running and 
exertion recovering activities assumed within the Army’s physical culture in the 1970s and 
1980s, which mirrored an aerobic exercise boom initiated in large part by Dr. Kenneth Cooper’s 
1968 book Aerobics. Another familiar stimulus involves changing interpretations held by the 
agencies most responsible for physical training doctrine and policy of wartime demands on 
humans. Experiences in wars featuring intensive ground combat such as Korea and Vietnam 
tended to incline the official physical culture toward a focus on individual combat readiness. In 
contrast, less demanding periods and a fascination with technology during the 1980s and 1990s 
                                                 
9 Department of the Army, Field Manual 21-20: Physical Training, (Washington, 1957), 9. 
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oriented the Army’s physical culture more on general, corporate fitness. In recent years high-
performance athlete training programs and systems such as CrossFit and P90X have exerted a 
powerful influence, especially since about 2003 as a result of demanding combat operations in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Elite units such as the 75th Ranger Regiment, conceiving of 
ideally fit soldiers as “combat tactical athletes,” have been the vanguard for this change.10 
Values, assumptions, and practices gestating in these units are now altering the wider physical 
culture as evidenced by a new combat-oriented, five-event fitness test announced in mid-2018 
and intended for Army-wide implementation. 
Another key stimulus in the continuing evolution of the Army’s physical culture derives 
from leadership. Although the Army’s original discovery of systematic physical training largely 
resulted from junior officer advocacy, subsequent change in the official physical culture has 
principally been top-down. Especially between 1914 and 1958, the individuals and agencies 
controlling policy and doctrine have also been the chief cultural producers. Originally, the most 
influential cultural producers were charismatic individuals who carried the cause of systematic 
training forward almost single-handedly. Herman Koehler, Edmund Butts, and Joseph Raycroft 
all fit this mold. Since 1942, durable agencies capable of sustained scientific research have taken 
the lead. The Army’s official physical culture tended to reflect the orientations of these agencies. 
Individual combat readiness in an infantry-centric framework largely defined the Army’s 
physical culture when the U.S. Army Infantry School (USAIS) held the lead after 1954. When 
the new Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) gradually assumed control of physical 
training policy and doctrine following its 1973 creation and the subsequent 1982 founding of the 
                                                 
10 For an excellent overview of doctrinal and policy developments since 1958, see Whitfield B. East, A 
Historical Review and Analysis of Army Physical Readiness Training and Assessment (Ft. Leavenworth: Combat 
Studies Institute Press, 2013). 
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U.S. Army Physical Fitness School (USAPFS), the culture shifted toward a more generic, health-
based concept of fitness.11 The pendulum swung back toward infantry-centric fitness in the 
1990s when streamlining initiatives in response to budget constraints moved many USAPFS 
personnel back to the U.S. Army Infantry Center at Ft. Benning. In 2007 the USAPFS 
headquarters downsized and moved once again, this time to Ft. Jackson. There, a close 
association with TRADOC’s Initial Military Training mission, the active leadership of senior 
officers such as Lieutenant General Mark Hertling, and the enduring demands of America’s 
Global War on Terror have increasingly oriented the Army’s official physical culture on basic 
functional fitness for combat readiness.12  
 Studying the Army’s official, systematic-training-based physical culture from its birth to 
maturity reveals that the dominant definition of fitness within the Army has been and remains 
layered, constructed, changeable, and heavily influenced by American society.13 Since cadets 
began sweating under Koehler’s tutelage in 1885, more has been at stake in physical training 
than simply improving an individual’s strength or endurance. Fitness at that time included 
elements such as symmetry and power, partly because muscle fiber was thought to be indicative 
of moral fiber, along with many other less quantifiable components. Fit soldiers were also 
masculine, disciplined, confident, selfless, efficient parts in a larger machine, and resistant to the 
pernicious effects of over-civilization in the modern world. During America’s first great crusade 
in Europe between 1917 and 1918, fitness accumulated new meanings that reflected 
Progressives’ worldviews and the demands of trench warfare. Later, scientific study yielded 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 142. 
12 Ibid., 188. 
13 Historian Shelly McKenzie arrives at a similar conclusion in her study of American fitness culture since 
the 1950s. See Shelly McKenzie, Getting Physical: The Rise of Fitness Culture in America (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2013), 178. 
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normalized measures of fitness in a physiological sense, yet the cultural definition of fitness 
retained immeasurable constituents such as teamwork, aggressiveness, confidence, a tough 
masculinity, and resistance to political subversion. Physical training remains a venue for the 
cultivation of mental toughness and a laboratory for character and leadership development today. 
As close readings of the ever-evolving definition of fitness within this culture reveal, that 
definition did not always correspond directly with the realities of combat. More influential were 
the ways in which cultural producers imagined combat and perceived the needs of nation’s 
young male population. Fitness within the Army’s official physical culture morphed over time, 
but it was always a malleable concept capable of sustaining many layers of meaning.  
 Part of the reason that fitness remains such a malleable concept is that there is no 
objective, quantifiable standard of fitness for combat. In fact, such a standard may be impossible 
to define. None of the systems of exercise developed between 1885 and 1958 were premised on 
actual measures of soldiers’ battle performance or on remediating specific reasons for physical 
failures in combat. McCloy’s and Esslinger’s work during World War II came closest to 
delivering a quantifiable definition of fitness. But even that work proceeded from a generalized 
list of tasks imagined to be necessary on the battlefield, such as jumping in and out of trenches or 
carrying heavy objects, and analysis of what could be expected of an average trained man in 
related and controlled tasks. Studies of combat motivation and soldier performance along with 
historical works in the face of battle vein frequently highlight the intense physical demands of 
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war and the interconnectedness of physical and mental stamina.14 However, they are also 
consistently vague on the specific physical demands soldiers face. Most soldiers’ recollections 
and scholarly studies never go beyond meditations on the sheer exhaustion and fatigue native to 
battle. A specific and quantified definition of fitness may be an impossibility. Too many factors 
are at play in combat, and too little data collection is possible. Superior battlefield fitness is also 
an eternally relative concept measurable only between combatants. The unquantifiability of 
fitness is significant to the Army’s physical culture because it leaves much up to interpretation, 
values, beliefs, and reasoning by analogy. The application of science may yield practices that can 
render a body capable of lifting more weight or moving faster, but there is no such precision or 
certainty possible in making a person combat-ready. 
For all the change in the Army’s physical culture during the period under study, some 
enduring threads of continuity connected the culture of 1958 to that of 1885. For instance, 
physical training always existed at the intersection between soldier-, citizen-, and man-making 
projects. This was especially true in the early twentieth century when obligations largely defined 
citizenship, when industrial warfare demanded that states be able to field and maintain large 
conscript armies, and when Social Darwinist thinking measured the health of the nation by the 
qualities of its men. The interaction of these projects also turned attention within the Army 
outward onto wider American society. Advocates of systematic training regularly trumpeted the 
anticipated enrichment of society anticipated when men returned home who had been taught the 
                                                 
14 For an entry to this literature, see Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in 
Battle (Boston: Kluwer, Nijhoff Publishing, 1982); John Ellis, Sharp End: The Fighting Man in World War II (New 
York: Scribner's, 1980); Samuel A. Stouffer et al., The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath, vol. II (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1949); J. Glenn Gray, The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1998); Gerald F. Linderman, The World within War: America's Combat Experience in World War II 
(Boston: Harvard University Press, 1999); Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in Battle (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2003); S. L. A. Marshall, Men against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 2000); Rune Henrikson, "Warriors in Combat--What Makes People Actively Fight in 
Combat?," The Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 2 (2007). 
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value of fitness and means of achieving it. But if the nation needed conscription to fight a 
modern industrial war, then returning healthy men was not enough. Men also needed to be made 
fit before entering the service so as to improve the overall quality of the nation’s potential 
soldiery and make basic military training more efficient. In this military context in which every 
young man existed in a yet-to-be-mobilized reserve, and in a social context in which soldiering 
was crucial to citizenship and the masculine ideal, it was only right to prehabilitate men for 
service. The urge to sculpt young Americans into better potential soldiers, better citizens, and 
better men became an enduring feature of the Army’s official physical culture, informing 
commonly understood valuations of fitness within the Army and systems designed to achieve it. 
The American public’s physical fitness, or more appropriately the lack thereof, remains a 
national security concern today. If called upon to fight war demanding mass mobilization today, 
Americans would no doubt adapt. Yet that process of adaptation would not be easy and the 
population capable of shouldering the demands of combat training is far smaller than it was in 
the early and mid-twentieth century.15 
Urges within the Army’s official physical culture to improve men reveal another thread 
of continuity: a tendency to foster and reinforce traditional gender norms. Because cultural 
producers understood the task of building men and building soldiers to be one and the same, 
women had no place within the culture. In this sense, women’s 1942 arrival in the force 
threatened the Army’s man-building mission even as the Army’s physical culture threatened 
women’s femininity. Thus, women required a different physical training system and culture, 
even though many men and women served in similar or even identical duty positions during 
World War II and beyond. Separate physical cultures, and the specific character of each, 
                                                 
15 Lewis, The American Culture of War, 35. 
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reinforced the notion that women were not real soldiers. Even when the Army’s physical training 
system became gender-integrated and duty position-neutral in 1980, female performance 
requirements on two of the three new Army Physical Fitness Test events were significantly lower 
than male requirements.16 Although designed to account for physiological differences between 
men and women, different gender-based standards buttress conceptions of male superiority and 
arguments against gender-integrating combat arms units. If the Army wants to take gender 
integration seriously, then it must define fit soldiers, not fit men and women. The recently 
proposed gender-neutral physical readiness test may help move the Army’s physical culture in 
this direction if implemented. 
A final observation about cultural continuity concerns agents of change. Specifically, 
organizational outsiders propelled the most significant changes within the Army’s official 
physical culture between 1885 and 1958. Herman Koehler, the driving force behind production 
of a physical culture predicated on systematic training, arrived at West Point as a young, barely-
tested Turnverein teacher and only earned an officer’s commission after fourteen years of 
service. Joseph Raycroft and his hastily recruited team of civilian educators and coaches led a 
major reform of the Army’s physical culture during World War I, even though many of those 
changes did not survive the interwar years. During World War II, Theodore Bank, Charles 
McCloy, and Arthur Esslinger dramatically altered the Army’s official physical culture by 
ushering in a data-driven “new physical training concept” rooted in scientific research. In each 
case, un-acculturated outsiders arrived in a time of need, bringing with them some of the latest 
ideas and practices from the world of physical education, and were empowered by Army 
                                                 
16 As of June 2018, this disparity remained in the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) requirements. As an 
example, a 22-year-old male soldier needs to complete 40 pushups in two minutes and run two miles in less than 
16:36 to achieve a passing score. A 22-year-old female soldier needs to complete 17 40 pushups in two minutes and 
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authorities to make changes. Between these revolutionary periods the Army’s physical culture 
tended to stagnate, especially when lacking an agency responsible for sustained research and 
development. Cultural influence also typically flowed unidirectionally from the civilian to 
military spheres. 
Historicizing the roots of the Army’s official physical culture is a valuable exercise for 
the Army as an organization. This study reveals that many present-day problems are not novel 
and that others have tried to address similar issues in the past. For instance, the challenge of 
generating leader buy-in and command emphasis for the Army’s official training system is not 
new. Koehler complained about it in 1907, as did attendees at the Infantry School’s physical 
fitness seminar in 1958. Similarly, lamentations about declining American fitness framed by 
many commentators as a national security concern are not unique to the 21st century.17 Recurring 
alarms about the pernicious effects of technology, urbanization, and sedentary lifestyles have in 
fact spurred physical training initiatives inside and outside the Army for well over a century. 
While this project offers no simple lessons or cookie-cutter solutions to such intractable 
problems, historical awareness may help today’s policy-makers approach issues with wisdom 
and sensitize them to possibilities, tendencies, and limitations. For example, policy-makers 
should give serious thought to who owns physical training research capabilities, doctrine, and 
policy. The Army’s official physical culture has always bent toward the parochial interests and 
proclivities of that owning agency. Also, leaders should be attuned to the notion that effecting 
real change in physical readiness across the force requires cultural change. Publishing a new 
                                                 
17 Present-day examples include: Mission: Readiness, Council for a Strong America, 
https://www.strongnation.org/missionreadiness (accessed 10 August 2018); “Citadel-led study reveals threat to U.S. 
military readiness due to unfit recruits,” https://today.citadel.edu/citadel-led-study-reveals-threat-to-u-s-military-
readiness-due-to-unfit-recruits/ (accessed 10 August 2018); and “Unfit to Serve,” 
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system of exercises is not enough. Nor is scientific reasoning on physiological grounds alone. 
People must be convinced to adopt new or modified definitions of fitness and to realign their 
values and beliefs accordingly. Such a task is never easy because so many different factors are 
bound up in a physical culture, ranging from gender norms and professional identity to body 
image and conceptions of citizenship. 
  Writing in 1892 during the dawning years of the Army’s systematic training-rooted 
physical culture, Captain James Pilcher observed that the necessity for “individual action has 
again arisen.” Pilcher posited a historical pendulum action of sorts. Where “individual strength 
and personal prowess” had been crucial characteristics for a warrior in the “days of Lysander and 
Scylla,” gunpowder later “dethroned individuality in combat” and gave way to the methods of 
“hurling great masses of men against the enemy.” Yet according to Pilcher, cutting-edge 
technological advances in his day denied soldiers “elbow-touch” encouragement and necessitated 
dispersion and individual action. “Duelling, although on a modified and vastly extended scale,” 
he wrote, “has once more taken the chief place in the machinery of war.” These new 
developments rendered more than ever the “culture of the soldier’s physique … indispensable.”18 
Pilcher, like all his peers who first advanced the cause of systematic training in the Army, 
believed he could enhance human performance to a degree never before known by applying 
science, rational exercise, and a modern, detailed knowledge of the body. Pilcher’s generation 
inaugurated the Army’s body-sculpting movement that continues today. Their efforts and the 
efforts of those who followed were influenced by more than a simple “detailed knowledge,” 
however. Broad and shifting cultural, political, scientific, technological, social, and military 
contexts both informed and constrained the imaginations of these advocates, as they still do. War 
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is an intensely physical activity. Participation in ground combat is perhaps man’s supreme test of 
physical stamina, mental toughness, and character. Despite the promises of the most ardent 
technophiles, technology has not changed these fundamental facts. Nor is it likely to do so in the 
future. Where there is war, there will be a need for strong bodies to prosecute it. Much is bound 
up in those bodies—interleaved mental, spiritual, moral, and physical characteristics. How might 
those bodies be best sculpted in pursuit of virtue, victory, and civic need? Answering these 
questions will remain a process fraught by and freighted with layers of meaning that transcend 
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